Working Methods
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold its annual open debate on working methods. Shamala Kandiah Thompson, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, is expected to brief. Ahead of the open debate, Denmark and Pakistan, who were the co-chairs of the IWG in 2025, are expected to circulate a concept note. (The 2026 chairs of the subsidiary bodies have yet to be agreed.)
The open debate will be held under the agenda item “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2024/507)”, referring to the most recent version of the comprehensive compendium of Council working methods.
Key Recent Developments
The Security Council convened for its most recent annual open debate on working methods (S/PV.10043) on 14 November 2025. The briefers were Co-Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen (Denmark), Executive Director of Security Council Report Shamala Kandiah Thompson, and Co-Author of “The Procedure of the UN Security Council” (4th Edition) Loraine Sievers. Pakistan delivered a joint statement on behalf of the elected members (E10). The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT) and the Nordic group also delivered joint statements, and 41 member states participated in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Among the issues raised were the importance of a transparent and inclusive process for selecting the next Secretary-General, more inclusive penholdership, veto restraint, the balance between open and closed meetings, interaction between the Council and other UN organs, and the work of the Council’s subsidiary bodies.
On 22 May, the Council adopted its annual report to the General Assembly (S/2026/426). Pakistan, which was the president of the Council in July 2025, drafted the introduction to the report. (The introductory portion of the report, which presents a factual overview of the Council’s work, is prepared under the coordination of the Council’s July presidency of the previous year. The body of the annual report, which lists the outcomes under different agenda items discussed, is prepared by the Secretariat.) The introduction to this year’s annual report, for the first time, recognises challenges that have hindered the Council’s work in addressing protracted conflicts and large-scale humanitarian crises, such as heightened geopolitical tensions and divisions among Council members. Despite these challenges, it highlights that the Council has continued to engage across various situations, arguing that this reaffirms the organ’s “enduring centrality” in addressing threats to international peace and security.
The Council has yet to agree on the allocations of chairs and vice-chairs for subsidiary bodies for 2026. This marks the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since the annual decision on these assignments was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979, surpassing the extended delay experienced last year. (In 2025, the subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs were not agreed until late May). The impasse has placed significant strain on the work of subsidiary bodies, with Council presidencies performing certain tasks of subsidiary body chairs. This has entailed carrying out only select, urgent duties of the subsidiary body chairs, due partly to the amount of work involved in addition to their responsibilities as president. An added complication is that the lack of clarity on the available positions may delay the negotiations of the incoming Council members regarding the 2027-2028 subsidiary body chair positions. On 30 July, the E10 submitted a letter to the president of the Council that expressed their “shared and deep concern” over the lack of agreement on the chairs and vice-chairs of subsidiary bodies. They said that the impasse undermines the “credibility, effectiveness and institutional integrity of the Security Council”, while “hampering the Council’s ability to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations”. (For background on the delay this year and the impact on the Council’s work, see the In Hindsight on the second year of delays in the allocation of subsidiary chairs in our July Monthly Forecast.)
Since the introduction of the “veto initiative” in April 2022—which calls for the General Assembly to meet within ten working days whenever a veto is cast and for the Council to submit a special report on the use of the veto to the General Assembly on each occasion—25 vetoes have been cast on 18 draft resolutions and three amendments. Each of these vetoes has been discussed by the General Assembly. The General Assembly’s most recent veto initiative meeting was held on 16 April. It addressed the 7 April vetoes of China and Russia on a draft resolution encouraging states to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz.
Since the joint letter issued on 25 November 2025 by the presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly outlining the process for selecting the new Secretary-General, six of the seven candidates for this position have participated in public interactive dialogues organised by the president of the General Assembly in June and July 2026. (The seventh candidate, Olara Otunnu, was nominated on 25 July). Council members held informal meetings with the six candidates that had been nominated at the time, continuing the practice of direct engagement with candidates established in recent selection processes. On 23 July, the six candidates also participated in a town hall in the UN General Assembly with member states and civil society. The first straw poll to determine candidate viability took place on 30 July, with more expected in August.
Key Issues and Options
The continuing delay in appointing subsidiary body chairs for 2026 remains a major issue that has hindered the Council’s work.
Over the years, several interlocutors have made suggestions on how to reform the process of allocations of subsidiary bodies, including SCR; Loraine Sievers, co-author of “The Procedure of the UN Security Council” (4th Edition); and ACT. One option is to move away from considering the allocation of chairs as a package that requires agreement on all positions. The agreed positions could then be conveyed in a presidential note while discussions on positions that have not been agreed continue. Another option would be to only consider the chairs and co-chairs of departing Council members as part of the process, while the positions held by continuing Council members are retained. Additionally, continuing Council members serving as vice-chairs could act as interim chairs the following year if agreement on the allocation of chairs is not reached by the start of the year. Finally, members could consider a more automatic allocation through alphabetical or geographic rotation.
Developments over the past two years have also demonstrated the need to more clearly codify what is expected from Council monthly presidents serving as interim chairs as a stopgap measure, as well as to clarify that such arrangements extend beyond January. A presidential note expanding on contingency measures in the event of a prolonged delay in the appointment of the chairs and vice-chairs could be initiated by Denmark and Pakistan as the 2025 IWG co-chairs. (For more background and analysis on the delay in subsidiary body chair appointments this year, please see the In Hindsight on the second year of delays in the allocation of subsidiary chairs in our July Monthly Forecast.)
An additional issue is to make sure that co-penholderships operate more efficiently. One option would be for co-penholders to consider producing an informal “terms of reference”, mapping out their responsibilities, expectations, and goals for the arrangement. (For analysis on penholding, please see our 27 May research report, The Security Council and the Power of the Pen).
Another issue frequently raised in working methods open debates in recent years is the decades-long disregard for the obligatory abstention provision of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which stipulates that any Council member that is a party to a dispute shall not vote in Council decisions of a substantive nature under Chapter VI (that is, those related to the peaceful settlement of disputes) and under Article 52(3) in Chapter VIII. Member states could also point out when fellow Council members do not adhere to the obligatory abstention in particular cases. In this regard, a draft resolution is currently under discussion in the General Assembly calling for Council members to adhere to the obligatory abstention outlined in Article 27(3).
A long-standing issue is achieving the right balance between public and private meetings and between transparency and confidentiality. Since 2001, Council meetings have predominantly been held in public, including in 2025, when 235 public meetings were held compared to 20 private meetings and 115 closed consultations. Consultations are most useful when there is a willingness to cooperate and have a free-flowing discussion, and, in this context, identifying issues that could benefit from such a discussion may be helpful.
An additional issue is how to strengthen the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. In this regard, Council members can continue to strengthen the analytical nature of the introduction of the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly. Through the veto initiative, the wider membership could use the opportunity to highlight concrete recommendations regarding pathways for action for the General Assembly after the use of the veto.
Another issue concerns strengthening the Security Council’s interaction with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The revised Note 507 adopted in December 2024 encouraged closer engagement between the two bodies, while the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, through the twin General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, underscored the importance of stronger cooperation with the PBC, including through more specific requests, early consultations, and the provision of timely advice. One option would be for the Council to request PBC advice more regularly, including ahead of mandate renewals and transitions and hold more frequent joint informal interactive dialogues (IIDs) with the PBC ahead of Council visiting missions to countries in which the PBC is also engaged.
Given the decrease in visiting missions in recent years, Council members have had little opportunity to witness field settings first-hand and communicate with key stakeholders. Council members may wish to consider which situations would benefit from a visiting mission during the remainder of the year. Given current budgetary constraints, mini-missions comprising a smaller group of Council members might be an option.
Denmark could also consider producing a summary of the open debate with key takeaways for enhancing the Council’s working methods. Such a summary could provide useful ideas for the IWG’s work, once subsidiary body chairs and co-chairs are agreed and the subsidiary bodies begin operating at full capacity.
Council Dynamics
Working methods can be used to make the Council function better. However, they have at times become politicised, impeding rather than improving the Council’s effectiveness and efficiency. Squabbles over which “specially affected” member states can participate in Council meetings without a vote under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure or which civil society briefers are qualified to brief under rule 39 of these rules are examples of such tensions.
During the past eight years, elected members have delivered a joint statement during the annual working methods open debate, which reflects their ongoing commitment to using working methods to promote a more effective and accountable Council in which all members have an opportunity to contribute to international peace and security. In keeping with this practice, the E10 is expected to produce a joint statement, which will be delivered by Liberia in its role as E10 coordinator in August. As in past years, ACT, a cross-regional group of 27 small and mid-sized states aiming to improve the Council’s working methods, is also expected to deliver a joint statement. Switzerland is likely to speak on behalf of ACT.
The need for a more equitable distribution of work, including through penholderships, has continued to be a common objective shared by elected members. The P3 has shown willingness to work with elected members as co-penholders on a case-by-case basis. Elected members often possess valuable regional knowledge and can make important contributions as penholders by bringing their ideas, regional expertise, and political influence to the drafting process. China and Russia have publicly supported expanding the penholder system, while rarely opting to be penholders themselves. One notable development in the past year is that China has assumed the pen on Afghanistan, the only file on which it plays this role.
Given the difficult peace and security environment and the perceived shortcomings of the Council’s work, calls for structural Security Council reform have become particularly salient in recent years during the Council’s working methods, even though the primary forum for dialogue on this issue is the intergovernmental negotiations in the General Assembly.
| Notes by the President of the Security Council | |
| 13 December 2024S/2024/507 | This was a presidential note containing the latest compendium of the Security Council’s working methods. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 14 November 2025S/PV.10043 | This was the first half of the annual open debate on Security Council working methods. |
| 14 November 2025S/PV.10043 (Resumption I) | This was the second half of the annual open debate on Security Council working methods. |
| Other | |
| 22 May 2026S/2026/426 | This was the 2025 annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. |
