Conflict and Food Insecurity
Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council is expected to hold a high-level open debate on conflict-related food insecurity under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item. A signature event of Denmark’s Council presidency, the meeting will be chaired by Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lars Løkke Rasmussen. The anticipated briefers are UN Secretary-General Antόnio Guterres, Acting Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP) Carl Skau, and a civil society briefer.
Key Recent Developments
The annual report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians, dated 7 May and covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2025, included a section on food insecurity and water scarcity. The report notes that in 2025 more than 147 million people in 19 countries and territories faced acute conflict-induced food insecurity, adding that “for the first time in two decades, two famines were confirmed in the same year, in the Sudan and the Gaza Strip”. In addition to these conflict situations, the report mentions Nigeria, Myanmar, Somalia and Yemen, stating that the causes of conflict-induced food insecurity in these places included: denial of humanitarian access and restrictions on the entry of aid and commodities; siege tactics; destruction and damage to cropland, fishing, irrigation and market infrastructure; direct harm to food and water sources and impediments to food and water production, delivery, and access; disruptions to maritime traffic, fuel imports and supply chains; and humanitarian funding gaps. The tenth edition of the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises, published on 24 April by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the WFP, and the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC), also noted a steep decline in humanitarian financing to food sectors, which fell to levels last seen in 2016-2017, compounding the effects of conflict-driven crises.
The FAO and WFP’s 17 June Hunger Hotspots report, covering the outlook period of June to November 2026, warned that acute food insecurity could deepen across 13 countries and territories. Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen are classified as the highest concern level, with populations already facing or at risk of entering catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase 5) conditions. A risk of famine persists in four contexts—Sudan, South Sudan, Gaza, and Somalia—according to the report. The report also said that the international community faces a narrowing window to prevent widespread loss of life, with armed conflict, supply disruptions in the Middle East, climate shocks, and severe funding reductions converging to drive conditions toward starvation in the most acute contexts.
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz—through which around a fifth of global oil shipments passed before the outbreak of hostilities on 28 February—have introduced a new systematic shock to global food security. FAO has warned that fertilizer scarcity resulting from the disruption will reduce yields and tighten food supplies in the latter half of 2026 and into 2027, and that the window for preventative action is closing quickly. WFP has estimated that if oil prices continue to remain high, up to 45 million additional people could be pushed into hunger. An additional 2.5 million people in Somalia, 2.3 million in Afghanistan, and 1.3 million in Sri Lanka have already been pushed into acute food insecurity or hunger as at 4 June, according to WFP.
On 27 March, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of a task force, led by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Jorge Moreira da Silva. This task force is focused on developing and proposing mechanisms designed to alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. The mechanism aims to facilitate fertilizer trade and the movement of related raw materials, drawing inspiration from other UN initiatives such as the UN Verification, Inspection and Monitoring Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM), the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), and the mechanism for Gaza initiated by Council resolution 2720. In a 24 July statement, Silva said that the task force had developed a “practical confidence-building Mechanism” providing for a “structured process for the registration, deconfliction, prioritisation, facilitation, monitoring, verification and reporting of vessel movements”, which is ready to become operational provided that the involved parties agree to it.
The food security situation in Gaza continues to be dire. The 23 July IPC special snapshot found that over 1.2 million people—59 percent of the population—faced crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse conditions between mid-April and June 2026, a figure projected to rise to 1.4 million people between July and December, including 212,000 people remaining in emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions. An expansion of humanitarian assistance following the October 2025 ceasefire agreement generated measurable improvements on food consumption and malnutrition indicators; however, these gains are increasingly fragile. Aid coverage has declined steadily since February, the population remains almost entirely dependent on external assistance, and continued hostilities, displacement, and access restrictions risk a rapid reversal of progress.
In Sudan, conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), now entering its fourth year, continues to be the primary driver of what FAO, WFP, and UNICEF described in a 15 May joint statement as one of the world’s most acute food crises. Nearly 19.5 million people—two in every five Sudanese—face high levels of acute food insecurity, with around 135,000 people in catastrophic conditions across 14 hotspots in Darfur and South Kordofan. Although famine conditions confirmed in parts of North Darfur in 2025 were not re-confirmed in a 14 May IPC analysis, the risk of famine persists across 14 areas of Sudan through August 2026. Conflict-driven restrictions on humanitarian access, attacks on supply routes, and destruction of markets and productive infrastructure continue to prevent aid from reaching those most in need, with only 40.3 percent of Sudan’s 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan currently funded.
The Security Council has addressed conflict-related food insecurity in several thematic meetings in recent years. Most recently, in November 2025, Sierra Leone organised a high-level open debate on this issue as a signature event of its Council presidency. Similarly, during their Council presidencies, Guyana and Switzerland organised high-level open debates related to food insecurity in February 2024 and May 2023, respectively. Between 2021 and 2023, the US also organised high-level open debates on conflict-induced food insecurity during its Council presidencies. In connection with one such meeting in August 2023, the Security Council adopted a US-proposed presidential statement (S/PRST/2023/4) on the issue.
Additionally, Council members have convened on numerous occasions to discuss conflict-related food insecurity in relation to country-specific situations, often at the request of the co-focal points on conflict and hunger. Several of these meetings were held in response to white notes that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) submitted in accordance with resolution 2417 of 24 May 2018, which condemned the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council when “the risk of conflict-induced famine and widespread food insecurity” occurs. The most recent meetings to be held in connection with food insecurity in country-specific situations were the 9 February closed consultations on the situation in Sudan and the 16 June 2025 closed consultations on the situation in Gaza.
This year, the Council’s co-focal points on conflict and hunger, Denmark and Bahrain, started to convene monthly expert meetings on situations on the Council’s agenda that FAO and WFP have identified as “hunger hotspots”. (Since the creation of this informal role in 2019, the focal points have organised Council meetings on OCHA’s white notes, in addition to convening members to consider the periodic reports on “hunger hotspots” issued by FAO and WFP.)
Key Issues and Options
A key issue is the compounding effect of the Strait of Hormuz crisis on an already dire global hunger landscape, with famine risk persisting in a number of countries as fertilizer shortages and rising fuel prices threaten to push tens of millions more into acute food insecurity.
August’s open debate could serve as a platform for Council members to assess ways to mitigate the hunger crisis, particularly in situations when conflict and regional escalations are exacerbating food insecurity beyond the territory directly affected by hostilities due to impacts on agricultural inputs and energy. In this regard, Council members could consider whether resolution 2417—which recognises conflict’s direct and indirect impact on food security while also calling on conflict parties to avoid harming objects necessary for food production and distribution—could be interpreted to address conflict-induced risks to global food systems and supply chains, including where food insecurity extends beyond the territory directly affected by hostilities.
Council members could also consider ways to support the Secretary-General’s task force mechanism and to facilitate its operationalisation. Adopting a de-politicised, humanitarian Council product that either supports or gives full Council authorisation to the mechanism is one such option. Such a product could even support the establishment of a humanitarian corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, allowing the transit of frozen aid and food stocks.
The persistent gap between early warning and early action also remains a core issue. Despite resolution 2417’s requirement for swift reporting, hunger hotspots continue to escalate before garnering sustained Council attention, further compounded by steep humanitarian funding shortfalls. Council members could request having a more regular, predictable reporting cycle for OCHA’s white notes, support a standing focal point to consolidate and coordinate early-warning data, and hold formal discussions on IPC reports prior to having a famine declaration. Members could also continue to draw on the co-focal points’ initiative for monthly expert meetings on hunger hotspots as a channel for sustained monitoring.
Furthermore, accountability for starvation as a method of warfare remains underused as a Council tool, particularly in Gaza and Sudan. Options include encouraging referrals to relevant judicial bodies and more consistent application of targeted sanctions against those obstructing humanitarian access.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members agree that conflict is a primary driver of acute food insecurity and that compliance with international humanitarian law—particularly the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare—is central to addressing it. This consensus was evident at the 17 November 2025 open debate, where nearly all speakers called for the Council to treat food security as integral to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Divisions persist, however, over the Council’s role and framing. Russia tends to question whether the Council is the appropriate body to address hunger, arguing at the November debate that causation runs from conflict to food insecurity rather than the reverse, and that the question of hunger must be comprehensively addressed, including through other UN bodies and agencies. It has also argued that Western sanctions and aid cuts contribute to compounding global hunger.
China has similarly resisted what it perceives as Council overreach into thematic terrain it views as belonging to the General Assembly or specialised UN agencies, particularly when considering arguments linking climate change to food crises.
The US, while having been a vocal proponent of Council attention to conflict and hunger linkages and accountability for starvation crimes in the past, has appeared to be less vocal on such issues in recent years. During past Council meetings discussing famine in Gaza, the US disputed IPC famine determinations in Gaza, complicating unified messaging from the Council on the issue.
These dynamics now intersect directly with the disruptions caused by hostilities in the Strait of Hormuz, where permanent members’ divisions over the broader US-Iran confrontation are likely to shape their appetite for Council engagement. France, the UK, and the US could directly accuse Iran of exacerbating global food insecurity through its blockades of the Strait, while China and Russia may emphasise the roles of the US and Israel in triggering the current crisis by launching the war against Iran in late February.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 24 May 2018S/RES/2417 | This was a resolution on the link between armed conflict and food insecurity. It strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, as well as the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 7 May 2026S/2026/390 | This was the Secretary-General’s annual report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. |
