What's In Blue

Posted Thu 16 Jan 2025
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Libya: Vote to Renew Sanctions Measures*

This afternoon (16 January), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. The draft text in blue also establishes a new listing criterion and contains new provisions concerning the arms embargo and assets freeze measures imposed by resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011 and modified by subsequent resolutions.

The UK, the penholder on Libya, authored the draft text.

Background

Through resolution 2146, the Council authorised member states to inspect on the high seas vessels designated by the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee for facilitating the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. Most recently, resolution 2701 of 19 October 2023 renewed the authorisation related to the illicit export of petroleum until 1 February and extended the PoE’s mandate until 15 February.

On 5 December 2024, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee received a briefing from the PoE on its final report, which was transmitted to the Security Council on 13 December 2024. The report, which was not yet publicly available at the time of writing, apparently identified an increase in the illicit smuggling of diesel fuel in and from Libya and recommended the establishment of a new designation criterion related to such activity.

Additionally, as requested by resolution 2701, the report made recommendations on possible actions that the Committee could take to accommodate a request by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA)—the country’s sovereign wealth fund—to reinvest its frozen assets, which the LIA says have depreciated under the assets freeze. Among other measures, the PoE apparently recommended that the Committee consider allowing the LIA to invest its cash reserves that are currently held by a European financial institution in low-risk time deposits in the same jurisdiction, and to reinvest its cash reserves currently held by investment fund managers in fixed-income instruments. In both instances, the PoE recommended certain conditions for reinvestment, including that relevant member states notify the Committee in advance, and that the accrued interest on the investments remains frozen.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

While Council members apparently agreed on the importance of renewing the petroleum-related sanctions measures and the PoE’s mandate, it seems that discussion about other provisions in the draft resolution were difficult. The UK circulated an initial draft of the text to Council members on 23 December 2024 and convened one round of negotiations on 3 January. After receiving comments from Council members, the penholder circulated a first and second revised draft on 7 January and 8 January, respectively. The penholder then placed a third revised draft under silence procedure until Monday (13 January), which was broken by China, Russia, and the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana). A fourth revised draft was placed under silence procedure until Tuesday (January 14), which was broken by those same members, as well as Pakistan. The UK subsequently placed a fifth revised draft under silence procedure until yesterday (January 15), which Russia broke. Finally, the penholder placed a sixth revised draft directly in blue, without an additional silence procedure.

The draft resolution in blue extends the authorisations and measures related to the illicit export of petroleum until 1 May 2026 and the PoE’s mandate until 15 May 2026. Additionally, based on the PoE’s findings and recommendation regarding the smuggling of diesel fuel, the draft resolution establishes a new listing criterion, deciding that the sanctions measures shall apply to individuals and entities determined to have provided support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum in Libya. While the exact scope and parameters of this listing criterion were apparently debated by some Council members, it seems that the substance of these new provisions was not particularly contentious. Other issues elicited more extensive deliberations, however.

One difficult topic of discussion pertained to the assets freeze. As was the case during the negotiations on resolution 2701, some members wanted to accommodate the LIA’s request to allow the fund to reinvest its frozen assets, while others—primarily Western members—were more reticent in light of the LIA’s management challenges and Libya’s unstable political environment. The UK’s initial draft resolution apparently included new operative paragraphs taking note of the PoE’s report and recommendations; reaffirming the Council’s readiness to consider changes to the assets freeze based on the LIA’s investment plan and Libya’s political situation; and welcoming and encouraging further progress on the LIA’s efforts to enhance transparency and compliance. The draft did not grant the LIA’s request, however, nor incorporate any specific recommendations from the PoE towards this end, prompting some members—including China, Pakistan, Russia, and the “A3 plus”—to argue that the Council should take more concrete action in this regard.

Consequently, it seems that the third revised draft that was put under silence incorporated the PoE’s recommendation to allow the LIA to invest its cash reserves held by a European financial institution in low-risk time deposits under certain conditions. The draft also set some additional restrictions not suggested by the PoE, such as approval from the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee rather than the less stringent notification requirement proposed by the PoE. China and the “A3 plus” members apparently broke silence for this reason, requesting the deletion of those stricter conditions, as well as the incorporation of the PoE’s other recommendation to allow the LIA to invest its cash reserves held by investment fund managers in fixed-income instruments. The subsequent draft retained the same restrictions but included language expressing the Council’s intention to consider permitting reinvestment in fixed-income instruments pending the successful reinvestment in time deposits. China and the “A3 plus” members broke silence on this language too, however, joined this time by Pakistan. In an apparent compromise, the final draft resolution in blue allows reinvestment in fixed-income instruments under the same conditions as previously stipulated for investment in time deposits. It additionally requests the PoE to assess the effect and performance of the investments in its future annual final reports.

New language on the arms embargo is also included in the draft resolution in blue. It contains a new operative paragraph that exempts military aircraft or naval vessels that are temporarily introduced into Libya by a member state solely for the purpose of facilitating activities otherwise exempted or not covered by the embargo, including humanitarian assistance. While it seems that Council members largely agreed on the intention of this proposal, positions diverged on its interpretation. Some members—including the US—apparently maintained that the provision would establish a new exemption, while Russia argued that it was simply clarifying existing rules. Russia broke silence on the third, fourth, and fifth revised drafts requesting edits reflecting its position. Consequently, while it seems that prior drafts contained language “deciding” that the arms embargo “shall not” apply to the abovementioned items, the draft resolution in blue “asserts” that it “is not to be” applied. Council members discussed but were unable to agree on this same issue during negotiations on resolution 2701, which took place in the aftermath of Hurricane Daniel, when the PoE identified the entry of foreign naval vessels into Libya to deliver humanitarian aid as violations of the embargo.

The draft resolution in blue also establishes a new exemption to the arms embargo. It decides that the embargo shall not apply to technical assistance or training by member states to Libyan security forces intended solely to promote the process of reunification of Libyan military and security institutions, as notified in advance to the Committee. It seems that this provision aimed to accommodate a request by Libyan Presidential Council President Mohamed al-Menfi  in an 18 September 2024 letter to the Security Council. In that letter, Menfi asked the Council to amend the 1970 Libya sanctions regime to facilitate coordination and information-sharing among Libyan security forces and strengthen Libya’s counterterrorism and border security capabilities through cooperation with other countries.

Another debated issue was the sharing of Committee correspondence with Libya. It seems that the “A3 plus” members, supported by other members such as Pakistan, proposed language that would require the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee to copy Libya on all outgoing communications. Other members opposed this measure, arguing that it would compromise the confidentiality of the Committee’s work. In an attempted compromise, the fourth revised draft apparently contained language directing the Chair of the Committee to inform the Permanent Mission of Libya to the UN of the final outcome of the Committee’s consideration of exemption requests and notifications, “without setting a precedent”. Despite this language, it seems that Pakistan and the “A3 plus” members still broke silence on that draft, maintaining that Libya should remain informed at every stage of the Committee’s consideration. The draft resolution in blue does not accommodate this request, however, retaining the previous draft’s language on this issue.

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**Post-script: On 16 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2769, renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 May 2026 and the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 May 2026. The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Russia).

In its explanation of vote, Russia regretted that it was not possible to “fully work out” the language exempting from the arms embargo the use of military assets to deliver humanitarian aid. It asserted that such activity “does not hinder sanctions in any way” and that therefore it “does not make any sense by definition” to exempt this means of delivery from the sanctions regime.

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