Yemen
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, an official from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a civil society representative are the anticipated briefers.
Key Recent Development
On 22 July, the Houthis said that they used drones and ballistic missiles to attack two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, the Encelia and the Layla, accusing the ships of breaking a blockade imposed by the group. On 24 July, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out airstrikes in Hodeidah province. The Saudi-led “Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen” said it had targeted military sites linked to threats against shipping and denied striking Hodeidah port itself. Escalations between the two sides continued when on 26 July the Houthis attacked Saudi oil refineries in the Red Sea coastal cities of Jizan and Yanbu.
The Houthis have threatened to strategically leverage control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, including by attacking Israeli– and Saudi-linked shipping. Additionally, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has threatened to establish a “security belt” from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, a strait that is vital to commercial shipping.
On 30 July, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 12 other regional stakeholders and Red Sea littoral states announced the creation of the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, a defensive coalition whose goal is the protection of freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, including through joint exercises and maritime operations.
The regional escalation came amid renewed tensions following Houthi attempts to resume flights from Iran to Sana’a, after more than a decade of restrictions for air traffic into Houthi territory. On 3 July, a passenger aircraft operated by the privately owned Iranian Mahan Air landed at Houthi-controlled Sana’a International Airport before departing for Tehran later that day. The Houthis said that the flight to Sana’a transported more than 200 patients and stranded citizens into Yemen, before returning to Tehran carrying an official delegation to attend the funeral of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On the other hand, Yemen’s government condemned it as a breach of the country’s sovereignty and airspace and accused Iran of using it to transport materials prohibited under UN sanctions.
On 13 July, another Mahan Air flight from Tehran reportedly tried to land in Sana’a International Airport but was diverted and landed in Houthi-controlled Hodeidah after airstrikes rendered the runway at Sana’a unusable. According to Houthi-owned media, the flight carried more patients and stranded civilians, and the returning Houthi delegation. Yemen’s government said it had targeted Sana’a airport to prevent the Iranian plane from landing. At the same time, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of bombing Sana’a International Airport and breaking the four-year truce between the two sides, and retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport. The Saudi-led coalition confirmed intercepting the missiles.
According to media reports, Houthi officials have pledged to maintain flights between Sana’a and Tehran and have said that the group reserves the right to “impose a siege” on Saudi Arabia’s airports.
Direct military escalations between Yemeni government forces and Houthi forces also took place on 4 July in Hodeidah governorate, where some of the deadliest clashes between the two sides in years reportedly killed at least 16 government troops and 50 Houthi fighters.
On 10 July, the Yemeni government and the Houthis also accused each other of causing delays in the 14 May agreement to release and exchange over 1,600 conflict-related detainees. The agreement was mediated by the UN, and its implementation is meant to be facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The next day, the Office of the Special Envoy said that Grundberg received “renewed reassurances” from both sides regarding their commitment to implement the agreement.
On 13 July, the Council held an open briefing on the escalating tensions in the region. The meeting was requested by the Yemeni government’s Prime Minister, Shaya Mohsen Al-Zindani, through a 6 July letter, which cited the recent developments as violations of Security Council resolutions by the Houthis that were supported by Iran.
UN Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific Khaled Khairi and Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Indrika Ratwatte provided the briefings. Khairi called on all parties to engage in negotiations under UN auspices to ensure de-escalation and reach mutually acceptable agreements. Ratwatte cautioned that any further escalation—in Yemen or across the wider region—could have immediate and severe humanitarian consequences, including increased displacement, higher prices for essential imports, and tighter constraints on humanitarian access. He also reiterated calls for the immediate release of UN, non-governmental organisation (NGO), and diplomatic staff arbitrarily detained by the Houthis.
At the same meeting, Ambassador Abdullah Ali Fadhel Al-Saadi (Yemen) argued that the 3 July flight was part of a deliberate attempt to impose a new political and security reality on the ground by bypassing Yemeni state institutions and defying Council resolutions. He further called on the Council to condemn the unauthorised flight and task the Panel of Experts (PoE) supporting the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee with investigating the flight to Sana’a to examine whether it involved the transfer of personnel or materiel in violation of the arms embargo and the sanctions regime. (For more information, see our 10 July What’s in Blue story.)
During a 14 July visit to Muscat, Grundberg held a series of meetings, including with senior Omani officials and the chief negotiator for the Houthis, Mohamed Abdul Salam. In his meetings, he urged the parties to engage in negotiations across political, security, and economic tracks to advance a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict.
On 14 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 2826, extending until 15 January 2027 the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). (For more information, see our 12 July What’s in Blue story.)
On 30 June, the PoE supporting the 2140 Sanctions Committee submitted a report to the committee on the flow of dual-use components and precursor chemicals to individuals or entities designated by the 2140 sanctions regime. The report was requested by Council resolution 2801 of 14 November 2025. The resolution also requested the PoE to present a report and advice on improving information sharing and flag state capacity to prevent vessels suspected of violating the sanctions regime from entering Yemen, which was presented to committee members in July.
Women, Peace and Security Developments
The annual report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), which was circulated to Council members on 28 May and covers developments between January and December 2025, says that CRSV persisted in Yemen. The report cites findings from the PoE on Yemen, reporting widespread CRSV in areas controlled by the Houthis, including to suppress dissent and in detention settings. Among other things, the report says that an all-female unit associated with the security branches of the Houthis has been actively involved in facilitating CRSV “as a form of torture or punishment against women”. It also cites reports by former detainees and human rights activists indicating that children were born in detention following rapes and, in some cases, were separated from their mothers after one year. In his recommendations, the Secretary-General called on the conflict parties to cease all forms of sexual violence and grant unimpeded access to detention settings. He also urged the Yemeni government to prioritise a survivor-centred approach to protection and service delivery and to enact comprehensive legislation criminalising all forms of sexual violence.
Key Issues and Options
The most pressing issue for the Council is the escalation of tensions between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. This marks a departure from the relative calm since the 2022 truce and raises the risk of a return to direct military confrontation involving the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni government, with the potential to further destabilise the wider region.
A related issue is the risk that renewed hostilities could spill over into the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea shipping lanes. The recent renewal—through resolution 2826—of the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting on Red Sea attacks will continue to ensure that the Council is kept updated on any developments in this regard to help determine whether further decisions on the issue may need to be pursued.
Council members could use the upcoming meeting to pressure the parties to de-escalate and to signal that unilateral or retaliatory actions risk further undermining the peace process. In this context, Council members could consider adopting a presidential statement expressing concern over the escalation and calling on all sides to exercise restraint. It could also reaffirm the Council’s support for Grundberg’s mediation efforts and call on the parties to re-engage in negotiations under UN auspices towards achieving a comprehensive, sustainable solution to the conflict.
Another key issue is the fragile state of the 14 May detainee release agreement, whose implementation appears to have stalled amid mutual recriminations between the Houthis and the Yemeni government.
Council members could consider convening an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with the Special Envoy, regional stakeholders, and countries supporting the Yemen peace process to assess both how the momentum generated by the agreement can be translated into broader political progress, and how to mitigate the risk of Yemen being drawn into the wider regional confrontation. The IID could provide a forum for members to encourage the parties to fulfil their commitments under the detainee agreement swiftly and in good faith, discuss ways to support Grundberg’s efforts to resume a credible and inclusive political process, and explore how regional actors can help insulate Yemen from further escalation, while aligning their efforts behind a renewed political framework that reflects current realities on the ground.
Members could also request that the PoE supporting the 2140 Sanctions Committee investigate whether the 3 July flight to Sana’a violated the targeted arms embargo and sanctions regime, in line with Yemen’s request to the Council. Furthermore, the committee could hold a meeting in which it discusses the findings of the two PoE reports requested by resolution 2801, which were circulated to Council members in July.
The continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation, compounded by severe access constraints, also remains a priority. The Council could consider adopting a resolution or presidential statement demanding the immediate and unconditional release of detained personnel and calling for the cessation of interference in humanitarian operations. Members could also consider holding a dedicated meeting focused on the protection of humanitarian personnel in Yemen and inviting a senior OCHA official to brief specifically on access constraints and operational impacts.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members continue to converge on support for an inclusive, Yemeni-owned political process under UN auspices and have similar concerns over the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the Houthis’ continued arbitrary detention of aid and diplomatic workers.
The latest escalation in Yemen, however, has exposed sharper divisions over how to characterise recent events. During the 13 July meeting—which was supported by Bahrain, France, the UK, and the US—a clear majority of members condemned the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and framed the Iranian flights to Sana’a and Hodeidah as violations of Yemeni sovereignty, with France, the UK, and the US underlining them as possible breaches of resolutions 2216 and 2140. Russia and China adopted a more measured tone, avoiding attribution of blame; Russia described the initial flight as “purely humanitarian” and stressed the importance of Sana’a International Airport to the local population. Both China and Russia also called for restraint from all sides and emphasised the need to de-escalate the broader US-Iran and Gulf tensions.
Regional dynamics also remain complex. Saudi Arabia—the Yemeni government’s principal backer—faces a more direct Houthi military threat than in recent years, while Iran’s visible reassertion of its ties to the Houthis raises the risk that Yemen could become a more active arena for wider geopolitical rivalry, particularly as Iran’s confrontations with the US and Israel persist.
The Council’s five permanent members remain divided along traditional lines. France, the UK, and the US continue to favour increased pressure on the Houthis and Iran, including through sanctions and PoE scrutiny, with the US in particular framing recent developments in Yemen within its broader confrontation with Iran. On the other hand, China and Russia continue to warn that exerting greater pressure further risks escalation and argue for prioritising diplomacy to de-escalate tensions in the Gulf.
Differences also persist regarding the Council’s engagement on maritime security in the Red Sea. Following the vote on resolution 2826, China expressed concern that military action in Yemen undermined the peace process and worsened Red Sea insecurity, while Russia argued that the resolution has no added value given recent calm in the Red Sea. Both linked Red Sea tensions to wider regional insecurity.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 14 July 2026S/RES/2826 | This resolution extended the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 January 2027. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 13 July 2026S/PV.10193 | This was an emergency meeting requested by Yemen in a 7 July letter to the Council which accused the Houthis of violating Yemen’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Security Council resolutions, with support from Iran. |
