In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2026: Mid-Year Scorecard and Looking Ahead
In the first half of 2026, the Security Council continued to be hampered by divisions among its members at a time when there are more conflicts than at any point since the end of World War II. UN peace operations have been a significant focus of the Council’s attention in the first half of the year. Some missions are drawing down, one has closed, and an important resolution on accountability for crimes against peacekeepers was adopted in June. Sanctions committees and working groups have only been functioning at a minimal level so far this year, as members have been unable to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs. The Council has also been laying the groundwork for its recommendation to the General Assembly on who will lead the UN when the current Secretary-General, António Guterres, finishes his term on 31 December 2026.
What do the Statistics Say?
In the first six months of 2026, there was a decline in the number of Security Council meetings, both formal and informal—and a concurrent decrease in the time spent in meetings—as compared to the same period in 2025. There was also a decrease in all forms of outcomes—resolutions, presidential statements, and press statements.[1]
Meetings
From January to June of 2026, there were 104 formal meetings and 47 informal consultations. This represented 18 fewer formal meetings and 19 fewer informal consultations than were convened in the first half of 2025. In the first half of 2026, the Council spent 237 hours in formal meetings and 53 hours in informal consultations; by comparison, from January to June 2025, Council members spent 263 hours in formal meetings and 92 hours in informal consultations. It should also be noted that in the first half of 2026, Council members did not hold any informal interactive dialogues (IIDs)—a closed informal meeting format that, unlike informal consultations, allows for the participation of non-Council member states—while it held three IIDs in the first half of 2025.
A significant factor in the decline in meetings is that the Council is convening less frequently to discuss “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ) agenda item. From January to June 2025, the Council held 22 open or closed meetings on the MEPQ, while it convened seven such meetings in the first half of 2026. This may be a result of the changed situation on the ground. Following the signing of the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” of 29 September 2025, the Council adopted resolution 2803 of 17 November, which endorsed the ceasefire plan. Subsequently, the Council’s intense focus on this issue subsided, although it has continued to discuss the many challenges in implementing the ceasefire and other provisions of the agreement in Gaza.
Other factors have contributed to the drop off in meetings this year. For one, some mandates have expired and are no longer part of the Council’s regular programme of work. In this regard, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) closed at the end of 2025, and the authorisation for maritime interdiction off the coast of Libya to enforce the arms embargo on the country expired in May. In addition, in January, the Council renewed the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for a final two-month period and has decided to meet once every two months to discuss Yemen, rather than every month.
Voting and Formal Outcomes
The Council adopted 14 resolutions in the first half of 2026 (January to June), two fewer than in the same six-month period in the previous year. In 2025, the Council adopted a total of 44 resolutions, which was the lowest number since 1991 (42). The pace of adoptions is likely to pick up in the coming months, as more peace operation mandates come up for renewal in the second half of the year than in the first. However, it appears likely that 2026 will be another year with a very low number of resolutions by post-Cold War standards.
Another revealing figure is that of the 14 resolutions between January and June this year, only eight (or 57 percent) were adopted unanimously. This is consistent with the difficulty that the Council has had in reaching consensus in recent years, with only 61 percent of the resolutions adopted in 2025 having the support of all 15 Council members and 65 percent enjoying unanimous support in 2024. In the decade from 2014 to 2023, the Council adopted 84 percent of its resolutions (494 of 589) unanimously.
Only two presidential statements were adopted between January and June 2026. These were both adopted on 2 April, proposed by Bahrain, and were on the cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations—one focused on the League of Arab States (LAS), while the other was on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This is a strikingly low figure but not inconsistent with the low number of presidential statements in recent years. Last year, the Council adopted eight such outcomes, and the six it adopted in 2023 were the lowest number since the Council began using its current documentation for presidential statements in 1994. By way of comparison, in the decade from 2011 to 2020, the Council adopted a total of 220 presidential statements (an average of 22 per year).
The low number of presidential statements this year has not been due to a lack of effort. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to reach agreement on draft presidential statements, which require the support of all 15 Council members to be adopted. Draft presidential statements so far in 2026 on the rule of law, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), and cooperation between the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) have been aborted because of lack of agreement, in some cases after weeks of negotiations.
The number of press statements is also down this year. While not formal outcomes, they are nonetheless unanimously agreed-upon documents that reflect the will of Council members. Between January and June 2025, there were 22 press statements, while 16 have been issued during the first six months of 2026.
There has only been one vetoed draft resolution so far this year. That was a draft resolution that strongly encouraged states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels. China and Russia vetoed the draft on 7 April, which was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with other member states of the GCC—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan. In their explanations of vote, China and Russia argued that the text could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits, including in relation to the escort of merchant and commercial vessels. They also maintained that the draft resolution failed to address the underlying causes of the escalation, which they linked to military actions by the US and Israel against Iran. Eleven members voted in favour, while two members (Colombia and Pakistan) abstained.
The fact that there has only been one veto to date in 2026 could be viewed as an encouraging development. However, it is important to recognise that concerns about the risk of the veto, which is just as effective in quelling initiatives as the veto itself, continue to be an ongoing factor in the Council’s work. For example, in addition to the 7 April vetoed draft resolution, another draft resolution that focused on de-mining in the Strait of Hormuz, which was penned by Bahrain and the US, was never put to a vote, notwithstanding the fact that it was put in blue and apparently had 138 co-sponsors among the wider UN membership in early May. This was because China and Russia expressed concerns about its provisions, and the draft would likely have been vetoed.
These failed outcomes were part of the Council’s effort to address the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, which was triggered by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region. To date, the Council has only been able to muster one resolution with respect to the conflict.[2] At the same time, no efforts this year have been made to pursue resolutions on several other intractable issues facing the Council—ones that would likely have a high risk of being vetoed. In this respect, there have been no votes so far this year on draft resolutions related to Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), Myanmar, or Sudan. The Council also decided to engage in only a limited way early this year on the crisis in Venezuela. (For more information on the Council’s response to developments in Venezuela, see our 1 February In Hindsight.)
UN Peace Operations at an Inflection Point
The first half of 2026 has been marked by continued efforts led by the US to overhaul UN peace operations as part of a “go back to basics” strategy to cut costs and to focus the UN on what Washington believes is its core peace and security mandate. The approach has included a call for strategic reviews and benchmarks to assess the progress and performance of several missions, with the results informing decisions on whether to streamline or even close missions.
While several members support the need to enhance the efficiency of peace operations, some have expressed concerns about hasty drawdowns and the implementation of benchmarks that may not be in sync with realities on the ground. However, as a permanent member with significant political and financial clout, the US has been able to wield significant influence over the direction of peace operations.
One mission has already been closed this year. UNMHA was shut down at the end of March, in large part due to US concerns that the mission had “outlived its usefulness”. Another peace operation, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), is scheduled to close at the end of 2026 at the behest of the US, which was particularly critical of UNIFIL for not confronting the threat posed by Hezbollah. The Council is currently considering options for a post-UNIFIL engagement in Lebanon.
The UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) will close on 31 October following a two-year transition process laid out in resolution 2753 of 30 October 2024, which was adopted before the start of the current US administration. This transition process has the backing of several Council members, including Somalia, which has strongly supported the handover of responsibilities of the UN’s political mission to Somali institutions and the UN Country Team.
The future direction of other missions whose mandates will be considered by the Council later this year is less clear. The Council has before it a strategic review regarding the future mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), whose current authorisation expires on 31 October. In a 20 March congressional hearing, US Permanent Representative to the UN Mike Waltz indicated that drawing down or streamlining the mandate of MINURSO (among other missions) was under consideration. The US has already said that its future support for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), whose mandate expires on 15 November, would be contingent on the parties (Sudan and South Sudan) making progress on benchmarks that the Council established late last year.[3] Additionally, it has maintained that the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), whose mandate will also expire on 15 November, should transfer mission responsibilities to the CAR authorities or other stakeholders where possible, while calling for reductions in MINUSCA’s troop strength.
This year, a series of attacks affecting UN peacekeepers in some missions—including UNIFIL and UNISFA—highlighted the growing risks they face and the interest among Council members in addressing the issue. In response to these developments, Denmark and Pakistan, who have worked together as a “peacekeeping duo”, co-authored resolution 2823 of 23 June. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously and garnered the support of 153 co-sponsors from the wider membership, focuses on ensuring accountability for crimes against peacekeepers. The resolution requests the Secretary-General to report in 120 days, and then annually, on the “status of the investigation and prosecution of cases related to the killing of and all acts of violence against United Nations personnel serving in peacekeeping operations”.
In the coming weeks, the Secretary-General is expected to release a review of the future of UN peace operations that was requested by member states in the 2024 Pact for the Future. A theme that has emerged in discussions about the future of peace operations—and one that may also feature prominently in the outcome of the review—is how to implement a networked approach that continues to capitalise on the UN’s comparative advantages, while also leveraging partnerships with regional organisations, host countries, and the broader UN system. (For more information on the state of UN peace operations, see our 2 March In Hindsight.)
Secretary-General Selection Process
In May, the Security Council agreed on modalities for meeting with the candidates for Secretary-General[4] and conducting straw polls, which are an informal way of gauging candidate viability. While these modalities were outlined in a private document, they reportedly covered issues such as the location and format of the candidate meetings and the straw polls, public communications related to them, and a timeline for conducting them.
Following interactive dialogues that six of the seven candidates held with the General Assembly, Council members convened closed-door meetings with each of them in June and July. (Olara Otunnu is the only candidate who has yet to participate in these meetings, as he only entered the race on 24 July). The first straw poll took place on 30 July, with more expected in August. In addition to Otunnu, any other candidates who may be nominated following the first straw polls are expected to also have an interactive dialogue with the General Assembly and meet Council members before being included in future straw polls.
While it is not clear precisely when the Council will vote on a resolution recommending a candidate to the General Assembly, it should be noted that the Council recommended the last two Secretaries-General, Ban Ki-moon and Antόnio Guterres, for the General Assembly’s consideration for their first terms on 9 October 2006 and 6 October 2016, respectively. (For background on the selection process for the Secretary-General, see our 15 April research report titled Power, Process and Participation: The Search for the Next Secretary-General.)
Ongoing Delays in the Allocation of Subsidiary Body Chairs
For the second year in a row, the Council has had difficulty agreeing on the allocation of chairs and vice-chairs of subsidiary bodies, which include sanctions committees and working groups. In 2025, agreement was not reached until late May. This year, agreement has yet to be reached, making it the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979.
The sticking point in 2026 relates to the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee. China and Russia have contested the activation of the “snapback” mechanism through which UN sanctions on Iran—outlined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015—were reimposed. As a result, they do not recognise the 1737 Sanctions Committee. This has created an impasse because the list of chairs is agreed as a package deal, which means that it is not finalised until members have agreed on who will chair all the subsidiary bodies.
In the first six months of 2026, Council presidencies have continued to perform certain tasks of subsidiary body chairs, in line with the contingency measures outlined in a 2023 presidential note on the matter. This has entailed carrying out only select, urgent duties of the subsidiary body chairs. (For more information, including on the negative implications of not having chairs of subsidiary bodies on the Council’s work, see our 1 July In Hindsight.)
Conclusion
In the coming months, the Security Council will grapple with several matters that have important implications for global peace and security. A fundamental issue is whether it will be able to play a constructive role in addressing major crises, such as the conflict in Iran and its spillover effects, including in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea; the civil wars in Sudan and Myanmar; and the deteriorating situation in South Sudan, among others. The Council will also have to make several key decisions regarding the mandates of peace operations in the second half of the year. How it responds to the proposals in the forthcoming UN peace operations review is another important question. It also remains unclear whether and how the Council will be able to resolve the impasse regarding its subsidiary bodies. As well, one of the most consequential decisions it needs to make before the end of the year is its recommendation to the General Assembly on the next Secretary-General.
Facing these and other important issues, a divided Council will need to find ways to build trust and cooperate to maximise its effectiveness in difficult fiscal circumstances and a fluid international peace and security environment. Perhaps now more than ever, given the surge in conflicts and the resulting large-scale loss of human life in recent years, the world needs an effective Security Council.
[1] For useful statistics on the Security Council’s work, please see UN Security Council Affairs Division, “Monthly Highlights of Security Council Practice”, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/monthly-highlights>.
[2] This was resolution 2817 of 11 March, which condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes against countries in the region, demanded that Iran immediately halt them, and condemned threats by Iran aimed at closing or obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
[3] These benchmarks include the demilitarisation of the Abyei area; the resumption of meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body meant to discuss security matters of mutual concern for Sudan and South Sudan; and the establishment of the Abyei Joint Security Police.
[4] The candidates are Michelle Bachelet Jeria, the former President of Chile and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, the former President of the UN General Assembly; Rafael Mariano Grossi, the current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis, the former Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett, the Ambassador of Guyana to the UN; Macky Sall, the former President of Senegal; and Olara Otunnu, a former UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict.