Yemen: Vote on a Draft Resolution Renewing the Sanctions Regime and Closed Consultations*
Tomorrow morning (13 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 15 November 2025. (The targeted arms embargo on the Houthi rebel group established through resolution 2216 in April 2015 is open-ended.) The draft text also extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2025.
After the vote, Council members will hold their monthly meeting on Yemen in closed consultations. The anticipated briefers are UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and Head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva and Director of the Coordination Division Ramesh Rajasingham.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The short draft resolution in blue has been characterised by members as a technical rollover of the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime and the mandate of the Yemen PoE, which were most recently renewed through resolution 2707 of 14 November 2023. (The term “technical rollover” is commonly used by diplomats to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks. It traditionally denotes an extension for a shorter period than is customary, but members increasingly use the term to describe routine mandate extensions where the content is barely changed.) The draft text in blue is almost identical to resolution 2707 and contains only minor technical updates.
The UK (the penholder on Yemen) circulated a zero draft of the technical rollover text on 6 November, inviting comments until the following day (7 November). Although many members expressed support for the initial draft, two members proposed some additional language. The penholder decided not to incorporate any additions and placed the unchanged zero draft under silence procedure on 8 November, until yesterday (11 November). The text passed silence and was subsequently put in blue.
It seems that the UK chose to pursue a straightforward renewal of the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime because of the complex Council dynamics on the file in the past year. Although members remain united in their support of UN mediation efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable resolution to the conflict in Yemen, issues such as the crisis in the Red Sea have produced notable divisions. Some members, including the UK and the US, have criticised the Houthis’ destabilising actions and called for stronger measures to enforce the arms embargo on the group. Other Council members—such as Algeria, China, and Russia—emphasise that ending the conflict in Gaza is critical to resolving the crisis in the Red Sea. Some of the Council’s permanent members have exchanged recriminations during meetings on Yemen, with the US alleging that Russia is considering transferring weapons to the Houthis, and Russia accusing the UK and US of destabilising the situation in the country through their retaliatory strikes against the Houthis. (For more information, see the brief on Yemen in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Although some members apparently would have liked to see stronger language in the draft text, including in light of developments such as the ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, there was general agreement that the current climate in the Council is not conducive to new additions. When approaching the negotiations on the draft resolution, members apparently were cognisant of recent difficult Council negotiations on the renewal of sanctions regimes, including the termination of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee following a 28 March veto cast by Russia. It seems that there was also a perception that adding new language to the text would lead to counterproposals from some members that might complicate the negotiations and prompt discussions that could affect the Yemen PoE’s work.
These considerations apparently led most Council members to support a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime. The US, however, made several proposals aimed at strengthening the text, which were unpalatable to some other members. These included a provision imposing an assets freeze on the Houthis as an entity. (Currently, the assets freeze imposed under resolution 2140 of 26 February 2014 only applies to designated individuals, whereas the Houthis as an entity are only subject to an arms embargo.) Based on a recommendation contained in the PoE’s final report, dated 11 October, the US also sought the inclusion of a provision adding a sixth expert to the panel to monitor maritime activities such as smuggling. Other US proposals included language condemning the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea. Switzerland also apparently suggested some text on due process in listing and de-listing procedures referencing resolution 2744 of 19 July, which strengthened the mandate of the Focal Point for Delisting. While several members supported some of these suggestions in principle, they preferred not to open the text for any additions to facilitate consensus. The penholder therefore eventually chose not to incorporate any new suggestions in the draft resolution in blue.
Closed Consultations
Although in the past Council members have often held their monthly meeting on Yemen in closed consultations only, they have not done so since January. Tomorrow’s meeting is therefore likely to feature less scripted speeches and might facilitate a frank discussion, including on sensitive issues such as the ongoing detention by the Houthis of national UN staff and other personnel from civil society organisations. In this regard, members may seek more information from the briefers about steps taken by the UN to facilitate their release and inquire about developments regarding the reported referral of some detained staff for “criminal prosecution”.
Several members are apparently interested in receiving an update from OCHA about the programme prioritisation exercise it has undertaken with the aim of minimising the exposure of staff to risk in Houthi-controlled areas. Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya elaborated on the exercise at a 12 September Council meeting on Yemen, noting that the UN decided to provide a narrower response focused on essential life-saving and life-sustaining activities, deprioritising broader activities such as capacity-building. Tomorrow, members may inquire about the expected timeline for the finalisation of the list of activities that will be de-prioritised.
The briefers are likely to highlight the difficult humanitarian situation in the country, including the growing food insecurity. A 31 October World Bank report projected that Yemen’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to contract by one percent in 2024. This development follows a two percent decline in 2023 and is expected to exacerbate the dire conditions faced by the Yemeni people. According to the report, the conflict has pushed most Yemenis into poverty, with food insecurity reaching “historic levels”, as almost 60 percent of the population experiences inadequate access to food. It added that many households have resorted to extreme coping measures, such as child labour or engaging in high-risk work. The report highlighted, however, that reaching a durable peace agreement could spur rapid economic recovery.
Prior to the vote on the 2140 sanctions regime, Council members that are supporters of the joint pledges on climate change, peace and security—France, Guyana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and the US—plan to hold a stakeout on this issue. The statement may note that the humanitarian situation in Yemen is being compounded by climate change-related hazards, including drought and desertification, erratic rainfall patterns, and flash flooding.
Climate change-related issues may also be raised by some members at tomorrow’s closed consultations. In this regard, they might reference a 25 October meeting of the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Climate, Peace and Security, which featured a briefing by Mona Luqman, the National Coordinator for Inclusion at the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen. Among other issues, she apparently emphasised the need to prioritise community-led solutions, including those led by women, to prevent and resolve local disputes related to land, water, and natural resources. Building on this, some Council members may ask the briefers how efforts to resolve climate-related issues and to improve the economy can serve as entry points for peacebuilding in the country.
Several members may also emphasise the importance of ensuring compliance with the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime, including the arms embargo imposed on the Houthis. In this regard, the PoE’s final report says that the “scale, nature and extent of transfers of diverse military materiel and technology provided to the Houthis from external sources, including financial support and training of its combatants, is unprecedented”. The report notes that these sources include Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Iraqi armed groups, adding that “the sanctions imposed on the Houthis will be of limited impact as long as the group’s network with regional armed groups remains unaddressed”.
_____________________________________________________
Post-script: On 13 November, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2758, renewing the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime—comprising targeted financial and travel ban measures—for another year, until 15 November 2025. The resolution also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee until 15 December 2025.
Several Council members delivered explanations of vote after the adoption. The UK said that the resolution’s unanimous adoption demonstrates the continued value that the Council attaches to the 2140 regime in maintaining pressure on the Houthis. It added that the Council’s positive engagement on the Yemen file is crucial to reinvigorating the political process in the country.
The US for its part regretted that the Council did not adopt further measures to “help degrade the Houthis’ ability to continue their destabilizing and aggressive acts in Yemen and in the region”. It argued that threats from one Council member, with support from another permanent member, to veto efforts to strengthen the sanctions regime precluded discussion on any such measures. The US further argued that the Council should use all the tools in its disposal, including targeted sanctions, to address the threats posed by the Houthis, including their ongoing attacks against vessels in the Red Sea and detention of UN and other staff.
In its explanation of vote, Russia said that the choice to pursue a technical rollover of the sanctions regime is “optimal in the current circumstances”, since it helps to preserve Council unity against the backdrop of heightened regional instability. It added that Council sanctions are intended to facilitate the establishment of peace and stability and are not meant to be used as a tool to punish “inconvenient” political forces in the country. Russia also argued against “broader interpretations” of Council sanctions resolutions, emphasising that they do not provide for “the high seas inspection of vessels heading for Yemen, nor for the shipment of military supplies seized as part of such inspections to third countries”.
