In Hindsight: The Security Council and the Changing Maritime Domain
Introduction
The Security Council has traditionally approached maritime security through specific geographic situations and discrete threats, rather than as a broader and interconnected peace and security challenge. However, in more recent years, several Council members, predominantly elected ones, have focused on the geographically widespread security implications of this challenge while calling for a more holistic approach. This reflects a growing recognition that maritime security—and preserving the oceans as part of the global commons—requires greater attention to the links among conflict, international law, economic security, and new technologies.
Long-standing threats such as piracy and armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime, and illicit trafficking increasingly intersect with emerging challenges, including the use of drones, advanced weaponry, and cyber threats. Disruptions to freedom of navigation have also become more prominent, particularly around strategic chokepoints and heavily trafficked maritime routes, as illustrated by recent developments in the Strait of Hormuz. Such disruptions can have significant consequences for international trade, with cascading effects on food and energy security. Taken together, these developments underscore the increasingly interconnected and transnational nature of maritime security threats, which are difficult to address through an episodic or situation-specific approach.
Against this backdrop, several elected members have sought to give maritime security greater attention within the Council. Greece convened a high-level debate during its May 2025 presidency on strengthening maritime security through international cooperation. Panama followed in August 2025 with a debate focused on prevention, innovation, and emerging challenges with regard to maritime security, while Bahrain again placed maritime security prominently on the agenda during its April 2026 presidency amid the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. The attention given to the issue by elected members from different regions reflects a growing recognition that maritime security requires more sustained consideration at the Council level and a more coherent approach to addressing increasingly interconnected threats.
The Evolution of the Council’s Approach to Maritime Security
Since the Council first began engaging more systematically with piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2008, its consideration of maritime security has gradually broadened. A range of other threats at sea have captured the Council’s attention, often through country-specific files. These have included migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the Mediterranean, illicit arms transfers, sanctions evasion, and other forms of transnational organised crime.
In addition to Somalia, the Council has also dealt with piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, adopting resolution 2039 of 29 February 2012, which encouraged a regional counter-piracy strategy and contributed to the development of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the region’s maritime security architecture.
In a significant development, the Council expanded its use of maritime enforcement measures in the Mediterranean in 2015. Resolution 2240 adopted under Chapter VII on 9 October 2015 authorised member states to inspect and seize vessels on the high seas off Libya suspected of migrant smuggling or human trafficking. This was followed by resolution 2292 of 14 June 2016, also acting under Chapter VII, which authorised inspections of vessels suspected of carrying arms in violation of the Libya arms embargo.
The Council has also used maritime interdictions and related measures to support sanctions implementation, including in the DPRK, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, particularly where illicit trade helps sustain conflict, organised crime, or terrorism. In some cases, the Council has authorised action by states and regional organisations.
An effort to move beyond a country-specific approach came in August 2021, when India, then serving as Council president, convened the first thematic meeting on maritime security. The meeting sought to frame the issue more holistically, examining the wider security, economic, and environmental effects of maritime crime. Following the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement identifying a range of maritime threats, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, terrorist activities exploiting maritime routes, and attacks on shipping and critical infrastructure, while stressing the importance of international and regional cooperation. As noted above, in recent years, several elected members also chose to highlight maritime security in signature events during their Council presidencies.
Differences Among Council Members
As maritime security has become more closely tied to armed conflict and geopolitical competition, divisions within the Council have become more pronounced, both over the scope of the Council’s role and the measures available to protect navigation at sea.
The Council has repeatedly recognised the importance of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in maintaining maritime security. Its 2021 presidential statement on maritime security reaffirmed that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, sets out the legal framework applicable to activities in the oceans. Differences remain, however, over how some of these principles are interpreted and applied, particularly in relation to navigational freedoms, coastal-state rights, and military activity at sea.
These differences are especially apparent in China and the US’ positions. China is a party to UNCLOS, while the US is not, although Washington regards many of the convention’s provisions as reflecting customary international law. The two countries have differed sharply over freedom of navigation and over China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, which the US and several other countries consider excessive and unlawful. The US routinely conducts freedom-of-navigation operations in the region using naval and air forces to challenge maritime claims that it considers inconsistent with international law.
China and Russia, while also affirming freedom of navigation, have generally placed greater emphasis on the limits of its exercise. China has stressed that navigational freedoms must be exercised with due regard for the sovereignty, security, and legitimate rights of coastal states. Russia has placed particular emphasis on flag-state jurisdiction and has opposed maritime interdictions it considers inconsistent with the law of the sea or based on an overly expansive interpretation of enforcement powers, including those undertaken pursuant to unilateral sanctions.
These differences have affected negotiations on Council products. China, for instance, has favoured language that does not present UNCLOS as an all-encompassing legal framework for activities at sea.
During negotiations on resolution 2634 of 31 May 2022 on piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, China sought to narrow the formulation describing UNCLOS by using language from the Council’s 2021 presidential statement, which referred to the convention as setting out the legal framework “applicable to activities in the oceans, including countering illicit activities at sea”. Earlier counter-piracy resolutions, including resolution 2608 of 3 December 2021, referred to UNCLOS as setting out the legal framework “within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out”.
China argued that UNCLOS itself recognises that matters not regulated by the convention remain governed by other rules and principles of general international law, while other members resisted language, they saw as limiting the scope and universality of the convention. (For more information, see our 30 May 2022 What’s in Blue story.)
Similar differences have emerged over the measures that states may take when navigation is threatened. Following the adoption of resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, Russia argued that the resolution’s reference to states’ right to defend their vessels lacked a clear basis in international law. The US and the UK, by contrast, maintained that states may defend their vessels in accordance with the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. (For more information, see the brief on the Red Sea in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
There are also differences over how far the Council should venture into maritime issues. Russia has argued that many matters frequently discussed under the heading of maritime security—including transnational organised crime, illicit arms and drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and the illegal exploitation of marine resources—do not fall within the Council’s remit unless they have clear peace and security implications and are better addressed in specialised forums. China has similarly resisted an expansive Council role in certain areas, maintaining, for example, that specific maritime disputes such as those in the South China Sea should not be addressed by the Security Council.
Conflict, Chokepoints, and the Council’s Response
A striking feature of several of the conflicts that have occupied the Council in recent years is the extent to which their effects have spilled into the maritime domain. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine turned the Black Sea into an active theatre of conflict, affecting commercial shipping, ports, and grain exports, while also demonstrating the growing role of naval mines, maritime drones, and other new technologies in naval warfare. The Houthis attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which disrupted shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez route, which the group framed as a response to Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The conflict involving the US and Iran has placed the Strait of Hormuz at the centre of wider regional hostilities. The conflict has also underscored the vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure, including ports, energy terminals, pipelines, and other facilities that support the movement of goods and energy across the region. Shipping through the Strait fell sharply as security risks mounted, pushing up war-risk insurance premiums and contributing to higher and more volatile oil prices, while forcing governments and companies to consider alternative supply routes.
The effects have extended well beyond the states directly involved in the conflict. Given the concentration of global energy flows through Hormuz, prolonged insecurity in the Strait carries implications for importing economies far removed from the Gulf region, with knock-on effects for transport costs, supply chains, and price stability.
These cases have presented the Council with very different maritime security challenges, and its response has varied considerably depending on the nature of the conflict, the actors involved, and the political dynamics surrounding the underlying situation.
In the case of Ukraine, the Council repeatedly discussed the maritime consequences of the war, including the disruption of commercial shipping, attacks on Black Sea ports, and the impact on global food security. Yet the most significant practical response in the maritime domain came from outside the Council. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by the Secretary-General and Türkiye in July 2022, sought to establish a maritime corridor for the safe export of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports. The Council helped keep attention on the initiative and the wider maritime consequences of the war, but deep divisions—particularly Russia’s position as a party to the conflict and a permanent Council member—left little scope for collective action.[1]
The Red Sea crisis prompted a more direct Council response. On 10 January 2024, the Council adopted resolution 2722, demanding that the Houthis cease their attacks on merchant and commercial vessels and taking note of the right of member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. The resolution also established monthly reporting by the Secretary-General on further Houthi attacks, a requirement that has since been repeatedly renewed and has provided the Council with a regular mechanism for following developments in the Red Sea.
The Council was able to agree on the need to protect commercial navigation, but agreement over the causes of the crisis and the measures needed to address it have been more difficult. Members differed over how the attacks should be understood in relation to the war in Gaza and over the legality of subsequent military action against Houthi targets in Yemen. These differences later carried over into discussions on strengthening the Yemen sanctions regime. Proposals to restrict the supply of dual-use components and to provide for maritime interdictions encountered opposition from China and Russia. (For more information, see our 13 November 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
The situation in the Strait of Hormuz has presented the Council with a particularly difficult maritime security challenge, given the legal and political questions involved, the parties to the conflict, and the wider implications of disruption to a critical waterway. Unlike the Red Sea crisis where the immediate threat to commercial shipping came from a non-state armed group, in Hormuz, the maritime crisis unfolded amid direct hostilities involving Iran, Israel, and the US, with disruption to navigation becoming part of the wider interstate confrontation.
The Council was initially able to agree on a limited response. On 11 March, it adopted resolution 2817, condemning Iran’s strikes against Gulf countries and Jordan, as well as actions or threats aimed at obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour, while China and Russia abstained. Both countries argued that the text focused disproportionately on Iran while failing to adequately reflect the US-Israeli military action that had preceded the regional escalation.
The divisions widened when the Council moved from condemning the disruption to considering how navigation through the Strait might be secured. In late March, Bahrain, working closely with Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Jordan, proposed a draft resolution that initially invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states to use “all necessary means” in and around the Strait to secure transit passage and deter attempts to obstruct international navigation.
China and Russia objected to the proposed authorisation of force language arguing that it could legitimise military action without clearly defined limits. They also maintained that the draft addressed the consequences of the crisis while failing to deal with what they regarded as its underlying cause—the military confrontation triggered by US and Israeli actions against Iran. Although the explicit authorisation of force was subsequently removed, China and Russia vetoed the draft. They subsequently put forward an alternative draft text calling broadly for an immediate cessation of hostilities and urging all parties to refrain from further escalation in the Middle East and beyond. The text was put in blue but was not brought to a vote.
The impasse continued. The US and Bahrain subsequently co-penned another draft, supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, aimed at restoring freedom of navigation through the Strait. Among other measures, it called on Iran to cease attacks, mining, and the imposition of tolls; disclose the number and location of sea mines it had laid; and cooperate with efforts to remove them. Despite attracting broad support among the wider UN membership, the draft, although put in blue, was not brought to a vote amid continuing objections from China and Russia and the prospect of another veto. (For more information, see our 6 April and 5 May What’s in Blue stories as well as the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
From Council Action to Coalition Responses
Operational responses to maritime insecurity have increasingly taken shape outside the Council through regional arrangements and smaller coalitions of states. In response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the US established the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023, while the EU launched Operation ASPIDES in February 2024 with a defensive mandate to protect commercial shipping and safeguard freedom of navigation. Military responses also included Operation Poseidon Archer, led by the US and the UK from January 2024, and the US-led Operation Rough Rider, launched in March 2025.
As the crisis escalated in the Strait of Hormuz, US President Donald Trump called for a multinational naval coalition to help secure the waterway, although several US allies were cautious about participating in enforcement operations. The US subsequently began enforcing a naval blockade on traffic to and from Iranian ports, including through the interception and, in some cases, seizure of Iran-linked vessels. Its maritime operations later expanded under “Project Freedom”, aimed at facilitating the movement of vessels through restricted waterways.
Such arrangements are able, at times, to provide rapid responses to threats at sea. There have, however, been disagreements over the legal basis, scope, and objectives of some of these operations. Their proliferation also raises a broader question about the Council’s place in an increasingly crowded maritime security architecture. If responses to threats with implications for international peace and security are developed primarily through unilateral action or mini-lateral coalitions outside the UN, the Council risks becoming peripheral to decisions and arrangements taking shape elsewhere. This is particularly consequential where military action is involved, since competing interpretations of the legality and purpose of such operations can themselves deepen existing tensions.
The Changing Nature of Maritime Security Threats
The nature of threats to maritime security is rapidly evolving. The use of naval mines, missiles, and increasingly sophisticated uncrewed systems has widened the range of threats facing both commercial and military vessels. Disruptions to freedom of navigation have also become more frequent, particularly around strategic chokepoints and heavily trafficked maritime routes, where even relatively localised incidents can have wider consequences for trade, energy flows, and supply chains.
Sanctions evasion has become more difficult to detect, including through deceptive shipping practices and sub-standard or so-called shadow fleets. The growing dependence of maritime trade on digital systems has also increased exposure to cyber threats, while ports, energy installations, pipelines, undersea cables, and other critical infrastructure have become increasingly vulnerable to attack or disruption.
Environmental and climate-related pressures add another layer of risk. Rising sea levels, extreme weather, and the degradation of marine ecosystems can place additional strain on coastal infrastructure and communities, while illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, pollution, and unsustainable resource exploitation can contribute to economic insecurity and tensions over access to maritime resources.
A further difficulty is the lack of a comprehensive, evidence-based assessment of maritime security threats at the global level. This limits understanding of how different threats are evolving, where they are converging, and how risks in one part of the maritime domain may affect another. The growing range of threats therefore raises a broader question for the Council: whether mechanisms designed largely to respond to individual incidents or country situations remain sufficient when the threats themselves increasingly cut across geographic, legal, and institutional boundaries.
Conclusion
The increasingly transnational and interconnected nature of maritime threats to international peace and security makes sustained Council engagement particularly relevant. Many such threats exceed the capacity or jurisdiction of any single coastal or flag state, while their consequences can quickly spread across regions. Maritime security should therefore be treated more clearly as a cross-cutting peace and security issue. The Council has tools that other bodies do not: It can adopt binding measures, establish sanctions and monitoring regimes, and authorise interdictions. More importantly, it can connect incidents at sea to the political and security conditions on land from which they often emerge. There is also growing recognition among Council members that military responses alone are unlikely to provide lasting solutions, and that addressing underlying drivers—including weak governance, poverty, and limited economic opportunities—may require concerted and integrated international, regional, sub-regional, and national approaches.
Yet the response across the UN system remains fragmented. Briefing the Council in May 2025, Christian Bueger argued that the UN system’s approach to maritime security needed to be recalibrated and streamlined, noting that more than 22 UN entities address different aspects of the issue under separate mandates without an overarching global strategy or coordination mechanism. Among other options, he suggested establishing maritime security as a standing item on the Council’s agenda or creating a dedicated capacity to support more systematic coordination, information-sharing, and strategic thinking. Another option could include more regular reporting to the Council, possibly on an annual basis, to provide a broader assessment of emerging maritime security trends and areas of convergence. Such an arrangement could strengthen the Council’s ability to identify emerging risks, assess how threats are evolving across different regions, and move beyond an approach driven primarily by individual crises.
However, a more coherent approach does not mean that the Council should become the world’s maritime regulator or displace the International Maritime Organization, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and other specialised bodies. Rather, as the body with primary responsibility for international peace and security, the Council could work towards creating a political and security framework that brings greater coherence to the current fragmented response. While this may be challenging given the current dynamics, the growing impact of threats at sea on international peace and security is making it increasingly difficult for the Council to remain at the margins.
[1] Apart from resolution 2623 of 27 February 2022, which called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, the Council’s only adopted outcome on the war until 2025 was a presidential statement of 6 May 2022 (S/PRST/2022/3). The statement expressed strong support for the Secretary-General’s efforts to find a peaceful solution and requested him to brief the Council in due course. The Council did not adopt another outcome on the conflict until resolution 2774 of 24 February 2025.
