Bosnia and Herzegovina
Expected Council Action
In October, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The Council is also expected to vote at the end of the month on the reauthorisation of the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) prior to its 31 October expiration.
Key Recent Developments
On 11 May, Christian Schmidt announced his resignation as High Representative for BiH, effective 1 July. Following unsuccessful consultations on selecting his successor, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board appointed Principal Deputy High Representative Louis Crishock as Acting High Representative on 30 June. Crishock assumed the role on 1 July. The PIC’s target date of 14 July for appointing a successor passed without an agreement, with Crishock remaining in office at the time of writing.
The death of Ratko Mladić on 27 August revived longstanding disputes over wartime accountability in BiH. The former commander of the Bosnian Serb army had been serving a life sentence following his conviction by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war committed during the 1992–1995 conflict in BiH. He died while hospitalised in The Hague. Describing Mladić’s case as a manifestation of “double standards and anti-Serb bias”, Russia criticised Judge Graciela Gatti Santana, President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (the Mechanism), for repeatedly denying his release on humanitarian grounds despite what Moscow described as his terminal illness. On 28 August, at Russia’s request, Security Council members discussed his death under “any other business”.
Mladić’s funeral in Belgrade on 7 September, which included military honours, drew international criticism and sparked diplomatic tensions between BiH and Serbia. UN human rights experts condemned the honours accorded to Mladić and expressed concern over the attendance of senior Republika Srpska (RS) officials at the funeral. They warned that such acts risk undermining efforts to establish the truth, end impunity, and secure justice and reparations, and called for commemorations that place victims at the forefront, uphold judicially established facts, and reject denialism and historical revisionism. On 8 September, BiH expelled two Serbian diplomats. In his 22 September address to the UN General Assembly, Denis Bećirović, the Bosniak member and Chairperson of the BiH Presidency, criticised Serbia’s glorification of Mladić.
Divisive reactions to Mladić’s death have also marked the political environment ahead of BiH’s 4 October general elections, which will be held at the state, entity, and cantonal levels. In its 18 September interim report, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) noted complaints against RS politicians and candidates over alleged glorification of Mladić, alongside negative campaigning, appeals to voters along ethnic lines, and pressure on journalists. The report also highlighted the planned first nationwide use of biometric voter identification and ballot scanning, which has raised expectations regarding electoral integrity, while noting delays in preparations and equipment delivery.
Disputes over BiH’s constitutional order have also persisted. On 25 September, BiH’s Constitutional Court ruled that RS budget funding for lobbying activities pursuing unconstitutional objectives was incompatible with the constitution. The ruling concerned a September 2025 contract between RS’ Representative Office in Vienna and Canadian lobbying firm Dickens & Madson. In an 11 February letter to the Security Council, BiH Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković argued that the contract explicitly identified RS independence as an ultimate objective and sought to internationalise and legitimise secessionist aims. The Court prohibited further payments under the contract and other RS-funded lobbying pursuing objectives contrary to BiH’s Constitution and institutional decisions.
Key Issues and Options
The future of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is a key issue. The PIC Steering Board has yet to agree on Schmidt’s successor, leaving Crishock in an acting capacity, while longstanding divisions remain over the OHR’s legitimacy, powers, and eventual closure. One option would be for the Council to adopt a presidential statement encouraging the PIC to conclude the succession process and reaffirming the conditions established under the “5+2 agenda” for the OHR’s closure. Alternatively, the Council could propose an independent strategic review of the OHR, including its remaining functions and progress towards meeting the 5+2 objectives and conditions.
Another key issue is whether Crishock will brief the Council. Since 2021, the Council has generally held the second of its two annual BiH debates, which coincides with EUFOR’s renewal, without a briefer following Russia’s opposition to Schmidt’s participation. Crishock’s appointment may prompt renewed discussion over this informal understanding. The Council presidency could consult members on whether to invite him to brief while seeking to keep this question separate from negotiations on EUFOR’s reauthorisation.
Protecting BiH’s constitutional order and maintaining stability during and following the elections are also key issues. Council members could adopt a press statement reaffirming BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order, calling on political actors to respect electoral and judicial decisions and rejecting unilateral attempts to alter the constitutional framework.
Council Dynamics
Council members broadly support BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the Dayton framework, but differ over the powers and future of the OHR, including the appointment and responsibilities of Schmidt’s successor. The renewal of the authorisation of EUFOR ALTHEA has remained an area of agreement, with resolution 2795 adopted unanimously in October 2025.
Schmidt’s succession process has exposed differences over the future role and responsibilities of the High Representative. At the 12 May debate, the US supported a successor with a “far more limited set of responsibilities” and greater authority for domestic leaders, while several European members—including Denmark, Latvia, and the UK—called for a “fully empowered” High Representative.
During subsequent PIC consultations, the US reportedly supported Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi for the post, while several European countries favoured French diplomat René Troccaz. On 5 June, Washington warned that the failure to agree on a successor was prompting it to reconsider its role in the international presence in BiH.
US policy towards BiH has also attracted congressional scrutiny. Following the Trump administration’s removal of sanctions on former RS President Milorad Dodik and his associates in October 2025, a bipartisan group of US lawmakers called for their reimposition on 27 March. On 15 September, Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee released a report linking the removal of sanctions and pressure for Schmidt’s resignation to a proposed gas pipeline concession worth over $1 billion for a company co-owned by Joseph Flynn, brother of Michael Flynn, who served as national security adviser to US President Donald Trump.
In its response, the State Department defended the lifting of sanctions as a response to steps taken by RS authorities to reverse legislation undermining the Dayton Agreement and appoint an interim president. It also maintained that, although Washington had advocated American commercial interests, decisions concerning the pipeline concession and the selection of a US company as lead investor were “sovereign choices made by Federation of BiH officials”.
Russia continues to seek the OHR’s closure. In a 12 July statement, its foreign ministry argued that the Dayton Agreement makes no provision for an Acting High Representative and that a legitimate appointment requires Security Council approval. China reiterated at the 12 May debate that Schmidt lacked Council endorsement and that both the OHR and the “Bonn Powers” were special arrangements for a specific period, noting that “they cannot be prolonged, let alone made permanent”. (The Bonn Powers, which the PIC granted to the High Representative in 1997, include the ability to make binding decisions and unseat elected officials who are found to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Dayton Agreement.) European members maintain that responsibility for appointing the High Representative rests with the PIC Steering Board.
Among elected Council members, Liberia has defended the OHR’s continuing relevance, while Pakistan has supported the prompt appointment of a successor. Somalia has advocated a comprehensive review of the High Representative’s role and consultation with all PIC Steering Board members during the appointment process, while Panama has called for a successor enjoying the support of all PIC Steering Board members and, ideally, the Security Council.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2795 | This resolution renewed the authorisation of the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) for an additional year. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 12 May 2026S/PV.10150 | This was the Council’s semi-annual debate on BiH. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 11 May 2026S/2026/405 | This was a letter transmitting the High Representative’s 69th report on implementation of the peace agreement. |