Ukraine Briefing
This afternoon (30 October), the Security Council will convene for a briefing under the “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” agenda item. The meeting was requested by Ukraine, with support from several Council members—including France, Japan, Malta, Slovenia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the UK, and the US—to discuss the alleged involvement of troops from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the conflict. Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia, and the Americas Miroslav Jenča is expected to brief. Ukraine and several countries from the region, as well as the DPRK, are expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Ukraine’s letter alleges that Russia intends to deploy approximately 12,000 military personnel from the DPRK to participate in combat operations within Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, the letter anticipates that DPRK troops already stationed in Russia will begin direct confrontation with Ukrainian forces by November 2024. The letter underscores that these developments represent a threat to the peace and security of Ukraine and the broader region.
The alleged deployment of DPRK troops on Russian territory comes after the DPRK and Russia signed a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” on 19 June, later ratified by the Russian Duma (parliament) on 24 October. Among other matters, the treaty provides that “in case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and [Russia]”. At a 20 June press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin clarified that the treaty does not entail a request for the DPRK to use its military capabilities in the Ukraine conflict, since the hostilities began before the “Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics…became part of Russia”.
Since the treaty’s signing, the DPRK and Russia have bolstered ties in several different areas. According to media reports, independent groups have continued to document evidence indicating that the DPRK is supplying missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. ROK’s National Intelligence Service estimates that DPRK has provided Russia with missiles, anti-tank rockets, and over 8 million rounds of ammunition—amounting to over 13,000 containers—on approximately 70 occasions since August 2023. On 6 January, the US, together with 49 other member states and the High Representative of the EU, issued a joint statement condemning the export of ballistic missiles to Russia by the DPRK, and contending that these arms transfers contravene several Council resolutions.
On 28 June, France, Japan, the ROK, the UK, and the US convened the first Security Council meeting specifically addressing the “unlawful arms transfers from the DPRK” under the “Non-proliferation/DPRK” agenda item. (For background information, see our 27 June What’s in Blue story.)
On 8 October, ROK Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyuan reportedly told ROK politicians that media reports indicating that DPRK military officers had been killed in a Ukrainian missile strike near Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region were “highly likely” to be true. Later, on 18 October, ROK’s National Intelligence Service issued a press statement accusing the DPRK of sending approximately 1,500 special forces to Russia for training, with the intent of deploying them to the frontlines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian intelligence estimates the number of DPRK troops preparing to join Russian forces to be significantly higher, placing it at approximately 10,000. On 23 October, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters “there is evidence that there are DPRK troops in Russia”, describing the situation as “very, very serious”.
During a press conference held as part of the recent BRICS summit, which took place in Kazan from 22 to 24 October, Putin neither confirmed nor denied that DPRK troops were in Russia.
On 28 October, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced that some DPRK military units have been deployed to the Kursk region in Russia, where Ukrainian troops launched a cross-border offensive in early August. Rutte described the deployment as a “significant escalation” and a “dangerous expansion” of the conflict, with potential reverberations extending to both Europe and the Pacific.
In response, Kyiv has intensified calls for increased military support and authorisation to use Western-supplied long-range missiles to strike military targets within Russian territory—a step that Kyiv’s allies have been reluctant to approve. However, on 28 October, the Pentagon said that it would not impose new limits on Ukraine’s use of US weapons if the DPRK joined the war, according to Reuters. Furthermore, on 23 October, US National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby said that any DPRK troops fighting in the war would be “fair targets” for Ukrainian attacks.
ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol expressed deep concern, describing the situation as a “serious security threat” to his country and the international community and committing to mobilising “all available means” in response. According to media reports, ROK has indicated that it may consider supplying weapons to Ukraine should DPRK troops join Russia’s war efforts. At the Security Council’s 21 October briefing on Ukraine, ROK said that it will respond to any actions that threaten its security, emphasising that its “prudent and measured” response will hinge on the actions of Pyongyang and Moscow.
During a phone conversation with Yoon on 29 October, Zelenskyy characterised the presence of DPRK troops in Ukraine as an “internationalisation of the war and its expansion” beyond the immediate borders of Russia and Ukraine. The two leaders agreed to enhance intelligence and expertise sharing and to strengthen communication at all levels in order to “develop an action strategy and a list of countermeasures in response to the escalation”.
At today’s briefing, Jenca is likely to reiterate the UN’s position that any relationship that any country has with the DPRK, including Russia, “must entirely abide by the relevant Security Council sanctions”. Several Council members are expected to echo this message, emphasising that any military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia must abide by international law and relevant Council resolutions.
Some members are likely to stress the seriousness of the alleged deployment of DPRK troops to Russia’s Kursk region. These members may argue that such a development constitutes a significant escalation of the conflict, with the potential to destabilise the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. They might maintain that it risks heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which have already escalated markedly in recent months. In this regard, several members may emphasise that the risk of escalation highlights the urgent need for the parties involved to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Council members may also argue that the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia is a violation of Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006 imposed sanctions on the DPRK for its nuclear and ballistic missiles programme and established a sanctions committee to oversee its implementation. It decided that the DPRK must cease the export of specific weapons, a provision later expanded by resolution 2270 of 2 March 2016 to include exports that “support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another member state outside the DPRK”. Resolution 2270 also prohibits states from engaging in the “hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training”.
Several Council members have criticised Russia for its 28 March veto on a draft resolution (S/2024/255) aimed at extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee (All other members—except China, which abstained—voted in favour of the text.) In this regard, some of these members may welcome the recent establishment of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), a mechanism composed of several countries—including Council members France, Japan, the ROK, the UK, and the US—tasked with monitoring and reporting violations and evasions of the sanction measures on the DPRK outlined in relevant Security Council resolutions.
At today’s meeting, Russia is expected to claim that its cooperation with the DPRK fully complies with international law. During a press briefing on 23 October, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova sought to downplay the ROK’s concerns, suggesting that accusations directed at the DPRK and Russia are intended to justify an intensification of trilateral cooperation among the ROK, Ukraine, and NATO, especially regarding the supply of lethal weapons. Zakharova urged the ROK to “show some prudence and common sense”, warning that Russia would deliver a “tough response to any actions that could threaten its security, wherever they may be”.
On Thursday morning (31 October), the Security Council will hold a briefing on Ukraine under the “Threats to international peace and security” agenda item. Russia requested the meeting to discuss the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine and the impact of that on the prospects for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Adedeji Ebo is expected to brief. Ukraine is not expected to participate in the meeting.