Lebanon
Expected Council Action
In October, Security Council members are expected to receive their semi-annual briefing in closed consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1559. Adopted in 2004, the resolution called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, the disarmament of all militias, and the extension of government control over the whole Lebanese territory. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo is the anticipated briefer.
Council members are also likely to continue considering options for possible arrangements after the termination of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to support the continued implementation of resolution 1701, which in 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. This follows the Council’s unanimous adoption in August 2025 of resolution 2790, which extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December and directed the mission to begin an orderly drawdown and full withdrawal from that date, “and within one year”.
Key Recent Developments
On 26 June, Lebanon, Israel, and the US signed a Trilateral Framework intended to chart a way to end the latest escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, which began on 2 March shortly after the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February. During the hostilities, Israel deployed to an area of up to 10 kilometres in Lebanese territory. Despite the Trilateral Framework and subsequent follow-up negotiations, hostilities have continued in southern Lebanon.
In the Trilateral Framework, Israel and Lebanon committed to a process by which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will “restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory”. According to the framework and its security annex, the LAF would gradually assume security responsibilities for “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, following the verification by “a mutually agreed-upon third-party entity” of the absence of non-state armed groups and associated weapons and infrastructure in these areas. However, a decision on which entity, state, or states may assume this third-party function has yet to be reached.
The prospects of the US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel remain unclear. Following two rounds of talks in Rome over the summer, a further round anticipated for mid-September was postponed until October. The latest round of negotiations, which took place in August, reportedly ended without reaching agreement on key issues.
On 28 August, Council members held closed consultations on Lebanon at France’s request in order to begin considering possible arrangements following the termination of UNIFIL. The consultations were also prompted by a deterioration in conditions on the ground. In a 3 September update, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric said that while incidents decreased following the signing of the Framework Agreement, UNIFIL recorded an increase in violence in August, with the mission recording daily violations by Israel of Lebanese airspace, as well as airstrikes, ground activities, and naval operations, and extensive Israeli military presence north of the Blue Line, in violation of resolution 1701 and of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He added that UNIFIL peacekeepers had reported the consolidation and fortification of Israeli positions, the construction of new infrastructure, and other engineering works, with the presence of individuals appearing to be Israeli civilian personnel carrying out demolition and engineering activities in support of the military operations. The update noted that peacekeepers last detected Hezbollah projectiles on 21 June.
IDF military operations in southern Lebanon have continued in September, including by taking “operational control” of the Ali al‑Taher ridge, a strategic position near the city of Nabatiyeh, destroying tunnels used by Hezbollah inside the ridge, and through airstrikes and extensive demolitions affecting residential areas. In an 8 September statement, the Secretary-General condemned the “mounting civilian casualties, including women and children killed and injured in the intensifying attacks, the distress and displacement caused by the evacuation orders, and the scenes of massive destruction and devastation”. The statement said that the Secretary-General was “particularly alarmed by reported Israeli strikes affecting hospitals, healthcare workers and public institutions, as well as restrictions on humanitarian access”. Successive UN updates in September continued to report IDF activity in southern Lebanon, including the dropping of explosive-filled jerrycans within UNIFIL’s area of operations and denials of freedom of movement.
Attention is increasingly turning to arrangements for the period following UNIFIL’s termination. One possibility is the initiative for an “international coalition to support Lebanon” after the mission’s closure, announced on 25 June by French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. While French and Italian authorities have stressed that the initiative would aim to reinforce Lebanon’s sovereignty and help prevent a security vacuum in southern Lebanon, its precise contours are yet to be defined.
In parallel, the EU has advanced planning for a possible civilian-military mission aimed at advising and training the LAF and Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces. According to media reports, the proposed mission, which is not expected to deploy to southern Lebanon or take over UNIFIL’s tasks, may be established in mid-October and could focus on training and support in areas such as border and maritime security. On 1 September, Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that more than ten EU member states had expressed willingness to contribute personnel or resources to the mission.
According to media reports, on 17 September, French, Jordanian, and Lebanese authorities, as well as officials from other states including Saudi Arabia, the UK, and the US, met in Paris for talks hosted by France to assess the operational, capability, and financial requirements of the LAF ahead of a possible donor conference and to consider arrangements for the period following UNIFIL’s drawdown. Discussions reportedly included both the Franco‑Italian proposal for an international coalition and the possible EU-led mission focused on supporting the LAF.
Lebanon has shown openness both to a limited extension of UNIFIL’s mandate and to the deployment of a successor international mission. Noting that the security context in Lebanon, across the Blue Line, and in the Middle East has shifted drastically since the adoption of resolution 2790, Lebanon said in a 26 August letter to the Secretary-General that UNIFIL’s termination “requires a careful re-examination” to avoid a security vacuum. The letter adds that Lebanon believes that the options for post-UNIFIL arrangements identified in the Secretary-General’s 1 June letter may no longer reflect the current realities, while extending “UNIFIL’s current arrangement, for a limited period of time” appears as “the most practical option, in operational, logistical, and cost-efficient terms”. (For background on the Secretary-General’s options, see the brief on Lebanon in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
In his 25 September address to the General Assembly’s general debate, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam similarly stressed the importance of avoiding the vacuum that the withdrawal of UNIFIL would create in the absence of arrangements for a successor international force. While he did not directly address the possibility of an extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, he stressed that a successor force “should ensure the continuation of monitoring, reporting and liaison functions, and its role should complement the requirements for implementing the tripartite framework”.
On 25 September, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume talks on its nuclear program in seven days if the US lifted its naval blockade of Iranian ports, waived sanctions on Iranian oil sales, and observed a ceasefire that would include Lebanon. On 26 September, the US reportedly rejected Iran’s proposal.
According to a 25 September statement posted on X by Salam, in a meeting between him and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the margins of the General Assembly’s general debate, Salam stressed that Lebanon does not want to be the battleground for regional conflicts or an arena for the exchange of messages, and that relations between Lebanon and Iran are to be built on the basis of mutual respect for respective sovereignty, independence, and non-interference. He also indicated that Lebanon’s priorities are Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the cessation of its aggressions, as well as moving forward with extending the Lebanese state’s authority over its territory and ensuring the state’s sole control over weapons.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 26 August, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed alarm at the increasing civilian toll, mass displacement, and widespread destruction as a result of Israeli military operations in Lebanon. These operations, which have intensified since 2 March, have included airstrikes, shelling, and the use of explosive weapons in heavily populated parts of the country, and have led to the deaths of 4,300 people. The committee also expressed deep alarm at public statements by “Israeli officials threatening to impose on Lebanon the same level of destruction as that inflicted in Gaza”. CERD further referenced a statement by Israel’s Minister of Defence characterising Shia inhabitants in 24 villages in the south of Lebanon as “enemies in justifying the complete destruction of their homes”. In addition, the committee’s experts registered their deep concern over “rockets fired by Hezbollah into populated areas in Israel” that have resulted in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.
Key Issues and Options
Supporting the full implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1701 remains a key priority for the Security Council. The Council has been largely sidelined in discussions on how to facilitate an end to the crisis in Lebanon. The Trilateral Framework does not mention the Security Council, its resolutions, nor any role for UNIFIL or a successor UN uniformed presence. A key issue for the Council is to consider what role it will play in the future in supporting the implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1701 and in promoting peace and stability between Lebanon and Israel.
If a decision at the Security Council on post-UNIFIL arrangements continues to be delayed, the Council could consider adopting a resolution postponing, on an exceptional basis, UNIFIL’s drawdown for six months. This would allow Council members to consider appropriate options and diplomatic and security developments while avoiding a security vacuum. Among other things, the resolution could also demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and call on all parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including regarding the protection of civilians, and to fulfil their obligations under resolutions 1701 and 1559. This would include the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanese territory; the LAF, with the support of UNIFIL, to deploy throughout southern Lebanon; the government of Lebanon to continue to extend control over all Lebanese territory; and the disarmament of all militias.
To focus the Council’s attention on the need to agree on appropriate arrangements for a reconfigured presence in southern Lebanon, a group of Council members, such as the ten elected members of the Council (E10), could organise a closed Arria-formula meeting on the consequences for civilians of a security vacuum in southern Lebanon. Members could invite representatives of the humanitarian community, as well as of Lebanese civil society, to brief.
On 29 May, the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) convened on the situation in Lebanon. In their deliberations on post-UNIFIL arrangements, Council members could refer to the recommendations put forward by UN Women as the IEG Secretariat. Recalling resolution 2594 of 2021 on peacekeeping transition, UN Women recommended that Council members request that technical gender expertise, comprehensive gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives, and consultations with women’s organisations are central to all options for a future UN presence in Lebanon after the withdrawal of UNIFIL.
The Security Council undertook a visiting mission to Lebanon and Syria from 2 to 7 December 2025. If the security conditions allow, Council members could also consider a follow-up visiting mission to the UNIFIL area of operations in southern Lebanon to have a better understanding of the situation on the ground to inform their negotiations.
Council Dynamics
Despite the eventual unanimous adoption of resolution 2790, the negotiation process highlighted sharp divisions among Council members. The US, Israel’s key ally on the Council, signalled its readiness to veto the mandate renewal if it did not contain a clear date for the end of the mission, while the other 14 members—none of whom had approached the negotiations seeking the termination of UNIFIL—argued in favour of prioritising conditions on the ground in considering the mandate rather than a specific end date for the mission. The result was a compromise that tempered US insistence on a set date for the mission’s exit, with a final, longer than usual renewal (16 months) reflecting the other members’ concern that an accelerated end of the mission could undermine the process of Lebanon achieving full control over its territory.
Most Council members are of the view that developments since the adoption of resolution 2790 and the current situation on the ground require a sustained international presence after UNIFIL’s mandate ends in December. Many members would also apparently support a temporary extension of the mission’s mandate. The US, however, seems unwilling to revisit its position on the mission’s drawdown.
Differences persist in Security Council members’ views of Hezbollah. Several Council members have accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon into a confrontation that the Lebanese population did not seek and expressed support for efforts by the Lebanese authorities to extend state authority over the whole Lebanese territory. On the other hand, Russia does not see Hezbollah as the primary problematic actor and has focused its criticism on Israel and on wider regional dynamics.
France is the penholder on Lebanon.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 28 August 2025S/RES/2790 | This resolution extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a final time until 31 December 2026 and established several functions that UNIFIL is authorised to fulfil during the drawdown and withdrawal period. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June 2026, “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL. |
| 11 August 2006S/RES/1701 | This resolution called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. It also expanded UNIFIL’s mandate. |
| 2 September 2004S/RES/1559 | This resolution urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and the extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 9 July 2026S/2026/566 | This was the most recent Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701. |
