DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In August, Council members are scheduled to discuss the 90-day report on the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations.
Ordinarily, the chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee briefs Council members on the report. At the time of writing, the chair had not been appointed, as Council members have not been able to agree on this year’s allocation of subsidiary bodies. If the chair is not appointed by the time the meeting is scheduled to take place, Denmark, as president of the Council in August, is likely to brief members on the report, consistent with recent practice. Greece served as chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee last year, after the appointments were finalised in May 2025.
Background and Key Recent Developments
The mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee—which monitored and submitted biannual reports on sanctions implementation—expired on 30 April 2024 after Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended it.
In October 2024, 11 countries—including the Council’s P3 members (France, the UK, and the US), Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—established the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to “monitor and report violations and evasions of sanctions measures” stipulated in relevant Security Council resolutions on the DPRK. Since then, the MSMT has published two reports: one dated 29 May 2025 on alleged unlawful military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia following the latter’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and another dated 22 October 2025 on the DPRK’s alleged violations and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and information technology activities.
The DPRK has continued to accelerate the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities. On 15 April, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that the country had made “very serious” advances in its nuclear weapons programme, including the likely construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and increased activity at other nuclear sites. He assessed the DPRK’s current nuclear arsenal at “a few dozen” warheads.
On 30 April, the Security Council convened for an open briefing under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/DPRK”. The meeting was requested by Council members Bahrain, Denmark, France, Latvia, the UK, and the US, as well as non-Council members Japan and the ROK, to discuss the DPRK’s “continued violations of multiple Security Council resolutions”.
Briefing the Council, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo noted that the DPRK’s Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)—the DPRK’s ruling party—held from 19 to 25 February, had outlined plans to introduce “new secret arsenals and special strategic assets”, including “ICBM complexes of ground and underwater launching”. She also referred to the DPRK’s testing of ballistic missiles equipped with what it calls “cluster bomb and fragmentation mine warheads”. DiCarlo warned that heightened military activity and limited dialogue had increased tensions and the risk of miscalculation, stressing the need for sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
Media reports quoting the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a DPRK state news outlet, noted that on 26 May, the DPRK had tested a newly developed lightweight multi-purpose missile launch system, tactical ballistic missiles, 240-millimetre guided artillery rockets, and tactical cruise missiles. The tests reportedly assessed what KCNA described as a “special mission warhead” on tactical ballistic missiles, the reliability and extended range of the artillery rockets, and the accuracy of cruise missiles equipped with autonomous navigation and artificial intelligence-based terminal guidance systems.
On 4 June, the DPRK reportedly unveiled a new facility for producing nuclear weapons material, which ROK authorities assessed to be a uranium-enrichment plant.
According to media reports, on 25 June, the DPRK tested an upgraded 240-millimetre multiple rocket launcher, tactical ballistic missiles, and a 155-millimetre self-propelled howitzer. The upgraded rocket launcher reportedly incorporates an autonomous precision-guidance system and has an extended range of 90 kilometres.
On 23 June, the DPRK commissioned its first 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer, the Choe Hyon, reportedly equipped with anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems, as well as nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. On 3 July, the DPRK conducted weapons trials aboard another destroyer, the Kang Kon, including the firing of its five-inch main gun and machine guns and the launch of several cruise missiles.
On 10 July, media reports citing KCNA said that the WPK’s Central Military Commission had adopted measures to strengthen the DPRK’s nuclear forces “quantitatively and qualitatively”. The measures reportedly included upgrading combat-system infrastructure, modernising military bases, strengthening intelligence capabilities, and expanding naval infrastructure and shipbuilding capacity.
Military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia continues to be reported. On 19 and 20 July, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow for the third strategic dialogue between the two countries, which focused on implementing their 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. On 25 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy alleged that Russia was preparing to receive an additional 30,000 DPRK troops, and that Pyongyang was preparing to supply new ballistic-missile launchers to Russia. On 28 July, media reports indicated that the two countries were nearing completion of their first road crossing—a bridge over the Tumen River linking Khasan in Russia with Tumangang in the DPRK—amid concerns that it could facilitate the movement of troops and military equipment.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 16 March press statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said that fundamental rights in the DPRK continued to be severely curtailed, including freedom of expression, the right to information, freedom of movement, and access to food and healthcare. He noted that accountability for grave violations, some of which may amount to crimes against humanity, remained extremely limited. Türk encouraged the DPRK to engage with international human rights mechanisms and urged states to pursue an International Criminal Court (ICC) referral and exercise extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction. He also emphasised the importance of supporting engagement aimed at improving the human rights situation, ending the country’s isolation, and advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Key Issues and Options
The Council continues to grapple with several long-standing issues on the DPRK file. A major concern is the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of multiple Council resolutions. The pace and breadth of its weapons development, including efforts to modernise its conventional and naval capabilities and integrate advanced technologies into its weapons systems, present an additional challenge.
Sanctions evasion and the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime also remain key challenges, particularly as the DPRK is widely believed to have significantly expanded its nuclear arsenal since the regime was established in 2006. The DPRK’s continued refusal to engage in denuclearisation dialogue, together with the country’s humanitarian and human rights situations, presents further challenges for the Council.
Council members could consider holding an informal meeting to discuss strategies for enhancing member state compliance with existing resolutions on the DPRK and compelling the DPRK to return to dialogue.
The lack of a PoE assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue. Some members appear to feel that the MSMT does not carry the same authority as an entity mandated by the Council. Given this concern, Council members, who are also part of the MSMT or who support its work, could explore options for enhancing its credibility, such as expanding its membership and providing more information about the way in which it operates. They could also convene an Arria-formula meeting with MSMT representatives and relevant experts to discuss its findings and their implications for sanctions implementation. In addition, they could consider holding joint press stakeouts following the release of MSMT reports. Such members could further convene informal expert-level meetings to consider how those findings might support the work of the Council and the 1718 Committee.
Separately, members could request an open Council briefing to address recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, their security implications for the broader region, and possible measures to reduce tensions and revive diplomatic engagement.
As well, UN agencies with relevant expertise, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), could be asked to brief the Committee on the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Council Dynamics
The Council is sharply divided over the DPRK, and this dynamic appears to have worsened as cooperation between the DPRK and Russia has increased. The P3 and other like-minded Council members generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its nuclear weapons programme while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some have also called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. Several of these members have strongly criticised the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including by highlighting evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia and noting that these transfers violate Council resolutions. Some have also called for the reinstatement of the PoE assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US and its allies for heightening tensions and have accused the US of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have previously argued that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country and have also blocked attempts to issue a Council product responding to missile launches carried out by the DPRK in recent years.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 30 April 2026S/PV.10147 | This was an open briefing held under the “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)” agenda item. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |