Sudan
Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.
The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 October.
Key Recent Developments
On 12 August, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Sudanese militia, launched simultaneous kamikaze drone attacks targeting several major cities, including El Obeid, Atbara, Omdurman, and Khartoum. El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, has faced mounting pressure amid a significant build-up of RSF and allied fighters around the city. Repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power and fuel stations, forcing medical facilities and water stations to shut down. While the hostilities have continued, displacement sites in the city have expanded, and people have fled violence in surrounding areas. The security situation remained highly volatile, with waves of drone strikes inside the city and fighting southwest of El Obeid reportedly killing scores of civilians.
In late July, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a major ground offensive in North Kordofan and announced that it had recaptured the Al Sadarat highway and five key towns along the route, including Bara, Um Sayala, and Gebrat al-Sheikh, following two days of intense clashes with the RSF. The SAF has since consolidated its control over much of the corridor, although the RSF reportedly has continued to challenge these gains.
In Blue Nile state, the security and humanitarian situation deteriorated following the expansion of fighting around the towns of Kurmuk and Geisan along the Ethiopian border. Media reports indicated that the RSF, together with its ally the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), retook the towns in mid-August. The fighting has raised concerns about the further regionalisation of the conflict, amid allegations of external support to the RSF, including claims that Ethiopian territory has been used as a supply conduit for RSF operations and that the latest RSF offensive in Blue Nile was reportedly launched from inside Ethiopia.
In late July and early August, the Quintet—comprising the AU, the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—held consultations in Addis Ababa with Sudanese political blocs and parties. The latest discussions built on the Quintet’s initial engagement with a group of Sudanese civilian actors on the sidelines of the international Sudan conference held in Berlin on 15 April and further consultations in early June. Media reports indicate that some groups, including Somoud and Tasis, declined to participate in this round of talks, citing reservations about the way the mediators designed the consultations process.
On 16 and 17 August, a delegation of the AU Peace and Security Council undertook a field visit to Sudan and met with senior Sudanese officials, including SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Transitional Prime Minister Kamil El-Tayeb Idris. Discussions covered the country’s political, security, socioeconomic, and humanitarian situation, as well as governance challenges and efforts towards an inclusive national dialogue. The AU has sought to reopen its liaison office in Sudan to facilitate engagement with stakeholders at different levels and provide technical support to the country. Sudan’s membership in the AU was suspended in the wake of the country’s 2021 military coup d’état. (For more information, see our 25 June, 4 August, and 21 August What’s in Blue stories.)
On 7 August, Somalia, with co-sponsorship from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia, convened an Arria-formula meeting titled “Safeguarding Education in Sudan: Investing in Peace, Recovery and Stability”. Ambassador Abukar Dahir Osman (Somalia) and UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed delivered opening remarks. UNICEF Deputy Executive Director for Management Hannan Sulieman and Executive Director of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) Lisa Chung Bender briefed.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 28 April, following a proposal by the Council’s P3 members (France, the UK, and the US), the Council designated four individuals— Al-goney Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF’s procurement director and brother of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, and three Colombian nationals involved in facilitating the RSF’s military operations.
Pursuant to resolution 2791 of 12 September 2025, which most recently renewed the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, the Council requested the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to submit its final report, including its findings and recommendations, by 13 July. On 13 July, Council members received the panel’s final report, which had not been published at press time.
On 6 August, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sent a letter to the Council expressing concern over the disclosure of information contained in the panel’s final report in a 29 July Reuters article. (Reports submitted by the panel remain confidential until they are considered by the committee and transmitted to the Council.) The UAE had apparently corresponded with the panel earlier in August regarding information contained in the report that had appeared in the media. In a 7 August letter, the panel requested that the UAE respond by 31 August to a series of assertions linking it to the conflict in Sudan. The UAE replied in a 20 August letter, providing information and evidence in response to the assertions and maintaining that its submission should be given due consideration and reflected in the final report.
As the appointment of subsidiary body chairs remains unresolved, Denmark, in its capacity as Council president in August, sought to convene a committee meeting to discuss the panel’s report and recommendations. It appears, however, that Bahrain requested to postpone the meeting seeking additional time to receive further clarifications from the panel while noting that it had submitted written questions to the panel in this regard. Liberia supported Bahrain’s request.
On 20 August, Denmark convened the committee meeting following several postponements. It seems that Bahrain reiterated its concerns and requested additional time to consider the report, including to allow the UAE to respond to the questions raised by the panel in its 7 August letter. Several members, including Denmark, France, Latvia, Panama, Somalia, the UK, and the US, supported convening the meeting to discuss the panel’s final report. Greece, meanwhile, apparently supported postponing the meeting to allow additional time for consideration of the report.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 6 July, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution without a vote at its 62nd session on the “Human rights situation in and around El Obeid, in the context of the ongoing conflict in the Sudan”. The resolution strongly condemned the escalating violence committed by the RSF and allied forces in and around El Obeid. It requested the independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan to “conduct, within its existing resources, an urgent inquiry into any violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law and related international crimes, allegedly committed in and around El Obeid in the context of the ongoing conflict in Sudan”.
Key Issues and Options
An immediate issue for the Council is the renewal of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance is particularly important amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region. Accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and other atrocities, remains a key issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.
A related issue is the increasing use of drones and other advanced weaponry by the warring parties. Their growing deployment has intensified risks to civilians, with attacks increasingly affecting populated areas and critical civilian infrastructure. Council members could consider strengthening existing measures aimed at preventing the transfer of weapons and related materiel that could facilitate such attacks, including through enhanced monitoring and reporting on arms flows and the networks facilitating their supply.
An important issue for the Council is whether the sanctions regime remains sufficiently equipped to respond to the changing nature of the conflict and patterns of sanctions violations. During the Council’s 24 August meeting, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos outlined several proposals in this regard, including expanding the arms embargo to cover the entire territory of Sudan; reaffirming that unmanned aerial vehicles, systems, and related technologies fall within its scope; requesting the Secretary-General to increase the number of experts serving on the panel supporting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee; and enhancing cooperation between the panel and expert groups supporting other sanctions regimes in the region. However, achieving the necessary consensus on some of these proposals would be difficult given the prevailing Council dynamics and the divergence of views among members in this regard.
One option would be for Council members to hold an informal meeting with the Panel of Experts to assess the practical implications of the measures proposed by the US, including their potential benefits, implementation challenges, and possible impact on the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.
Council members could also encourage greater cooperation between member states and the Panel of Experts, including through information-sharing on arms transfers, financial networks, and entities involved in sanctions violations. This could help the panel trace the supply chains and financing networks, identify those facilitating violations, and support more effective implementation of the sanctions measures.
Council members could also consider following up on the 16 December 2025 informal interactive dialogue (IID) organised by the UK and Denmark by convening a similar meeting with key regional and international stakeholders, including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts. Such a meeting could explore ways to better coordinate diplomatic initiatives, leverage comparative advantages, and support a coherent political strategy for resolving the conflict. It could also examine the regional implications of the conflict, including displacement dynamics, arms flows, and risks to regional peace and security. (For more information, see our 16 December 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
Council Dynamics
Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia, by contrast, has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. More broadly, many members have pointed to inadequate implementation and enforcement of the sanctions regime.
Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as Denmark, France, the UK, and the US, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions measures beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Several members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against additional individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the African members, China, and Russia have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia has been particularly categorical in rejecting any extension of the measures beyond Darfur. The issue has resurfaced repeatedly in recent years, most recently during the negotiations on resolution 2791.
The use of mercenaries in Sudan’s conflict has drawn increased attention from member states amid reports of Colombian mercenaries fighting alongside the RSF in Darfur. This issue was raised during the negotiations on resolution 2791, during which the UK proposed language condemning the use of mercenaries, as well as violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses committed by them. The proposal, however, was not retained in the final text, apparently because it did not garner sufficient support among Council members. (For more information, see our 11 September 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 12 September 2025S/RES/2791 | This resolution renewed the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—for another year, until 12 September 2026. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 12 September 2025S/PV.9993 | This was a meeting on the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts assisting the Sudan Sanctions Committee. |
| Security Council Letter | |
| 6 August 2026S/2026/657 | This was a letter sent by the UAE expressing concerns about alleged unauthorised disclosure of the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. |
