Kosovo
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council is expected to hold its second briefing of the year on Kosovo. Special Representative and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Peter Due will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest report.
Key Recent Developments
The European Union (EU) continued efforts to advance the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, with limited progress. EU Special Representative Peter Sørensen met with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on 9 April and Prime Minister Albin Kurti on 15 April. In separate meetings with both leaders on 22 September, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas reiterated that agreements reached through the EU-facilitated dialogue, particularly the 2023 Ohrid Agreement, are binding, and stressed that progress on normalisation and European integration must go hand in hand.
Kosovo faces continued political uncertainty over the election of a new president. Following the December 2025 legislative elections, the Assembly of Kosovo failed to elect a successor to former President Vjosa Osmani and was subsequently dissolved on 28 April, prompting the third legislative election in 18 months on 7 June. Kurti’s Vetëvendosje party won 53 of 120 seats.
On 31 August, Kurti’s Vetëvendosje party and the opposition Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) agreed to support Bekim Sejdiu, a former Constitutional Court judge and law professor, for president, but six LDK legislators rejected the agreement. On 13 September, the Assembly elected a Kurti-led government with 62 votes. The LDK did not participate, while legislators from non-majority communities helped provide the majority. Sejdiu withdrew his candidacy the following day, recognising that he would not have the necessary support to assume the presidency. On 23 September, the Constitutional Court upheld the government’s election and ruled that the deadline for electing a president would expire on 6 October. Failure to meet it would trigger another legislative election.
Ahead of the June election, on 19 May, Kosovo Police arrested seven directors of Serbia-run educational and healthcare institutions in Gračanica, central Kosovo, on suspicion of pressuring voters. Srpska Lista (Serbian List), the largest Kosovo Serb political party, disputed the allegations, claiming that the arrests were intended to facilitate the forcible integration of these institutions into Kosovo’s system and intimidate Kosovo Serb voters into supporting rival politician Nenad Rašić.
On 28 May, Kosovo authorities took control of four Serbia-operated railway stations in northern Kosovo, drawing criticism from Belgrade.
The implementation of Kosovo’s Law on Foreigners, which establishes residence and registration requirements for foreign nationals, continued to raise concerns over access to Serbia-run education and healthcare for Kosovo Serbs without Kosovo-issued documents. In a 28 May statement, the UK urged gradual, transparent, and coordinated implementation that ensures uninterrupted access to essential services.
The reintegration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel has also stalled. In November 2022, 25 Kosovo Serb judges and ten prosecutors, integrated into the judiciary in 2017 under an EU-facilitated agreement, resigned during the vehicle registration dispute. (For more information, see the brief on Kosovo in our April 2023 Monthly Forecast.) Amid EU efforts to facilitate their reintegration, Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors sought to withdraw their resignations on 15 July. On 20 July, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council rejected the prosecutors’ request, arguing that their voluntary resignations had terminated their employment and that reinstatement would require new recruitment procedures. The following day, Acting President Albulena Haxhiu issued decrees formally dismissing seven prosecutors. The Kosovo Judicial Council subsequently rejected similar requests from Kosovo Serb judges on 27 August, and Haxhiu formally dismissed 18 judges on 2 September. In statements issued on 21 July and 28 August, the EU questioned these decisions’ compatibility with due process and warned that they undermined efforts to restore a multi-ethnic judiciary. Kurti maintained that reintegration must respect Kosovo’s constitution and judicial independence.
The circumstances surrounding the September 2023 attack in Banjska/Banjskë, in which a Kosovo police officer and three armed Kosovo Serbs were killed, remained contentious. On 24 April, a Pristina court convicted three Kosovo Serbs of terrorism offences, sentencing two to life imprisonment and one to 30 years. Serbia rejected the verdict and denied supporting the attackers. Dozens of suspects, including former Serbian List deputy leader Milan Radoičić, who admitted involvement in the attack, remain at large. During his September meeting with Kallas, Kurti asked the EU to put pressure on Belgrade to cooperate in bringing those responsible to justice. (For background information on the attack, see our 22 October 2023 What’s in Blue story.)
UNMIK has continued operating under financial constraints. At the April briefing, Due reported that liquidity-related contingency measures had reduced filled encumbered positions by almost 30 percent. He distinguished these measures from the Civilian Staffing Review completed in 2025, whose recommendations would inform subsequent budget adjustments.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue is how the Council can encourage implementation of EU-facilitated dialogue commitments while preventing renewed tensions in northern Kosovo. The reintegration of Kosovo Serbs into institutions, continuity of essential services, and accountability for violence remain important to rebuilding trust. Outstanding commitments such as those contained in the 2023 Ohrid Agreement include Kosovo’s establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities and Serbia’s commitment not to object to Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. Kosovo’s unresolved presidential election could further complicate sustained political engagement. One option would be a presidential statement encouraging both parties to implement existing agreements, refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tensions, and protect the rights of all communities.
Another issue is how UNMIK can fulfil its open-ended mandate amid resource constraints and competing views of its future. Members could request a focused briefing from Due on the operational effects of staffing reductions; the functions that remain central to UNMIK’s work; and coordination with the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
A further issue is how to foster more constructive engagement on Kosovo in the Council. Open briefings frequently feature sharply contrasting accounts from Belgrade and Pristina, leaving limited scope for substantive discussion of obstacles to normalisation. Council members could consider holding the regular briefing as a private meeting instead. This could facilitate a more candid exchange on outstanding commitments under the EU-facilitated dialogue while preserving the participation of a representative of Serbia under rule 37 and a Kosovo official invited in a personal capacity under rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members support the EU-facilitated dialogue to establish conditions for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Deep divisions among permanent members, however, continue to characterise the Council’s approach to the issue.
Among the five permanent Council members, France, the UK, and the US recognise Kosovo’s independence and tend to be supportive of its government; China and Russia do not recognise its independence and support Serbia’s position and its claim to territorial integrity. Elected members Bahrain, Colombia, Denmark, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, and Panama recognise Kosovo’s independence, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Greece do not. Somalia reportedly recognised Kosovo’s independence in May 2010, although its recognition has been disputed by Serbian officials in recent years. Most recently, on 1 September, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Đurić thanked Somalia for its continued respect for Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity during a meeting with his Somali counterpart. Earlier in the year, Kosovo’s authorities published a 17 February letter from Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud congratulating Kosovo on the 18th anniversary of its independence and expressing support for stronger bilateral relations.
Council members hold differing views on the future of UNMIK. At the 9 April briefing, the US called for the mission’s closure, and pending that outcome, further staffing reductions and the transfer of its residual functions to other institutions. The UK called for a strategic review of UNMIK’s role, responsibilities, and funding, while Denmark and Latvia also supported a possible strategic review. France supported efficiency measures while emphasising that UNMIK’s mandate is intrinsically linked to the normalisation process. Greece supported the continuation of the mission’s mandate for as long as necessary, while remaining open to measures to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. The DRC cautioned against premature reductions or withdrawal, while Liberia stressed that the mission’s adaptation should reflect conditions on the ground and the perspectives of all communities. Russia opposed reductions in UNMIK’s staffing and funding, as well as changes to the frequency or format of Council meetings on Kosovo. China called for adequate political and budgetary support for the mission.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 1 April 2026S/2026/264 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIK. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 9 April 2026S/PV.10132 | This was the Council’s first briefing of the year on Kosovo. |
