Syria
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, and a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
On 23 September, Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa delivered a statement at the general debate of the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly in New York. He outlined the progress Syria has made since his first address to the UN in 2025, as the country moves to post-conflict recovery with the government focused on reconstruction, rehabilitating the economy, and building international partnerships. Challenges to the transition persist, however, as ordinary Syrians continue to feel the weight of the economic crisis. On 13 September, large demonstrations reportedly erupted across Syria over rising fuel and living costs.
In his 17 September monthly briefing to the Council, Cordone said that he had held discussions with the Syrian interim authorities on preparations for “future parliamentary and presidential elections, […] in line with a new constitution”, to be implemented within the remaining three-and-a-half years of the transition. He also said that discussions have included exploring opportunities for UN electoral assistance.
On the security front, Syria continues to grapple with both exterior and interior threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 9 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited a military position on Mount Hermon, inside Syrian territory, accompanied by Defence Minister Israel Katz and senior military officials. Damascus condemned the visit and called for a return to implementation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the two countries. The escalation comes amid an expanded occupation of Syrian territory and near-daily incursions into the southern governorates of Quneitra and Daraa by the Israeli military, which intensified in December 2024 following the ouster of the former Syrian government. In his 23 September statement at the UN General Assembly, Sharaa called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory to the lines of 8 December 2024, reaffirming Damascus’ position that the Golan remains Syrian territory and its commitment to the 1974 agreement. (For more information, see the brief on the UN Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] in the Golan in our October 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
In the southern governorate of Suweida—one of the only territories of the country that remains outside of Damascus’ control—tensions have persisted between government forces and armed Druze groups. In late August and early September, clashes were reported in the governorate, resulting in a number of casualties. Some Druze leaders also continued to suggest separatist agendas in their statements. In the September briefing, Cordone called for a reinvigoration of the September 2025 Suweida roadmap agreed by Jordan, Syria, and the US, and for efforts to address issues regarding detainees and missing persons, build trust between Damascus and the Druze, and promote reconciliation between the Bedouin and Druze communities.
Syrian authorities continued efforts to resolve the issues pertaining to the previous government’s chemical weapons and nuclear programmes. During the Council’s 3 September meeting on Syria’s chemical weapons programme, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu noted significant progress by Damascus in the elimination of remnants of the chemical weapons programme and said that for the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had verified the destruction of chemical munitions from Syria, following the destruction of 42 aerial bombs. Additionally, on 9 September, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously adopted a resolution terminating the Agency’s investigations into Syria’s non-compliance, after Damascus gave the IAEA access to sites suspected to be part of the former government’s nuclear programme.
During the Council’s 17 September briefing on Syria, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher underlined the four obstacles threatening the country’s progress: continued displacement, localised insecurity, regional escalation, and landmines. He noted that while several million internally displaced Syrians and refugees have returned, 5.5 million people remain displaced, with around 800,000 in camps. Additionally, he stressed how terrorism and sporadic violence continue to threaten peace in Syria, while external tensions and supply route disruptions are impacting the country’s economy, driving up costs for essential goods and services. Fletcher asked the Council to invest in assisting Syria’s transition from humanitarian needs to reconstruction; removing obstacles standing between recovery and development; and insulating Syria from regional conflict, including by supporting its territorial integrity.
Women, Peace and Security
Briefing the Security Council at its 27 August meeting on Syria, the Country Director of Women Now for Development-Lebanon, Rola Roukbi, warned that the political transition taking shape in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime risks changing those in power without changing how power is exercised. Stressing that stability in Syria should not come at the expense of civic space, fundamental freedoms, and justice, she highlighted concerns about such issues as excessive centralisation, the absence of an effective separation of powers, transparency, accountability, and the deteriorating economic situation.
Roukbi stressed that despite the leading role of women during the conflict in documenting violations, supporting communities, and advocating for justice and accountability, women remain marginalised from decisions about Syria’s future, accounting for less than 11 percent of parliamentarians and only one member of the transitional cabinet. She called for reforming the nationality and personal status laws, establishing stronger protections from gender-based violence, and removing Syria’s reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Citing violations and abductions particularly targeting Alawite women, Roukbi stressed that all victims—before and after the regime’s fall—have an equal right to truth and justice.
Roukbi called on the Security Council and the UN to centre human rights; civic space; women’s full, equal, meaningful, and safe participation; accountability; and the rule of law in any new UN presence in Syria, and in the UN’s political engagement with the Syrian transitional authorities. She also urged the Council to continue to support independent UN human rights and accountability mechanisms and insist on rights-based institutional and security sector reform.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 3 September, three UN Human Rights Council rapporteurs urged the transitional government in Syria to suspend laws that led to “systematic dispossessions and displacement” under the prior government, calling on the authorities to “initiate a process in the People’s Assembly to review and replace them with new regulations”. In this regard the rapporteurs referred to Decree No. 66 of 2012 and Law No. 10 of 2018, stating that these laws “privileged property interests of a wealthy minority at the expense of the housing rights of families of average or modest means”.
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria (COI) delivered a statement to the UN Human Rights Council on 8 September. In the statement, the commission emphasised the “importance of ensuring that all perpetrators of grave violations are equally the subject of accountability, warning that selective justice for international crimes is not compatible with international law, and further, could renew grievances and undermine reconciliation”. While welcoming ongoing engagement with the government on human rights and transitional justice, the COI called for strengthened accountability for recent violence, including in coastal and Western Syria and in Suweida in 2025.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is ensuring that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external pressures. By maintaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members could encourage the Syrian government to make continued progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through transparent accountability and reconciliation processes.
A remaining issue regarding Syria’s unity is the situation in the southern governorate of Suweida, which remains largely out of Damascus’ control amid tensions with Druze groups.
The continued violations of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity by Israel also remains a pressing issue.
Furthermore, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) continues to pose a threat to Syrian security, despite Damascus’ enhanced counter-terrorism efforts.
The Council could consider adopting a presidential statement calling for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and for full respect for the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Such a statement could:
- welcome progress made towards Syrian unity, while also calling on progress on the Suweida political roadmap;
- welcome further cooperation with the OPCW and IAEA;
- urge Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms and meaningfully engage victims and civil society on transitional justice;
- call for sustained support towards advancing Syria’s counter-terrorism efforts, SSR, and capacity-building for Syrian security forces;
- and call for enhanced financial support for humanitarian needs and long-term recovery.
The Council could also consider encouraging the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the Syria file. The PBC’s convening role and its capacity to mobilise sustained, coordinated international support for countries navigating fragile transitions could be of significant value at this juncture. Council members, in close collaboration with Syria, could consider requesting written advice from the PBC on how best to support the country’s transition.
Council members could further continue to press for progress on an expedited agreement for the Special Envoy’s office to relocate an appropriate number of personnel to Damascus, to support the transition.
Sustaining international support for Syria’s shift from emergency humanitarian assistance to longer-term recovery remains a key issue. Council members could consider convening an informal interactive dialogue with relevant UN entities and international financial institutions—including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—to discussion options on how to address humanitarian and economic recovery needs, such as by accelerating Syria’s reintegration into international financial systems and convening a donors’ conference focused on rebuilding Syria’s economy.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. There is agreement that intercommunal tensions cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus and its decisions to delist Sharaa, Syria’s Interior Minister Anas Khattab, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list signalled unified support for Syria’s interim government and the overall transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
Members differ in their criticism of Israel’s continued attacks on Syrian territory and its military presence in the south of the country, with European members and the US tending towards more measured language, while the A3 group (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, Pakistan, and Russia are more likely to condemn Israeli actions in stronger terms. Colombia’s position on the Golan seems to have shifted after President Abelardo de la Espriella assumed office. On 10 August, the new government recognised Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan, a break from the previous government’s approach and only the second such recognition globally following the US.
On 11 September, Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ibrahim Olabi was joined by representatives of 44 other member states—including Council members Bahrain, China, Denmark, France, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia—in a press stakeout reacting to Netanyahu’s visit to Mount Hermon and the continued Israeli incursions into Syrian territory. These members affirmed the importance that international law, the UN Charter, and the 1974 agreement are fully respected and upheld, and warned that such escalations could undermine recent progress made by the Syrian government.
During the 17 September Council meeting, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the UN Danny Danon said that Israel maintains a “small security buffer” in Syrian territory as a “defensive measure” against terrorist cells operating in Syria, including Hezbollah and ISIL. Additionally, he accused Türkiye of planning to “expand its own military capabilities inside Syria and take over the country” through the presence of its troops and bases in Syrian territory, contrasting it with Israel’s smaller presence in the country. Danon further framed the Turkish military build-up in Syria as a direct threat to Israeli security. Speaking at the same meeting, Türkiye’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ahmet Yıldız rejected the Israeli claims and stressed that Türkiye’s role in Syria is positive, constructive, and conducted with the consent of the Syrian government.
Many Council members remain aligned on the importance of counter-terrorism efforts in Syria, while calling for sustained support for Syrian counter-terrorism capacity. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance against all Security Council-listed terrorist organisations, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, whose members have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces.
| Security Council Presidential Statement | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 17 September 2026S/PV.10225 | This was a meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
