Syria
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a civil society representative are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
On 12 July, the People’s Assembly—Syria’s transitional parliament—held its inaugural session. The body consists of 210 seats, 70 of which were directly appointed by Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 1 July, while the rest were appointed through indirect elections in recent months. Around ten percent of the members are women, while three seats reserved for representatives from the Druze governorate of Suweida remain vacant due to the interim government’s lack of control over the region.
On 25 and 26 July, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Syria for the first time since the ouster of former president Bashar al-Assad, marking also the first visit of a UN Secretary-General to Syria since 2009, prior to the outbreak of the civil war. During the visit, Guterres met with Sharaa, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, the Speaker of Parliament, and other official representatives of transitional bodies, women’s organisations, civil society representatives, and members of Syria’s diverse communities. Guterres welcomed progress by the interim government in advancing Syria’s political transition, while urging sustained international political and economic support to ensure a peaceful, inclusive recovery. He also stressed the need to uphold Syria’s sovereignty, ensure accountability for violence, protect all communities, and foster national reconciliation and economic reintegration as the foundations for long-term stability.
In July, Syria witnessed several security-related developments. On 2 July, a bomb explosion in a café close to the Syrian Palace of Justice killed five people and wounded 16 others. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. On 7 July, two bombs exploded close to a hotel in Damascus where French President Emmanuel Macron was staying during his first official visit to Syria since Assad’s ouster. The blasts injured 18 people, and the Syrian authorities later said that they arrested individuals responsible who were affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh).
On 17 July, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly said that it had targeted a US special operations command centre at al-Tanf base in southern Syria with missiles and drones. Syrian authorities reportedly said that the attack had not hit the base itself and that there were no casualties, while US Central Command denied claims that American personnel were captured or killed in the attack. In February, the US had reportedly withdrawn from al-Tanf, handing control to the Syrian military.
At the same time, Israeli incursions into the southern Syrian governorates of Daraa and Quneitra continued to take place, violating Syrian sovereignty and the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the two countries. Israel has argued that its operations in Syria are intended to defend its national security and protect the Druze minority in the country. In a 26 July interview, Sharaa reportedly said that Syria is working to establish a security agreement with Israel, which could help secure a more comprehensive resolution to the crisis between the two countries.
Sharaa also reiterated that Syria has no intention of intervening militarily in Lebanon to fight Hezbollah, despite repeated suggestions from US President Donald Trump that Syria is willing to directly confront the Iran-backed Lebanese group. On 16 July, Syrian authorities said that they had seized a shipment of weapons bound for Hezbollah at the al-Tanf border crossing between Syria and Iraq.
The situation in the southern governorate of Suweida also remains problematic. In his briefing to the Council on 21 July, Cordone warned that security in the region “continued to deteriorate”, including through instances of clashes, intra-Druze fighting, kidnappings, organised crime, and narcotics trafficking. He called for a rebuilding of trust between the Syrian authorities and the Suweida Druze factions, which must include accountability for the July 2025 violence, dialogue, and confidence-building measures, which would build towards a political process resolving underlying issues.
On 21 July, the Council held an Arria-formula meeting on transitional justice and missing persons in Syria, which was organised by Council members Colombia and Denmark together with non-Council members Luxembourg and Syria. (For more information on the meeting, see our 21 July What’s in Blue story.) In their briefings, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk and Assistant Secretary-General and Head of the Independent Institution on Missing Persons (IIMP) Karla Quintana emphasised that addressing the fate of missing persons and advancing comprehensive transitional justice are indispensable to Syria’s recovery, underlining the importance of victim-centred, internationally supported, Syrian-led efforts for accountability, reconciliation, and lasting peace. Also briefing were Abdulbaset Abdullatif, the Head of Syria’s National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ), and Mohammad Reda Jalkhi, the Head of Syria’s National Commission for the Missing (NCMP), who focused on the authorities’ efforts to establish national institutions for transitional justice and missing persons, while underscoring their commitment to a Syrian-owned process focused on accountability and rebuilding public trust with international cooperation.
Briefing the Council on 21 July, OCHA Director of Operations and Advocacy Edem Wosornu stressed that Syria needs a bridge between relief and recovery, arguing that humanitarian action and recovery efforts should be pursued in parallel. She noted that since December 2024, roughly 1.7 million refugees and 1.9 million internally displaced people have returned home, even as millions remain displaced inside and outside Syria. Wosornu called for a coordinated approach that supports voluntary, safe, and sustainable returns while ensuring vulnerable populations are not left behind. She noted, however, that funding is not meeting the scale of the needs, with only one third of OCHA’s humanitarian appeal for this year funded.
Human Rights-Related Developments
Between 10 and 21 July, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Paula Gaviria Betancur, conducted her first country visit to Syria, where she visited Damascus, Rural Damascus, Suweida, and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Engaging with national and local government authorities and representatives of UN entities, among other relevant stakeholders, Betancur assessed the human rights situation of internally displaced persons in the country, including measures taken by the government to address their protection needs and support durable solutions. The Special Rapporteur will present a comprehensive report on her visit to the UN Human Rights Council at one of its upcoming sessions.
On 8 July, Commissioners Monia Ammar and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic concluded their latest visit to Syria. During the visit, the commissioners focused on key international human rights and humanitarian law issues and challenges in furtherance of the commission’s investigative mandate, providing expert advice to relevant interlocutors on strengthening respect for human rights, ensuring accountability, and preventing future violations. They noted progress in developing a transitional justice law and the start of trials in relation to the Assad government-era human rights and international humanitarian law violations. At the same time, the commissioners reiterated the importance of fully implementing its recommendations, aimed at addressing the aftermath of the coastal violence, the Suweida violence, and the overall human rights situation in Syria.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is ensuring that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. By maintaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members could encourage the Syrian government to make concrete progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through accountability and reconciliation processes.
The continued violations of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity by Israel also remains a related and pressing issue.
The security situation inside Syria continues to be a pressure point as well. ISIL attacks in Damascus in July point to a resurging threat in urban areas and underscore the risks of a security vacuum.
The Council could consider adopting a presidential statement calling for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and for full respect for the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Such a statement could also encourage continued progress on the integration agreement with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Suweida political roadmap, urge Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms and meaningfully engage victims and civil society on transitional justice, and call for enhanced financial support to address humanitarian needs and long-term recovery.
In the statement, the Council could urge Damascus to intensify its counter-terrorism efforts and call on international partners to provide sustained support for SSR and capacity-building of Syrian security forces.
The Council could also consider encouraging the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the Syria file. The PBC’s convening role and its capacity to mobilise sustained, coordinated international support for countries navigating fragile transitions could be of significant value at this juncture. Council members, in close collaboration with Syria, could consider requesting written advice from the PBC on how best to support the country’s transition.
The Secretary-General’s visit to Syria on 25 and 26 July underscored the importance of sustained international engagement. Council members could build on the momentum of the visit to press for progress on an expedited agreement for the Special Envoy’s office to relocate to Damascus, given the importance of a meaningful and well-resourced UN presence on the ground to support the transition.
Sustaining international support for Syria’s shift from emergency humanitarian assistance to longer-term recovery remains a key issue. With only one third of the 2026 humanitarian appeal funded, Council members could consider convening an informal interactive dialogue with relevant UN entities and international financial institutions—including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—to discuss how international support can be better coordinated to address humanitarian needs and accelerate early recovery, including through engagement on sanctions relief and Syria’s reintegration into international financial systems.
Council Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that intercommunal tensions cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus and its decisions to delist Sharaa, Syria’s Interior Minister Anas Khattab, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list signalled unified support for Syria’s interim government and the overall transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
During the 21 July meeting, members broadly welcomed the inaugural session of the People’s Assembly on 12 July, with several members highlighting the value of having increased women’s representation within the body.
Furthermore, several Council members have taken steps to normalise bilateral relations with Syria and to support its recovery. The 8 July announcement by Trump of his administration’s intent to rescind the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism continues to signal US commitment to cultivating Syria’s economic recovery and international reintegration. On 17 July, the US also announced its support for a project to rehabilitate and reconstruct an Iraq-Syria crude oil pipeline. In the 21 July Council meeting, France highlighted the significance of Macron’s visit as a signal of growing confidence in Syria’s transition and noted its intent to help attract investors and finance development projects in Syria.
External threats to Syria’s security are also reflected in Council dynamics. Israel’s continued military presence in southern Syria remains an area where members differ in the forcefulness of their language, with western members tending towards more measured language, while the A3 group (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, Pakistan, and Russia are more likely to condemn Israeli actions in stronger terms. At the same time, the UK and the US condemned Iran’s recent attack on southern Syrian territory in their statements at the most recent Council meeting on Syria.
Many Council members remain aligned on the importance of counter-terrorism efforts in Syria, while calling for sustained support for Syrian counter-terrorism capacity. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance against all Security Council-listed terrorist organisations, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, whose members have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 31 July 2026S/PV.10199 | This was a meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
| Other | |
| 31 March 2026S/2026/257 | This was a report of a visiting mission to Lebanon and Syria, which took place from 3 to 7 December 2025. |
