The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis is expected to chair the meeting, which is taking place during Greece’s Council presidency. The anticipated briefer is Acting Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator at the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) Ramiz Alakbarov.
Key Recent Developments
October’s open debate will be held one year after Israel and Hamas agreed to the US-brokered “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, which the Security Council endorsed through resolution 2803 of 17 November 2025. The first phase of the framework committed the parties to a ceasefire in Gaza, secured the release of all hostages, and established an international Board of Peace (BoP)—chaired by US President Donald Trump—as a “transitional governance administration” in the enclave. The second and third phases of the plan, which have not yet been implemented, entail Hamas’ disarmament and the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) under the oversight of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) deployed by the BoP, enabling Gaza’s reconstruction and ultimately a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood.
On 31 July, the BoP announced that Hamas had accepted a 15-point roadmap that it and the mediating countries—Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the US—had presented for implementing the outstanding stages of the Comprehensive Plan. Briefing the Security Council on 26 August (S/PV.10214), BoP High Representative for Gaza Nickolay Mladenov described Hamas’ agreement to disarm in exchange for Israeli withdrawal as a breakthrough that would establish the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon” in Gaza through sequenced steps that are “performance-based, not calendar-based”. These steps would be certified by an Implementation Verification Committee led by the BoP and the US and supported by the ISF and the other mediators.
The roadmap’s content and prospects appear unclear, however. Following a meeting between Mladenov and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 3 August, the BoP issued a statement that appeared to modify the roadmap’s sequencing in Israel’s favour. On 9 August, Netanyahu cast further doubt on his commitment to the plan, reportedly stating that “Israel is ruling out the 15-point document”. In his 26 August briefing to the Council, Mladenov noted that Israel is not a signatory to the roadmap and that the mediators had instead asked the country to reaffirm its commitments under the Comprehensive Plan and the 1999 Sharm El-Sheikh protocol. While Mladenov stated that Israel had done so, he acknowledged that “important questions” remain regarding the roadmap’s implementation.
Other aspects of the Comprehensive Plan have also stalled. The ISF has yet to deploy, and while it has continued to formalise troop pledges under the command of US Major General Jasper Jeffers—including from Morocco in July and Kosovo in September—media reports suggest that the force may field only a fraction of the roughly 20,000 personnel originally envisaged. Additionally, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)—the local governing body established by the BoP comprising Palestinian technocrats—has prepared a six-month recovery programme for Gaza but has not yet been able to enter the enclave from its temporary base in Cairo amid the current impasse. Meanwhile, the IDF retains territory beyond the “yellow line” demarcating the approximately 50 percent of Gaza that Israel was allowed to hold during the first phase of the ceasefire.
Humanitarian conditions remain dire. According to a 24 September situation report by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), citing local health authorities, 1,394 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire was announced in October 2025, bringing the total killed since October 2023 to 73,914. Despite some improvement in food security, funding and fuel shortages continue to disrupt health services, and a survey cited in the UNRWA report found that 90 percent of Gaza’s population face frequent disruptions in access to safe water. According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), restrictions on the entry of engine oil and generator parts have increased the risk of death and severe illnesses, as these supplies are essential for keeping hospital generators and water pumps running.
Another survey cited by UNRWA found that 94 percent of Gazans require shelter and household assistance. On 16 September, a war-damaged residential building collapsed in Gaza City, killing at least 20 of the approximately 100 residents sheltering there. In a statement issued the same day, Alakbarov called for urgent approvals for the entry of heavy machinery, specialised equipment, and fuel for search and rescue, and for tents and tarpaulins to reach vulnerable communities within four weeks, warning that “no one should have to risk their life simply to find a safe place to shelter”.
The situation in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, also continues to deteriorate. In his most recent quarterly briefing to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016 (S/PV.10230), held on 28 September, Alakbarov stated that 32 Palestinians, including nine children, were killed in Israeli security forces operations, armed exchanges, settler attacks, and other incidents during the reporting period from 13 June to 18 September. According to a situation report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), dated 18 September, more than 1,600 settler attacks resulting in Palestinian casualties, property damage, or both had been recorded this year as at 14 September—an average of 6.7 per day, compared with five per day in 2025. At the request of the Security Council’s five European members—Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, and the UK—the Council convened a briefing on 11 August to discuss the escalating violence in the West Bank.
The violence has occurred alongside intensifying settlement activity. In his 28 September briefing, Alakbarov said that Israeli planning authorities had advanced or approved nearly 4,570 housing units in Area C of the West Bank and 3,515 units in East Jerusalem during the reporting period. On 18 August, Israel’s housing ministry published tenders for 1,234 of the 3,401 housing units approved for a settlement in the E1 area, which covers approximately 12 square kilometres between East Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim settlement. The E1 project—which had been under consideration for decades but not implemented due to international pressure—was approved in August 2025 by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who said that it was intended to “permanently bury the idea of a Palestinian state”. In his Council briefing, Alakbarov said that the project would “effectively sever the connection between the northern and southern West Bank and further isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank”, constituting “an existential threat to the two-State solution”. The deadline for bids is 19 October, just eight days before Israel’s general elections scheduled for 27 October, and some observers have argued that the government is seeking to sign contracts before the vote to make it more difficult for a future government to cancel construction. On 28 September, however, Israel’s Attorney-General reportedly ruled that no tenders could be awarded until after the election.
Diplomatic activity has escalated in response to the E1 project. On 8 September, Canada, France, and the UK announced a ban on the import of goods from settlements and issued a joint statement criticising the project with nine other countries that either have or will introduce similar measures. In response, Israel ordered the closure of the UK’s consulate in East Jerusalem. On 22 September, Secretary-General António Guterres opened the general debate of the 81st session of the General Assembly, delivering a statement in which he criticised ceasefires in the region that had “amounted to little more than ‘lesser fires’”; condemned violence, displacement, and settlement expansion in the West Bank that is “raising the spectre of ethnic cleansing”; and stressed that “we cannot allow the two-State solution to disappear before our eyes”. On the same day, on the margins of the general debate, Guterres participated in a high-level meeting on the two-state solution convened by Canada, France, the UK, and Saudi Arabia, marking the one-year anniversary of the General Assembly’s endorsement of the New York Declaration. On 24 September, the BoP hosted a high-level briefing on the Comprehensive Plan and the status of its implementation. The following day, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee held a ministerial meeting on support for Palestinian governance and institutions.
Key Issues and Options
One year after Israel and Hamas agreed to the Comprehensive Plan in Gaza, a key immediate issue for the Security Council remains the poor implementation of the plan’s first stage, as violence and dire humanitarian conditions in the enclave persist. An important priority in this regard is to ensure that both parties abide by their commitments under the plan and fully cease hostilities, and that Israel withdraws the IDF to the agreed deployment line and allows unobstructed aid at scale.
In the medium and long terms, a central issue for the Security Council is how to facilitate implementation of the second and third stages of the Comprehensive Plan in a manner that is consistent with international law and conducive to achieving unified Palestinian governance over the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) under a two-state solution. The feasibility of the BoP’s 15-point implementation roadmap without Israel’s buy-in is uncertain, as it relies on reciprocal steps by both parties, and the compatibility of Israel’s existing obligations under the Comprehensive Plan and the Sharm El-Sheikh protocol—on which the BoP has premised the country’s compliance with the roadmap—is unclear.
In addition to Gaza, the deteriorating situation in the West Bank is another critical issue for the Council. Intensifying settler violence and settlement expansion is an increasingly acute protection and displacement crisis—especially as the E1 project advances—that is also eroding the long-term viability of a two-state solution. The deepening fiscal crisis experienced by the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a result of Israel’s withholding of tax revenue is further exacerbating these challenges.
To comprehensively address these issues and more assertively oversee the implementation of the Security Council’s decisions—including resolution 2803 that endorsed the Comprehensive Plan—Council members could consider undertaking a visiting mission to Israel and the OPT. Such a mission would allow members to assess the situation on the ground, receive field-level briefings from relevant stakeholders, and apply political and diplomatic pressure on the parties to uphold their commitments and obligations. If members are unable to achieve the consensus required to undertake an official mission, interested members could organise an informal one.
Council members could also consider adopting a product to mark the one-year anniversary of the Comprehensive Plan, either in conjunction with or independently of a visiting mission. Such a product—for instance in the form of a presidential statement—could call on the parties to implement their commitments in good faith and without delay. It could also underscore the importance of ensuring that efforts under the Comprehensive Plan are consistent with other international frameworks—including the New York Declaration, Council resolution 2334, and the July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice—and restore a credible political pathway towards the two-state solution.
In the absence of consensus on such a product, Council members as well as the broader UN membership could consider accountability and protection measures in their national capacities, including sanctioning violent settlers and banning settlement goods, building on the recent announcement by Canada, France, the UK, and other countries.
Council and Wider Dynamics
While Council members remain largely united in supporting the peace framework that the Comprehensive Plan established and resolution 2803 endorsed, they are divided over where responsibility for the current impasse lies.
At the Council’s 28 September meeting, most members reiterated that implementation cannot rest on Palestinian obligations alone, criticising continued Israeli strikes in Gaza and the country’s rejection of the 15-point roadmap. China and Russia—the two members that abstained on resolution 2803—both identified Israel’s opposition to the roadmap as the principal obstacle to progress, with Russia observing that key elements of the Comprehensive Plan remain “just on paper” a year on.
Regarding the West Bank, nearly all Council members condemned settlement expansion and warned that the E1 project would sever the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state. Many also pressed for accountability for settler violence, the release of the PA’s withheld tax revenues, and durable banking arrangements, while welcoming the PA’s reform agenda and the Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for 28 November.
The US, for its part, described Hamas’ disarmament and demobilisation as critical for implementation of the Comprehensive Plan; urged member states to support the BoP, the NCAG, and the ISF; and reiterated Trump’s opposition to Israeli annexation of the West Bank. It also objected to measures adopted by other member states targeting businesses in the territory, echoing US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s warning against “destabilizing” activity in the West Bank at this moment.
Israel’s general elections scheduled for 27 October are an additional factor shaping dynamics, as media reports indicate that the BoP does not expect any Israeli progress on the 15-point roadmap before the vote. Polls show a close race between the current coalition government led by Netanyahu and the leading opposition party headed by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. While Netanyahu’s government is considered the most right-wing in Israeli history, Eisenkot has also expressed opposition to Palestinian statehood.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 17 November 2025S/RES/2803 | This resolution endorsed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, welcoming the establishment of the BoP and authorising it to deploy the ISF to Gaza. The resolution received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). |
| 23 December 2016S/RES/2334 | This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 30 June 2026S/2026/513 | This was the Secretary-General’s 38th quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334, covering developments between 14 March and 12 June 2026. |
| Security Council Letter | |
| 15 May 2026S/2026/418 | This was a letter from the Permanent Representative of the US addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the first biannual report of the BoP, submitted pursuant to resolution 2803. |
