Great Lakes Region: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (8 October), the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the Great Lakes region. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest semi-annual report on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the region (PSC-F), which was published on 30 September and covers the period from 16 March to 15 September. A civil society representative will also brief the Council. Several regional countries may participate in tomorrow’s meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
The security situation in eastern DRC is an expected focus of Xia’s briefing. Fighting continues between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group in the North Kivu province, despite a 30 July ceasefire signed between the DRC and Rwanda under the Angola-facilitated Luanda process. (For more information, see our 27 September What’s in Blue story.) Xia may also refer to ongoing regional tensions, including the mutual recriminations between the DRC and Rwanda over alleged support for their proxies in the conflict. The DRC accuses Rwanda of supporting the M23, while Rwanda blames the DRC of supporting the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda. The Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee has corroborated these assertions in its reports.
As part of the Luanda process, the DRC and Rwanda had agreed to operationalise a plan to neutralise the FDLR, which was supposed to be followed by Rwanda easing what it has described as “defensive measures”. Nonetheless, the Congolese government continues to call on the international community to impose targeted sanctions against Rwanda for its destabilising actions and to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. The DRC’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, reiterated this message in a 4 October interview with the BBC. Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Olivier Nduhungirehe told Reuters on 5 October that Wagner refused to sign the plan to neutralise the FDLR during their latest meeting in Luanda on 14 September. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame were in Paris to attend the Francophonie Summit on 4 and 5 October. French President Emmanuel Macron reportedly met with the two leaders separately to encourage them to continue to engage in dialogue to achieve a comprehensive settlement through the Luanda process.
The military activities of other foreign armed groups operating in eastern DRC remain a major factor in stoking regional tensions. At tomorrow’s meeting, Xia may describe the series of attacks perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)─an armed group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh)─and the continued cooperation between the DRC and Uganda to fight the ADF, known as Operation Shujaa. He may also refer to clashes in the South Kivu province between the Burundi National Defense Force (FDNB) and the Résistance pour un État de Droit au Burundi (RED Tabara), a Burundian armed group active in eastern DRC. The FDNB operates in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government and supports the FARDC in its operations against the M23.
Xia may speak about his series of meetings with regional leaders aimed at promoting dialogue and supporting regional peace initiatives. Unlike the Luanda process, the regional peace initiative under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC), known as the Nairobi process, has stalled for some time. Xia may refer to his meeting with former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, the facilitator of the EAC-led Nairobi process, during which they discussed the challenges facing the process and possible ways forward.
A communiqué adopted at the end of an EAC ministerial retreat held between 6 and 8 July in Zanzibar, Tanzania, recommended convening an EAC summit to revitalise the Nairobi process in coordination with the Luanda process. The ministers also reviewed interstate relations within the community, noting the rising tensions among its members and their negative effects on the EAC integration agenda. Xia may elaborate on the outcome of the retreat, with the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda agreeing to meet within the framework of the Luanda process, which they have done several times since the retreat.
The foreign ministers of Burundi and Rwanda also agreed to meet on 31 October to address outstanding bilateral issues. The relationship between the two countries has been especially strained since Burundi decided in January to close its border with Rwanda, accusing it of supporting Burundian armed groups—an allegation Rwanda has denied.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to be interested in receiving updates on the ongoing discussions on the revitalisation of the PSC-F, in line with the decision of the 11th Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) held in Burundi in May 2023. The next ROM summit, to be hosted by Uganda this year, is expected to consider the recommendations of an independent assessment report to be submitted by the Technical Support Committee (TSC), a structure under the ROM, on the revitalisation of the PSC-F. Xia may refer to the draft action plan adopted by the TSC in this regard, which will be considered at the next ROM summit. He may also mention ongoing consultations to convene a meeting of the foreign ministers of the PSC-F signatories to review and endorse the plan before the summit.
Xia may also describe ongoing efforts to implement the UN Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, which was developed by his office. He may reference his office’s activities to promote sustainable and transparent management of natural resources, which is one of the strategy’s key priorities. During the Council’s 30 September briefing on the DRC, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Bintou Keita described how competition over exploitation and trade of natural resources has further aggravated the situation in eastern DRC. She referred to the intensified conflict between various armed groups in the Ituri province to control mining sites and the M23’s consolidation of territory in North Kivu, which has allowed the group to control coltan production. Keita added that the trade from the Rubaya area―a mining site in North Kivu estimated to supply over 15 percent of global tantalum production―is helping the M23 generate an estimated $300,000 per month. This statement appears to have attracted significant media attention, eliciting a reaction from the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—a political-military coalition of armed groups formed in December 2023 that includes the M23 as a key member—which rejected these claims in a 2 October statement.
In its midterm report submitted in December 2023, the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee recommended that the Congolese government “work with transit and destination countries of minerals originating from Rubaya, to align the supply chain with the Group’s due diligence guidelines”. The guidelines were developed in 2009 and adopted by the Council in 2010 to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict in eastern DRC through the provision of direct or indirect support to Illegal armed groups, criminal networks, or individuals or entities targeted by sanctions. In this regard, the chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu (Sierra Leone), is expected to visit the DRC and the region in November to discuss the implementation of the 1533 DRC sanctions regime.
