What's In Blue

Posted Tue 29 Oct 2024
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Kosovo Briefing

Tomorrow morning (30 October), the Security Council will convene for its second regular briefing this year on the situation in Kosovo. Special Representative and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Caroline Ziadeh is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNMIK, which was issued on 14 October and covers developments from 16 March to 15 September. Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Đurić will participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, while Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of Kosovo Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz is expected to participate under rule 39.

Ziadeh is likely to highlight key political and security developments in Kosovo during the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report. She may note that little progress was made in the implementation of European Union (EU)-facilitated agreements between Belgrade and Pristina in that timeframe.

On 26 June, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell Fontelles extended an invitation to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti to attend a high-level trilateral meeting in Brussels as part of the EU-facilitated dialogue. The meeting did not take place, however; Borrell instead held separate bilateral discussions with each leader that day. During a press briefing on 26 June, Borrell indicated that Kurti had outlined three conditions for participating in the trilateral meeting: the formalisation of the Ohrid Agreement with both parties’ signatures; the retraction of a letter from former Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić to the EU, which stated that the Ohrid Agreement was “acceptable solely within a context that does not pertain to the de facto and de jure recognition of Kosovo”; and the extradition of Milan Radoičić, former vice president of Serbian List (the predominant political party in the Serb-majority northern Kosovo), along with his affiliates, to Kosovo’s judicial authorities. (For background information on the Ohrid Agreement and Radoičić’s indictment, see the brief on Kosovo in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

Borrell stated that Vučić has expressed a willingness to engage in the trilateral meeting but was “not ready to fully meet Kurti’s conditions, citing constitutional constraints”. He also noted Vučić’s willingness to “explore options” regarding Brnabić’s letter and formalising the Ohrid Agreement “in line with past dialogue practices”.

On 2 July, Miroslav Lajčák, the EU’s Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues, hosted a meeting in Brussels with chief negotiators from Belgrade and Pristina to discuss the finalisation of the sequencing plan for the Implementation Annex of the Ohrid Agreement. The talks concluded without any progress, however.

The Secretary-General’s UNMIK report states that, as the EU-facilitated dialogue “continued to stagnate”, Kosovo authorities “undertook a series of actions that have affected the day-to-day lives of Kosovo Serbs and other non-majority communities”. While Pristina claimed that these actions were intended to enforce the rule of law and were not specifically aimed at Kosovo Serbs, the report notes that “each time the Kosovo authorities implemented a measure that was not consulted and agreed upon with Kosovo Serb representatives and in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, many Kosovo Serbs perceived it as antagonistic”.

The report observes, for example, that a regulation of the Central Bank of Kosovo determining the euro as the only legal currency for cash transactions “continued to affect the economic and social rights of Kosovo Serbs and other non-majority communities, especially Kosovo Roma”. On 15 May, the EU announced that Belgrade and Pristina had failed to reach a compromise on this issue during a trilateral meeting. (For background on the regulation, see our 7 February What’s in Blue story.)

Later in May, Kosovo police conducted operations targeting banking facilities in northern Kosovo. On 20 May, they closed and confiscated six offices of the Serbian Postal Savings Bank in four northern municipalities, alleging that these institutions were “operating illegally” and asserting that the operation aimed to “establish law and order”. According to the Secretary-General’s report, affected residents are now required to cross the administrative boundary line to access their salaries, pensions, and social assistance provided by the Serbian government. On 21 May, the EU called the police operation “escalatory” and contradictory to the “spirit of normalisation”. On 31 May, Ziadeh stressed the importance of avoiding “unilateral actions that could increase tensions, jeopardize stability and undermine trust among communities”.

Kosovo authorities also closed several Serbian-financed institutions. On 5 August, Kosovo police shut down all nine offices of Serbia’s national postal service in northern Kosovo, citing suspicions of inadequate licensing and registration. According to the UNMIK report, these closures “cut key financial and postal services to residents”, affecting money transfers, payments for Serbian institutions such as education and healthcare, utility bill distribution, and social benefit payment disbursements. The move drew criticism from several international interlocutors, including the EUthe UN, and the US.

On 30 August, Kosovo police closed the four remaining municipal offices and a regional district office run by the Serbian government in northern Kosovo. The police described the municipal offices as “illegal structures” operating “in violation of the constitutional legal order”. These actions were again met with international criticism. The EU stressed that the operation put “the fragile security situation on the ground at risk” and noted that the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was deployed to monitor the conduct of the operation. Similarly, the US expressed disappointment with the “uncoordinated actions” taken by Kosovo authorities and cautioned that such actions “put Kosovan citizens and [Kosovo Force] soldiers at greater risk, unnecessarily escalate regional tensions, and undermine Kosovo’s reputation as a reliable international partner”. Ziadeh highlighted that such actions “undermine efforts to consolidate trust between different communities and to maintain security, stability and peace”. She may reiterate these messages at tomorrow’s meeting.

Tomorrow, several Council members are likely to emphasise the need for the parties to prioritise de-escalation, refrain from unilateral measures, and re-engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue aimed at normalising the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.

Deep divisions among the Security Council’s permanent members have continued to colour the Council’s consideration of the Kosovo file. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) recognise Kosovo’s independence and tend to be supportive of Pristina, while China and Russia do not recognise its independence and strongly support Belgrade’s position, calling for full respect for Serbia’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

Most Council members support the EU-facilitated dialogue. Russia, however, has voiced criticism of the Ohrid Agreement and its Implementation Annex. During a 22 April Council briefing on Kosovo, Russia accused the EU and the US of pressuring Belgrade to de facto recognise Kosovo, alleging that they ignored the Brussels Agreements of 2013 and 2015 in favour of imposing the “oral, unsigned” Ohrid Agreement and Implementation Annex. Earlier, at an 8 February Council’s briefing, Russia described this approach as indicative of the EU’s “intractability and complete failure” as a mediator between Belgrade and Pristina.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are expected to underscore the importance of UNMIK’s work in fostering trust between communities, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and supporting progress towards normalising the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina. However, some members may highlight that the situation in Kosovo has changed considerably since UNMIK’s establishment in 1999. These members are expected to call for a strategic review of the mission, with some urging the Council to establish an end-date for the mission through a sunset clause. In contrast, Russia is likely to oppose any changes to UNMIK’s mandate, staffing, or budget, arguing that the mission remains essential.

 

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