Arria-formula Meeting on the Humanitarian Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures
This afternoon (25 November), Russia will convene an Arria-formula meeting on the humanitarian impact of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs). The expected briefers are Alena Douhan, UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of UCMs on the enjoyment of human rights; Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, a diplomatic think tank; and Emmanuel Tronc, Syria Mission Country Director at HEKS/EPER, a Swiss church-affiliated humanitarian organisation.
The meeting, which will begin at 3 pm EST and take place in the ECOSOC chamber, will be broadcast on UNTV. In addition to Security Council members, the meeting is open to the broader UN membership, permanent observers, UN entities, civil society organisations, and the press.
While there is no strict definition of UCMs, the term usually refers to economic measures imposed by one state or group of states to compel a policy change in another state, including through national sanctions regimes. The term itself is contentious and most often used by countries subject to UCMs, who argue that such measures are illegal under international law and have detrimental effects on the concerned countries’ humanitarian and economic conditions. Conversely, proponents argue that such measures reflect the sovereign right of countries to decide with whom to maintain economic relations and that they are a legitimate response to breaches of international norms.
UCMs are not the same as sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Article 41 of the UN Charter gives the Council authority to impose sanctions under its mandate to maintain international peace and security. Currently, there are 14 active UN sanctions regimes. To alleviate their unintended humanitarian consequences, the Council adopted resolution 2664 of 9 December 2022, establishing a standing humanitarian exemption to the asset freeze measures imposed by all UN sanctions regimes. Some countries have since incorporated the resolution’s cross-cutting carve-out into domestic legislation regulating their national regimes. Council members are currently negotiating a draft resolution extending the application of resolution 2664 to the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. While resolution 2664 applied to all other UN sanctions regimes indefinitely, it modified the 1267/1989/2253 regime for an initial two-year period.
The concept note prepared by Russia for today’s Arria-formula meeting reiterates the country’s position that UCMs are illegal under international law, arguing that they hinder humanitarian efforts by imposing financial restrictions and impeding the movement of essential goods and services. The note acknowledges that many national sanctions regimes include humanitarian exemptions. It argues that they are largely ineffective, however, due to purportedly inconsistent and complex provisions, as well as the so-called “over-compliance effect”, whereby fear of legal repercussions deters commercial entities and humanitarian actors from assisting populations in need even when permitted to do so. Against this backdrop, the concept note says that the objectives of today’s Arria-formula meeting are to “display the negative impact of [UCMs] on humanitarian activities”, highlight the “ineffectiveness of humanitarian exemptions”, and outline ways to minimise risks for humanitarian workers. It proposes the following guiding questions:
- What legal and practical difficulties do UCMs impose on humanitarian organisations and implementing partners?
- To what extent do UCMs prevent humanitarian organisations and implementing partners from providing assistance to those in need?
- How do UCMs affect the full implementation of resolution 2664?
- What additional measures can the UN and the international community take to eliminate the practice of imposing UCMs?
Several UN bodies have taken up the issue of UCMs. The General Assembly has adopted a biannual resolution titled “Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries” since 1989, and an annual resolution on “Human rights and unilateral coercive measures” since 1997. The Human Rights Council (HRC) has also regularly adopted a resolution on the topic “Human rights and unilateral coercive measures”, continuing a practice started by its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights. In 2014—when several Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia for annexing Crimea—the HRC established the mandate of a special rapporteur on the negative impact of UCMs on the enjoyment of human rights.
Subsequent events in recent years have renewed focus on the issue. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Western countries and their allies imposed additional and increasingly severe sanctions on Russia. Several Western countries also imposed harsher sanctions against Belarus for its role in the invasion, further expanding measures imposed following the authorities’ crackdown on anti-government protests after the country’s August 2020 presidential elections.
Iran has become another flashpoint in the dispute over UCMs, increasingly linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine. In 2018, the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and reimposed national sanctions on the country. In September 2023, as the restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program imposed by Security Council resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015—which endorsed the JCPOA—were due to expire, France, Germany, and the UK announced that they would retain the restrictions in their national sanctions regimes because of “Iran’s consistent and severe non-compliance with its JCPOA commitments since 2019”. More recently, in September, the US said that Iran had supplied Russia with ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine and imposed additional sanctions on Russian and Iranian entities allegedly involved in the transfer. The EU and the UK subsequently widened their own sanctions against Iran.
Other country situations are also relevant to the issue. Since 2011, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, among others, have imposed economic sanctions against Syria in response to alleged human rights violations committed by the government led by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Some of these countries have also imposed sanctions on Venezuelan individuals associated with the administration of Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, for their alleged role in corruption and human rights violations committed during protests held in the country in 2014 and 2017. In September, the US applied additional sanctions against individuals affiliated with Maduro for allegedly interfering in and overturning the results of the country’s 28 July presidential election.
There are divergent views among Council members regarding the use of UCMs, particularly between Western countries on the one hand and China, Russia, and African countries on the other. China and Russia have frequently criticised the use of UCMs, such as those imposed on Belarus, Syria, and Venezuela. In November 2020, these members—together with former elected members Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and South Africa—convened an Arria-formula meeting on the negative humanitarian and economic effects of UCMs in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March, Russia convened an Arria-formula meeting on the impact of UCMs on global counter-terrorism efforts.
At today’s meeting, Council members who are opposed to UCMs may reiterate their position that such measures are illegal under international law and primarily impact the civilian population of the affected country by impeding economic development and hindering humanitarian efforts. By contrast, Western countries may describe nationally imposed sanctions as a legitimate foreign policy tool that is designed in a targeted fashion to minimise unintended consequences on civilian populations. In this regard, some members may dispute the contention that humanitarian exemptions are ineffective, referring to the growing incorporation of resolution 2664 into national sanctions legislation to expand the scope and reduce the complexity of their exemptions.
