Democratic Republic of the Congo: Closed Consultations
This afternoon (15 January), Security Council members will hold closed consultations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Bintou Keita is expected to brief via videoconference (VTC).
France, the penholder on the DRC, requested the meeting after the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) circulated a white note to Council members on 9 January describing recent developments in eastern DRC. The security situation in the area has continued to deteriorate despite the August 2024 ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda as part of an ongoing regional initiative facilitated by Angola known as the Luanda process. France’s request for the meeting was apparently prompted by the recent offensive by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group in North Kivu province, the epicentre of the conflict in eastern DRC. The group has expanded its control in the Masisi territory, capturing its administrative capital, Masisi centre, which is considered militarily strategic. According to the white note, the recent offensive by the M23 has led to the deaths of at least seven civilians and the displacement of 200,000 people.
This latest escalation in fighting has unfolded following the postponement of a face-to-face meeting between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda on 15 December 2024. On that day, a press release from Angola’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the talks were postponed at the last minute at the request of one party. The press release also highlighted that the finalisation of a peace agreement between the two countries had been delayed due to the ongoing issue of negotiations with the M23. On 17 December 2024, the DRC sent a letter to the Security Council accusing Rwanda of causing the delay by insisting on direct negotiations with the M23 as a precondition. The DRC clarified in its letter that it has no objections to the participation of the M23 in the Nairobi process, another regional initiative under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta.
Rwanda rejected the DRC’s assertion in a 19 December letter to the Council that it had inserted the M23 issue into the Luanda process. It claimed that the Angolan facilitator had included it in the initial draft agreement presented to both the DRC and Rwanda in August 2024. Rwanda further clarified that an M23 delegation went to Luanda between 31 August and 3 September 2024 at the invitation of the facilitator to present the group’s political grievances. Rwanda noted that following this, the M23 issue became a regular subject of discussion and outcomes in subsequent ministerial meetings held within the framework of the Luanda process.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing diplomatic disagreements between the DRC and Rwanda, the M23 continued to expand its control over several additional areas in North Kivu, according to the white note. However, the Alliance Fleuve Congo—a political-military coalition of armed groups, of which M23 is a major component—accused Kinshasa and its allied militias of escalating the conflict in an 8 January statement. The white note confirmed the resumption of airstrikes by the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) targeting M23 positions and referred to threats by the M23 to attack airports in retaliation, along with its accusations against Congolese authorities of using data obtained from MONUSCO drones. According to the white note, the mission has recorded instances of “jamming” and “spoofing” affecting Global Positioning Systems (GPS) in certain areas of North Kivu, including Goma, the provincial capital. The Secretary-General’s latest report on MONUSCO, dated 29 November 2024, highlighted the effects of these activities in undermining MONUSCO’s ability to carry out its mandate. This prompted Council members to express strong concerns about the issue through resolution 2765 of 20 December 2024, which most recently renewed MONUSCO’s mandate. (For more information, see our 20 December 2024 What’s In Blue story.)
The escalation of the conflict has elicited a strong reaction from Angolan President João Lourenço. In a 7 January statement, he condemned the takeover of territory in Masisi by the M23 as a “flagrant and unacceptable violation” of the August 2024 ceasefire. He also emphasised the negative impact of this action on efforts to pacify the situation in eastern DRC and expressed deep concern over the “illegal occupation of territory”, which he said violates the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the principles enshrined in the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act and the UN Charter. There has been a strong response from Kigali to Angola’s statement, particularly the reference to the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a 9 January press briefing, Kagame said that: “[w]herever there were meetings to discuss how to end this problem, Rwanda was present”. He implicitly criticised the process by noting that “being there and not being there amounts to the same thing; it doesn’t address the problem”. Kagame added that “the leaders of those processes holding people’s hands is not an end in itself”, underscoring the need to address the root causes of the crisis.
Nevertheless, Angola’s statement was echoed by other actors , such as the European Union (EU), which in a 6 January statement condemned the “occupation” of Masisi and its surrounding areas by the M23 and expressed its readiness to “consider new restrictive measures against those responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC”. The US and France issued similar statements on 6 and 8 January, respectively. The US statement condemns the violation of the ceasefire by “the Rwanda-backed, US and UN-sanctioned M23 armed group” and reiterates the call for Rwanda “to immediately withdraw” all Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) personnel and equipment from the DRC. The French statement also calls for “the withdrawal of Rwandan troops” from the DRC but makes similar calls for the implementation of the plan agreed as part of the Luanda process to neutralise the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
France apparently circulated a draft press statement to Council members on Monday (13 January) as a possible outcome of today’s consultations. It seems that the draft text urges the M23 to cease its territorial expansion and the establishment of parallel administrations and calls on all parties to adhere to the ceasefire. It also apparently expresses concern regarding the reported presence of the RDF in eastern DRC, arguing that this is inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. Council members were expected to provide comments on the draft text by yesterday afternoon (14 January).
As in past negotiations on Council products on the DRC, the reference to Rwanda could complicate discussions on the draft press statement. The role of external forces and sophisticated weaponry in eastern DRC was the most contentious issue during the MONUSCO mandate renewal negotiations in December 2024. The US, supported by several other Council members, sought to explicitly condemn Rwanda for its involvement in the conflict, citing past reports from the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee that corroborated this role. At today’s meeting, some of these members may refer to the mid-term report submitted by the Group of Experts on 27 December 2024, which provides further information on the situation in eastern DRC. Although France would prefer to agree on the draft press statement ahead of today’s meeting, this may not be possible because of the stark divisions on this issue.
This meeting presents the first opportunity for the Council’s five new elected members—Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia—to voice their positions on the situation in eastern DRC. For instance, the EU members (Denmark and Greece) are likely to reflect Brussels’ stance, while Somalia may align itself with the rest of the “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Guyana), which previously pushed back against explicitly referencing Rwanda during the MONUSCO mandate renewal negotiations, arguing that doing so would complicate ongoing regional mediation efforts.
