Libya
Expected Council Action
In October, the Council will hold its 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Additionally, the Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of UNSMIL, which expires on 31 October.
Key Recent Developments
Since Libya’s national elections scheduled for December 2021 were indefinitely postponed, UNSMIL has been involved in efforts to address the deadlock among Libyan political stakeholders over the electoral framework and institutional fragmentation in Libya. The mission presented a political roadmap in August 2025 centred on three pillars: establishing a viable framework for presidential and legislative elections; unifying state institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues. The Structured Dialogue, which UNSMIL launched in December 2025, concluded its work on 7 June, generating nearly 600 recommendations aimed at addressing Libya’s structural challenges, strengthening and unifying state institutions, and creating conditions conducive to national elections and longer-term stability. (For background, see the brief on Libya in our August 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
As part of efforts to overcome outstanding obstacles in the electoral track, UNSMIL launched the “Smaller Convening”, a mechanism bringing together a small group of Libyan stakeholders, with its first meeting held on 29 April in Rome. The convening, also known as the “4+4”, comprises two representatives from each of Libya’s four main institutions: the Government of National Unity (GNU), the High Council of State (HCS), the House of Representatives (HoR), and the Libyan National Army (LNA).
On 30 August, participants of the Smaller Convening reached an agreement addressing two key milestones outlined in UNSMIL’s political roadmap: the reconstitution of the Board of Commissioners of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and the resolution of outstanding issues in the constitutional and legal framework governing presidential and legislative elections. The agreement also provides for adjustments to the electoral framework, including arrangements for holding presidential and legislative elections under a single executive authority, and commits the parties to work towards elections within a period not exceeding 24 months. In an 8 September press statement, Council members welcomed the 30 August agreement reached through the Smaller Convening.
On 20 September, members of the Smaller Convening held their ninth meeting, chaired by Tetteh, to follow up on implementation of the agreement they signed in Tripoli on 30 August.
In accordance with the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the HoR and the HCS are required to agree on amendments to the constitutional framework and appointments to the leadership of the electoral commission. On 14 September, the HoR endorsed the 30 August Smaller Convening agreement during a session in Benghazi chaired by Speaker Aguila Saleh. By contrast, the HSC reportedly has rejected the agreement’s outcomes, arguing that changes to the electoral framework and HNEC should be agreed through Libya’s established constitutional and institutional mechanisms. It has also expressed concern that the agreement bypassed previous HoR-HCS understandings, including those reached through the joint 6+6 Committee. (The committee was established in 2023 by the HoR and HCS to draft electoral laws to enable elections and comprises six representatives from each body.)
On 10 September, Saleh and HCS President Mohamed Takala met Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın in Ankara, where discussions focused on advancing political consensus and reviving coordination between the two institutions, including through the 6+6 Committee. The meeting also included a discussion on ways to strengthen cooperation between Türkiye and Libya.
The security situation has remained fragile, particularly in western Libya. On 3 August, armed confrontations broke out between rival groups in Zawiya and Sorman and continued into the following day. The fighting involved heavy weapons, disrupted movement along the western coastal corridor, damaged infrastructure, and resulted in civilian deaths and injuries.
The violence was followed by a series of drone attacks in the subsequent days targeting oil and electricity infrastructure in and around Zawiya, including the Zawiya oil complex and power facilities. The attacks occurred amid intensifying competition among armed groups in the city over territorial control and access to illicit economic activities, including fuel smuggling.
On 21 September, an armed group closed a valve on the Sharara-Zawiya crude oil pipeline, sharply reducing production at the Sharara field and preventing technical teams from accessing the area around the affected valves. The following day, personnel from the Petroleum Facilities Guard blocked the gates of the Zawiya refinery and other oil facilities, preventing employees and technicians from entering and disrupting ongoing operations.
In a 26 September statement, UNSMIL expressed concern over the closure of the Sharara-Zawiya oil pipeline and called on all concerned parties to safeguard Libya’s oil and energy facilities. The mission also warned that attacks against, or actions undermining, such infrastructure could constitute grounds for punitive measures under relevant Council resolutions, including resolution 2213 of 27 March 2015, which provides for sanctions against individuals and entities threatening Libya’s peace, stability, or political transition, including through attacks on state institutions or oil facilities.
Key Issues and Options
The most immediate issue for the Council in October is the renewal of UNSMIL’s mandate, which expires on 31 October. One option would be to renew the mandate for another year while retaining the mission’s core tasks and updating the text to reflect recent political and security developments. Council members could also reinforce UNSMIL’s role in supporting implementation of its political roadmap, including progress towards national elections and a unified executive authority, and request periodic updates on implementation.
A related issue is how the Council can help sustain momentum in the political process while avoiding competing or parallel tracks that could undermine UNSMIL’s mediation. One option for Council members would be to use the briefing to reiterate support for the 30 August agreement and urge the HoR, the HCS, and other relevant stakeholders to engage constructively with UNSMIL to resolve outstanding disagreements and advance the roadmap. Council members could also encourage international and regional initiatives to complement, rather than compete with, the UN-led process.
Another key issue is the fragile security environment and its potential to undermine political progress. Recent armed clashes in western Libya, drone attacks on critical infrastructure, and interference with oil facilities underscore continued armed-group competition and the vulnerability of Libya’s economic assets. One option would be to reinforce calls for the cessation of violence, progress towards the unification of military and security institutions, and the protection of oil and other critical infrastructure from political and security disputes.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role towards this end. Council members also share concerns about the fragile security situation in the country.
In the 8 September press statement, Council members described the 30 August agreement as an important step towards holding free, fair, transparent, and inclusive national elections and advancing the unification of Libya’s institutions. Council members underlined the importance of the agreement receiving support from all Libyan stakeholders and encouraged them to work towards its implementation. They also stressed the importance of further progress towards the unification of Libya’s institutions, including its military and security institutions, as well as the establishment of a unified executive authority.
The US, meanwhile, has been pursuing a separate diplomatic initiative on Libya led by Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos. Media reports have suggested that the initiative envisages a power-sharing arrangement involving GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar, son of LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar, although no agreement has yet been publicly announced. At the same time, the US has reiterated its support for UNSMIL’s political roadmap and the broader UN-led political process.
China and Russia have continued to emphasise Libya’s sovereignty and the principle of a “Libyan-led and Libyan-owned” political process. China has stressed that the UN should retain a central role in mediation and has called for UNSMIL to maintain broad engagement with Libya’s main political forces. Russia has also expressed support for UNSMIL and Tetteh’s efforts, while placing greater emphasis on existing Libyan legal and institutional frameworks. It has argued that agreements reached through the Smaller Convening would need to be validated within Libya’s legal framework and cautioned against allowing new discussion formats to supplant earlier inter-Libyan understandings. Moscow has also characterised the Structured Dialogue as playing a supporting role rather than serving as the principal basis for a settlement.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2025 S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 18 August 2026 S/PV.10209 | This was the open briefing on the situation in Libya and the work of UNSMIL. |
