Syria
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone and a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
The Syrian interim government—led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa—has continued its efforts to insulate Syria from regional volatility in the Middle East, as it steers the country through the transitional period.
Despite the 14 June announcement of a memorandum of understanding consolidating the Iran-US ceasefire, Hezbollah and Israel continued exchanging strikes in Lebanon, complicating efforts to end the Israeli-US war with Iran. On 16 June, US President Donald Trump suggested that Syria assume responsibility for confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, an idea Washington has reportedly promoted since March. Sharaa has repeatedly rejected military intervention, stating in a 21 June interview that Syria seeks only to support Lebanon and deepen economic integration, while remaining open to dialogue with Hezbollah if it serves Lebanese stability. The following day, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reportedly praised Sharaa’s position in a call with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.
In southern Syria, Damascus continues to face challenges to its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. On 15 June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israeli forces would remain in Lebanese and Syrian territory, areas it characterises as “security zones”. The Secretary-General’s 2 June quarterly report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), covering 14 February to 14 May, and media reports, indicate that Israel has established positions in Syrian territory beyond the ceasefire line and buffer zone established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the two countries, conducting hundreds of incursions since December 2024. At the Council’s 22 June monthly briefing on Syria, the country’s Permanent Representative Ibrahim Olabi said Netanyahu’s “statement confirms that Israel is the main obstacle to stability in Syria”. On 25 June, the Council unanimously renewed UNDOF’s mandate until 31 December. (For more information, see our 19 June What’s in Blue story on Syria and the brief on UNDOF in our June 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
The situation in Suweida governorate is also fuelling insecurity in southern Syria and poses a threat to the country’s unity. Briefing the Council on 22 June, Cordone reported that there had been no progress on implementing the September 2025 Suweida roadmap—announced by Jordan, Syria, and the US—which aims to build confidence between authorities in Damascus and Druze actors in Suweida and to eventually reintegrate the governorate under Damascus’ control. He noted that distrust between the actors persists, while calls for secession, internal rivalries among Druze factions, and violence continue to impact the governorate.
In contrast, developments in northeast Syria suggest continued implementation of the 29 January agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In his briefing, Cordone noted that four SDF brigades have been integrated into the national armed forces and are “receiving salaries through national structures”. He also said approximately 1,300 SDF-affiliated detainees have been released, and displaced Kurdish families have started to return to their homes. At the same time, he said that challenges persist, including: the integration of Asayish personnel—the Kurdish internal security and police forces—into the Ministry of Interior; “the future status of the Women’s Protection Units; integration of the civilian administration; and the education curriculum”.
The threat posed by terrorism in Syria remains acute. In June, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) claimed several attacks—including in Aleppo, Raqqa, and rural Damascus—which resulted in the deaths of Syrian security personnel and injuries to several others. For its part, Syria has taken significant steps towards countering the threat posed by ISIL. The Ministry of Interior conducted a three-month counter-terrorism campaign, which led to the dismantling of several cells, the arrest of 235 ISIL operatives, and the seizure of weapons and explosives.
Syria is also facing challenges on transitional justice. In the first half of June, protests calling for accountability for crimes committed under the former government led by Bashar al-Assad erupted across several cities, with some reportedly escalating into mob violence against minorities and individuals associated with the former government. On 15 June, the Syrian interior ministry confirmed that it had arrested nearly 6,000 former regime members, including senior officers. At the 22 June Council meeting, Cordone highlighted the importance of the draft transitional justice law being developed by the National Commission for Transitional Justice and the Ministry of Justice, stressing that to be credible it must address atrocity crimes committed by all parties—not only the former government—and fully account for the experiences of women and survivors of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).
The Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 16 June and covering developments in 2025, noted that the UN had verified 1,374 grave violations against 1,281 children in Syria. (For more information on the grave violations, see the Secretary-General’s full report.) Syrian parties that have committed grave violations against children included Syrian government forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the SDF, and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—a former opposition armed group. The report clarified that “most grave violations attributed to Syrian government forces occurred before the formal establishment of the current Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 29 March 2025” and expressed concern that members of the SNA and HTS have been integrated into Syria’s forces. It further noted that Damascus has committed to ensuring that children are not integrated into its forces, to preventing recruitment, and to ensuring that violators of children’s rights are held accountable. It also welcomed the government’s commitment to engage on a plan to end and prevent grave violations against children and its prioritisation of decontamination and clearance of explosive remnants of war, which are killing and maiming children at alarming rates.
Also briefing the Council on 22 June, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Indrika Ratwatte noted that while there are signs of progress towards recovery, humanitarian needs remain acute and conditions for sustainable returns are uneven across the country. He highlighted that the Euphrates flooding at the end of May affected over 17,600 people, damaging farmland and critical infrastructure. He also noted that conditions in Quneitra and Suweida southern governorates remain particularly fragile. Ratwatte warned that the $2.92 billion 2026 humanitarian appeal is only 20 percent funded, and called on Council members to sustain flexible funding, support Syria’s transition beyond emergency aid, and invest in longer-term recovery and reconstruction.
Women, Peace and Security
The annual report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, which was circulated to Council members on 28 May, addresses cases of abductions followed by rape and forced marriage, including against Alawite women, and allegations of abductions of Druze and Bedouin women and sexual violence perpetrated against them by armed elements in 2025.
The report states that, following the release of thousands of people from detention facilities after Assad’s ouster, the UN documented “multi-year patterns” of rape and sexual violence, including as a form of torture, perpetrated under the regime against detainees as young as 11 years old. The report also refers to sexual violence incidents against four girls perpetrated between October 2022 and December 2024 by Da’esh and the SNA. Additionally, it notes that at least three appointees to the Syrian Armed Forces “have reportedly been implicated in recent or past human rights violations against minorities” in the context of which CRSV “allegedly occurred”.
In his recommendations, the Secretary-General called upon the Syrian government to ensure accountability for CRSV crimes within the transitional justice framework and to engage with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, on prevention, protection, and assistance measures for survivors.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is ensuring that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. By maintaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members could encourage the Syrian government to make concrete progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through accountability and reconciliation processes.
A related issue is how the Council should respond to continued violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement and Israel’s military presence in and beyond the areas of separation.
To address the many-faceted challenges facing Syria, the Council could consider adopting a presidential statement calling for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including through adherence to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and a cessation of Israeli military activity in Syrian territory. Such a statement could also encourage progress on the SDF integration agreement and the Suweida roadmap, urge Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms, and meaningfully engage victims and civil society on transitional justice—including on CRSV. It could also call for enhanced financial support to address humanitarian needs and long-term recovery.
The Council could also consider encouraging the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the Syria file. The PBC’s convening role and its capacity to mobilise sustained, coordinated international support for countries navigating fragile transitions could be of value at this juncture. Council members, in close collaboration with Syria, could consider the possibility of requesting written advice from the PBC ahead of the Council meetings on how best to support the country’s transition.
An additional issue is how to sustain international support for humanitarian assistance and early recovery. Council members could consider an informal interactive dialogue with relevant UN entities and international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to discuss how international support can be better coordinated to address Syria’s humanitarian needs and support early recovery.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue. Council members could maintain support for an expedited agreement on Cordone’s office relocating to Damascus and enhancing cooperation with the Syrian government, given the importance of a meaningful UN presence in supporting the political transition. They could also press for progress on appointing a Special Envoy following Geir O. Pedersen’s October 2025 resignation.
Council Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice, alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus and its decisions to delist Sharaa, Syria’s interior minister Anas Khattab, and HTS from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list signalled unified support for Syria’s interim government and the overall transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
Furthermore, several Council members have taken steps to normalise bilateral relations with Syria and to support its recovery. High-level officials of the Syrian government have visited all the capitals of the Council’s five permanent members. The European Union’s 11 May decision to fully resume its 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and open talks on stronger economic and security ties is likely to translate into European Council members’ growing support for the transition.
External threats to Syria’s security are also reflected in Council dynamics. Fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon continues to pose a proximate security issue for Syria. Trump’s suggestion that Syria take on responsibility for confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Sharaa’s firm rejection of military intervention, have highlighted a divergence between Washington’s expectations—as it continues to cultivate positive bilateral relations with Damascus—and Syria’s stated priorities.
Meanwhile, Israel’s continued presence in southern Syria is an area of some divergence. While the Council voted unanimously to renew UNDOF’s mandate on 25 June, members differ in how strongly they are willing to call for an Israeli withdrawal, with western members tending towards more measured language, while China, Pakistan, and Russia are more likely to condemn Israeli actions in stronger terms. Overall, Council members have so far managed to keep Syria-specific discussions relatively separate from regional tensions, in part due to Syria’s efforts to insulate itself from the escalation.
Many Council members agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTF in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTF constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 22 June 2026S/PV.10178 | This was a meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
| Other | |
| 31 March 2026S/2026/257 | This was a report of a visiting mission to Lebanon and Syria, which took place from 3 to 7 December 2025. |