Sudan: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (26 February), the Security Council is expected to receive the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023 followed by closed consultations. Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu is expected to brief in the open chamber, while Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in consultations.
Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Sudan, where almost two-thirds of the country’s 47.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 12.4 million people have been displaced during the conflict, which started in April 2023, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Nearly 25 million people are suffering from acute food insecurity, with famine confirmed in North Darfur and eastern Nuba Mountains and expected to spread in the coming months, according to OCHA. With the healthcare system collapsing, diseases such as cholera, dengue fever, and malaria are also spreading. High levels of gender-based violence have also been a feature of the conflict.
Wosornu and several Council members may reiterate the critical need to ensure full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and highlight impediments to such access. Some members may be interested in learning about OCHA’s recent engagement with parties to the conflict, including with respect to opening humanitarian access routes and establishing humanitarian hubs. In this regard, Wosornu and Council members may welcome the 17 February decision of the Sudanese government to permit aid to flow through the Adre border crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for an additional three months. In an 18 February post on X (formerly Twitter), Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher called the crossing “a lifeline for millions”.
Wosornu may provide an overview of the latest developments in the country. Since launching an offensive in late September 2024, the SAF has made progress in reclaiming strategic locations in Khartoum and surrounding areas from the RSF. In recent days, the SAF has broken the RSF’s siege of El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and an important commercial and transportation centre, and retaken Al-Qutaynah city, which is located roughly 73 kilometres south of Khartoum.
Wosornu may also address how the recent conflict dynamics have affected the humanitarian situation in the country and what can be done to address the needs of civilians more effectively. The intense fighting in and around the Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in North Darfur, which is home to approximately 500,000 people, is likely to be discussed in this regard. On 25 February, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders) announced that it was forced to halt its operations in the Zamzam camp, saying that the current escalation of attacks and fighting is “making it impossible” for MSF to continue providing medical assistance in “such dangerous conditions”, notwithstanding the “widespread starvation and immense humanitarian needs” in the IDP camp. Humanitarian and security challenges in other parts of North Darfur, South Kordofan state, White Nile state, and the area around Khartoum may also be discussed at tomorrow’s meeting.
Given the growing severity of the humanitarian crisis, Wosornu may appeal to member states to support the 2025 Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan and the 2025 Sudan Emergency Regional Refugee Response Plan, which are seeking $4.2 billion and $1.8 billion, respectively.
At the briefing, Wosornu and several Council members may reiterate messages from previous Council meetings on Sudan, including the call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the need for the parties to respect international humanitarian law, and the importance of addressing the difficult humanitarian situation.
During the closed consultations, Lamamra is expected to update Council members on his efforts to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. In this regard, he may elaborate on his interactions in recent months with the SAF, the RSF, and key regional actors. Between 22 and 24 December 2024, Lamamra met in Port Sudan with senior Sudanese officials, including SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to discuss UN-led peace efforts. During his visit, he also engaged with senior diplomats from various countries to discuss regional and international support for the peace process. On 25 December 2024, Lamamra travelled to Addis Ababa, where he met with a delegation from the RSF. The discussions focused on the implementation of the recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan contained in the Secretary-General’s 21 October 2024 report. Among other things, the report proposed that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the “Declaration Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. Lamamra may also provide details about his discussions with the African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan—which is tasked with helping to create a process to restore peace, constitutional order and stability in Sudan—and other key regional actors on the sidelines of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in mid-February.
Lamamra may also discuss the implications of the decision by the RSF to establish a parallel government in the territories it controls in Sudan, based on a political charter that it signed in Nairobi on 22 February with affiliated armed groups and other political actors. At tomorrow’s meeting, some Council members are likely to echo the concerns of Secretary-General António Guterres on this issue, which were outlined in a 24 February statement from his spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric. In the statement, Guterres expressed deep concern about the political charter, maintaining that it constitutes a “further escalation in the conflict…[that] deepens the fragmentation of the country and risks further entrenching the crisis”. He further asserted that preserving Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity “remains key for a sustainable resolution of the conflict and the long-term stability of the country and the wider region”. At the time of writing, it appears that members may be interested in pursuing a press statement regarding the political charter.
The Sudanese government has criticised Kenya for hosting an RSF meeting on 18 February and the subsequent signing ceremony on 22 February. Critics have suggested that the Kenyan government’s decision to provide a venue for the RSF may have been influenced by a $1.5 billion loan agreement that it is expected to receive from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has reportedly provided military support to the RSF during the conflict.
The briefers may urge the Security Council to take action to promote the protection of civilians in Sudan. On 18 November 2024, the Council voted on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in the country that was authored by the UK and Sierra Leone. That draft text demanded that the SAF and the RSF honour and fully implement their commitments under the Jeddah Declaration. Russia vetoed the draft resolution, citing concerns about undermining Sudan’s sovereignty. (For more information, see our 17 November 2024 What’s in Blue story.) No concrete action has materialised thus far to pursue another formal outcome aimed at protecting civilians in Sudan.
