Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (9 December), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including the work of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO Bintou Keita will brief the Council based on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the mission, which was published on 29 November and covers developments since 20 September. A civil society representative is also expected to brief. Angola, the DRC, and Rwanda are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
In describing the political situation in the DRC, Keita may refer to the ongoing discussions about a proposal to revise the country’s constitution, which has recently dominated the domestic political scene. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi suggested this revision in October, arguing that the existing constitution is outdated and needs to be adapted to current realities, and expressed his intention to establish a commission to draft a new constitution. However, opposition parties and civil society groups have rejected this move, apparently alleging that the president is seeking to extend his term in office and citing provisions in the existing constitution that prohibit amendments to the number and duration of presidential terms.
An expected focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the ongoing regional efforts to address the security situation in eastern DRC, which have gained momentum in recent months. On 30 July, the DRC and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement in Luanda under Angola’s auspices, which took effect on 4 August. Under the agreement, the ceasefire is to be monitored by the Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism, which was established as part of the Luanda process, a regional initiative led by Angolan President João Lourenço aimed at easing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. An enhanced version of this mechanism was launched on 5 November.
Keita may highlight the continued engagement between the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda on a peace proposal presented by Angola aimed at finding a lasting solution to the long-standing conflict in eastern DRC. These discussions have focused on how to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide—and to address what Rwanda has described as “defensive measures”. Past reports from the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee have implicated the DRC in supporting the FDLR and Rwanda in supporting the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group. Earlier this month, Council members received a mid-term report from the Group of Experts which provides additional information on this matter.
There have been some differences between the DRC and Rwanda regarding the implementation of the plan, particularly concerning the sequencing of the FDLR’s neutralisation and Rwanda’s disengagement. Concurrently, the Congolese government has continued to urge the international community to impose targeted sanctions on Rwanda for its alleged destabilising actions and has demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, reiterated this position in a 1 November letter to the Security Council (S/2024/859), urging immediate action against Rwanda. Kigali has denied the presence of its troops in eastern DRC, however, maintaining that it has only taken defensive measures to address security threats.
Eventually, experts from both countries met in Luanda on 31 October to develop a harmonised plan for the neutralisation of the FDLR and Rwanda’s disengagement. A concept of operations was subsequently approved by the foreign ministers of both countries during a 25 November meeting in Luanda. Following these developments, which were seen as a major breakthrough, media reports indicated that Lourenço intends to convene a face-to-face meeting between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda on 15 December.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Keita might mention the outcome of the East African Community (EAC) summit, held on 30 November in Tanzania. At that summit, EAC heads of state received a report from former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, the facilitator of the EAC-led regional initiative known as the Nairobi process, which aims to address the security situation in eastern DRC. Kinshasa has rejected the Nairobi process, which focuses on direct dialogue between the Congolese government and armed groups, expressing its unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the M23 and opting instead to talk directly with Rwanda under the framework of the Luanda process. Tshisekedi did not attend the EAC summit, which, among other things, emphasised the need to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes to consolidate various regional initiatives. The summit also called for the convening of a joint meeting between the EAC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which have been experiencing tensions following Kinshasa’s decision last year to expel the EAC Regional Force which had been deployed in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi process and replace it with the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC).
The security situation in eastern DRC remains fragile, although the Secretary-General’s report notes that the ceasefire between Rwandan and Congolese military forces “largely held” during the reporting period. The report describes continued clashes between the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), supported by allied militias, and the M23, resulting in the M23 expanding its control over new territories in the North Kivu province, the epicentre of the conflict in eastern DRC. These clashes have intensified in recent days, according to media reports. In a 30 November communiqué, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—a political-military coalition of armed groups, of which the M23 is a key member—reiterated its position that the ceasefire announced on 30 July does not apply to the group. The AFC continues to insist that the conflict can only be resolved through direct political dialogue with the Congolese government. Meanwhile, on 22 October, the FDLR sent a letter to Lourenço, calling for direct dialogue with the Rwandan government.
Other armed groups operating in eastern DRC, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Coopérative pour le Développement du Congo (CODECO), continue to target civilians in North Kivu and Ituri. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, 304 civilians were reportedly killed in these provinces, including 53 women and 32 children. The report also indicates that the security situation in South Kivu remains volatile following MONUSCO’s withdrawal from the province in June. It highlights the intercommunal violence in certain areas, the increasing violations by state security forces, and military operations by the Burundian armed forces targeting the RED Tabara, a Burundian dissident group operating in eastern DRC. (Burundi has kept its forces in the region based on a bilateral agreement with Kinshasa.)
Another likely focus of tomorrow’s meeting is MONUSCO’s disengagement process, agreed upon with the Congolese government and endorsed by the Security Council through resolution 2717 of 19 December 2023, which last renewed MONUSCO’s mandate. Keita may discuss the lessons learned from the mission’s withdrawal from South Kivu and the agreement reached with the Congolese authorities to regularly assess the situation in North Kivu and Ituri, the two remaining provinces where MONUSCO is operating. These assessments are expected to incorporate evolving security dynamics and the protection risks to civilians in implementing the disengagement plan. Council members also believe that the conditions have not been met yet for the mission to draw down from these provinces. Members will soon begin negotiations on renewing MONUSCO’s mandate, which is set to expire on 20 December.
Additionally, Keita is likely to update Council members about the implementation of resolution 2746 of 6 August, which authorised MONUSCO to provide logistical and operational support to SAMIDRC, deployed in eastern DRC since December 2023. During an extraordinary summit held on 20 November, the SADC extended SAMIDRC’s mandate for another year.
