Libya
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold its 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country and the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNSMIL.
The Council is also expected to receive a briefing on the work of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. The usual practice is for the chair of the Committee to brief Council members on the Committee’s activities. At the time of writing, however, the chair had not yet been appointed, as Council members continue to negotiate this year’s allocation of subsidiary body chairs. Consequently, Denmark is expected to brief on the report in its capacity as Council president in August. Ambassador Mohamed Rabi Yusuf (Somalia) served as the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee last year.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Libya remains mired in a political impasse between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over a draft legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention is over the proposal to form a unified interim government to organise the elections—an arrangement favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections.
To address the deadlock over the electoral framework and institutional fragmentation, UNSMIL presented a political roadmap in August 2025 centred on three tracks: establishing a viable framework for presidential and legislative elections; unifying state institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues. The structured dialogue concluded its work on 7 June, generating nearly 600 recommendations to address Libya’s structural challenges and create conditions conducive to the holding of elections.
Briefing the Council on 18 June, Tetteh welcomed the outcome, noting that some 120 Libyans from diverse political, professional, social, and geographic constituencies participated in the process. UNSMIL also collected views from a broader cross-section of society through surveys and other consultation mechanisms, with more than 13,000 Libyans contributing. Tetteh emphasised that the recommendations provide a solid foundation for advancing the political process and urged the Libyan stakeholders to use them as a basis for the next phase of political dialogue.
UNSMIL has also begun engaging a smaller group of Libyan stakeholders, comprising representatives from the two rival governments, to unblock the two election-related milestones in the political roadmap: the adoption of a viable electoral framework and the establishment of a unified government to support the electoral process. Tetteh noted the importance of this format in helping to identify practical steps that Libyan institutions can take to move the electoral process forward. One such meeting took place in April in Rome, although no tangible progress was apparently made in resolving outstanding issues.
Over the past several months, the US has intensified its diplomatic engagement in Libya, spearheaded by US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos. Its approach can be inferred from Boulos’ public statements and media reports, which indicate that it appears to be seeking a power-sharing arrangement between Libya’s main rival factions that would facilitate the unification of state institutions and create conditions conducive to increased investment in the country’s energy sector. According to the arrangements being discussed behind the scenes, Dbeibah would reportedly retain his position as prime minister, while Saddam Haftar (the deputy commander of the LNA and son of Khalifa Haftar) would be elevated to the position of president with executive powers. The arrangements also reportedly provide for a transitional period aimed at consolidating state institutions prior to the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.
Proponents of the US plan argue that it could help stabilise the country, ensure continued production and export of Libya’s oil resources, and facilitate the return of major American energy companies to the sector. Critics, however, argue that the proposal amounts to a “transactional elite bargain” that risks entrenching the dominance of existing political and military actors. Some have particularly expressed concern that the proposal, by privileging an agreement among a narrow group of political and military representatives over a broader, inclusive political process, could further diminish prospects for national elections, sideline broader public aspirations, and undermine the UN-led political process.
On 20 June, Egypt hosted a meeting in Cairo that brought together the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye. Boulos attended the meeting. He described the meeting as “productive”, noting that participants reaffirmed their cooperation in support of Libya’s unity, sovereignty, and long-term stability. Boulos also expressed support for the UNSMIL roadmap and the efforts of Tetteh, including the recommendations emerging from the UN-facilitated structured dialogue. On the following day, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan (that is, the Regional Four Alliance or R4 Group) met in Cairo to discuss regional issues.
On 25 June, GNU Deputy Defence Minister Abdulsalam al-Zoubi met with Boulos and senior US State Department officials in Washington to discuss military and security cooperation. Four days later, Saddam Haftar met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. According to the readout of the meeting released by the US, the discussions focused on Libyan-led efforts to reunify the country, bilateral cooperation, and US support for Libya’s path towards unification.
On 6 July, Boulos met in Valletta, Malta, with senior officials from western and eastern Libya as part of efforts to advance the unification of the country’s institutions. Over the following two days, he travelled to Libya, where he held a series of meetings with political, military, and community stakeholders. In Misrata, Boulos met with local leaders and representatives to discuss their perspectives on the political process and prospects for a more stable and unified Libya. According to media reports, participants expressed opposition to any settlement that would preserve the status quo or reintegrate individuals accused of corruption or human rights abuses. At the same time, they indicated support for US mediation efforts, provided that such efforts respect Libya’s sovereignty and independence. Boulos also met with senior political and military officials in Tripoli and Benghazi.
In a 9 July meeting with Tetteh in Tripoli, Boulos discussed how the US and UNSMIL could work together to advance shared objectives of peace, stability, and unity in Libya. He also reiterated US support for UNSMIL’s political roadmap.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how best to support the roadmap for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process presented by Tetteh in August 2025. Council members have emphasised the importance of fostering common political ground between Libya’s rival authorities to reach agreement on an electoral framework, including modalities for a unified interim government to organise elections.
In light of the US mediation efforts, Council members may want to know more about the plan presented to the Libyan stakeholders. A possible option is to hold an informal meeting with Boulos to get a better sense of those efforts and the prospects for a mediated solution that meets the needs and aspirations of the Libyan people.
Council members have issued two press statements in support of the ongoing process. In the absence of progress, however, they may wish to consider working on a resolution to urge the Libyan political stakeholders to narrow their differences and send a strong signal in support of advancing the political process through the UN roadmap.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan‑led, inclusive political process leading to elections as the only way to restore political, security, and economic stability in the country. They are also broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role in pursuing this objective, and they share concerns about the volatile security situation.
During the two most recent briefings on Libya, several Council members such as the UK, Latvia, and Bahrain commended the US for its role in facilitating the signing of the unified national budget. France and Greece welcomed the US mediation role in efforts to support military integration in Libya. The US emphasised that its efforts in supporting the unification of Libya are complementary to the work of UNSMIL.
However, no Council member has formally endorsed or even directly addressed in a formal Council meeting on Libya the plan’s proposed political architecture advanced by Boulos. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) from 2015 is the internationally recognised framework for Libya’s transition, establishing a collective Presidential Council and requiring a HoR confidence vote for government legitimacy. UNSMIL’s roadmap operates within this framework. The US plan appears to pose a direct challenge to this framework. By proposing a single president and pre-selected prime minister outside the LPA, it would place the Council in the difficult position of having to choose between abandoning its endorsed framework or withholding recognition from the US-backed government. China and Russia have consistently maintained their priority on national sovereignty and the “Libyan-led and Libyan-owned” principle—a position they have reiterated across successive Council briefings on Libya. China has consistently emphasised the UN’s central role in mediation. Russia has consistently relegated UN-led initiatives like the Structured Dialogue to a “supporting role”, warning that “imposing” its recommendations would be “destabilising”, and has instead advocated for a settlement through existing institutions, such as the “tripartite format”. This mechanism brings together Libya’s HoR, Presidential Council, and GNU in a Libyan-initiated dialogue aimed at reaching settlement through existing state institutions rather than an externally imposed framework. Both countries have also consistently urged the protection of frozen Libyan assets, with Russia denouncing the “predatory practices” of foreign financial entities.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 18 June 2026S/PV.10176 | This was an open briefing on the situation in Libya and the work of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). |