Lebanon
Expected Council Action
In July, Council members expect to receive a briefing in consultations on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 1701. Adopted in 2006, resolution 1701 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The Secretary-General’s report is due on 9 July. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and a representative of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) are the expected briefers. (On 26 June, spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric announced that, as of 1 July, Jean Arnault will serve as Officer-in-Charge of UNSCOL following the conclusion of Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert’s term.)
Key Recent Developments
On 26 June, following several rounds of negotiations in Washington, DC, Lebanon, Israel, and the US signed a Trilateral Framework agreement intended to establish a pathway toward a “full comprehensive peace and security” arrangement. The framework agreement seeks to chart a way out of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah that began on 2 March when, shortly after the US-Israeli attacks on Iran, Hezbollah fired projectiles at Israel, which responded with large-scale airstrikes in several parts of Lebanon and sustained ground operations in the south of the country, carrying out demolitions and deploying to an area of up to 10 kilometres north of the Blue Line. (The Blue Line is a withdrawal line set by the UN in 2000 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. While not an international border, the Blue Line acts in practice as a boundary between Lebanon and Israel in the absence of an agreed-upon border between the two states.)
In the agreement, Israel and Lebanon declared their intent to “end the conflict, address its underlying causes, and to therewith formally conclude any state of war between them”. They also committed to a process by which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will “restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory”. The agreement says that details of this process will be contained in a future security annex to be developed with the support of the US. It nonetheless states that the LAF will “gradually assume full and effective security responsibility in pilot zones”, two of which have already been agreed upon by the IDF and the LAF. Once non-state armed groups are disarmed and their infrastructure is dismantled in these zones, the LAF will assume full security responsibility, “internationally supported reconstruction efforts will begin”, and Lebanese civilians will be able to return.
In the agreement, Israel underscored that the termination of the threat posed by Hezbollah would “eliminate any future need for IDF military action or presence in Lebanon” and declared that “it has no territorial ambitions” there. At the same time, Lebanon and Israel affirmed that the framework does not prevent them “from exercising their inherent right to defend themselves”. Israel and Lebanon also agreed to the “cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora”. The agreement further says that both governments “commit to establishing a military coordination group” with the participation of the US, to ensure the implementation of the framework. The US will simultaneously “rally international partners” to support rebuilding Lebanon, repairing infrastructure, restoring the economy, and “creating opportunities for prosperity”.
Hezbollah officials rejected the agreement, with parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah warning that enforcing it would require the Lebanese authorities to enter a civil war. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem described it as a “grave error” and said it was “null and void”, accusing the government of legitimising a prolonged Israeli presence, and rejecting any linkage between Israeli withdrawal and the disarmament of Hezbollah. He argued that the 17 June memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US—under which the US and Iran “and their allies” declared an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon”—should instead be implemented as the appropriate framework to address the situation in Lebanon.
A 25 June update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), citing figures from the Lebanese government, reported that 4,230 people have been killed and 12,179 injured in Lebanon since 2 March. The update notes that attacks on healthcare have had a severe impact, with 135 health workers killed and 406 injured. It also highlights that ongoing insecurity, the presence of unexploded ordnance, and extensive destruction continue to pose significant risks, particularly in areas close to the IDF deployment area in Lebanon. According to media reports citing figures provided by Israel, as at 14 June, four civilians were killed in Israel in Hezbollah attacks and 28 IDF soldiers died in Lebanon.
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has repeatedly come under attack during the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, with seven UNIFIL peacekeepers killed since 2 March. The mission has also reported repeated restrictions on its freedom of movement. In response to attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers, Council members adopted three press statements on 1 April, 20 April, and 12 June condemning the killing of peacekeepers; reaffirming full support for UNIFIL; and calling on all parties to respect the safety, security, and freedom of movement of UN personnel and to fully implement resolution 1701.
Resolution 2790, which in August 2025 extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December, requested the Secretary-General to provide options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701 after the withdrawal of UNIFIL, including regarding “assistance in respect of security and monitoring of the Blue Line” and ways to enhance the support to the LAF’s redeployment south of the Litani River through the UN’s “tools”.
In a 1 June letter to the Security Council, the Secretary‑General stressed that since the adoption of resolution 2790, the situation on the ground has changed significantly, with recurrent hostilities underscoring the imperative of the full implementation by the parties of resolution 1701. The letter, which outlines three options, said that a UN uniformed presence facilitating de-escalation, dialogue, liaison, and coordination between the parties, and support for the LAF, would be necessary to complement a strengthened UNSCOL Office towards a long-term solution of the conflict. More specifically, the UN, as “the temporary custodian of the Blue Line”, would retain a “vital role” in impartially monitoring and maintaining the Blue Line through observation, reporting, cartography, surveying, marking, and technical deconfliction efforts. Regarding UNSCOL’s expanded role, the letter says, among other things, that it could assume further responsibilities in the facilitation of dialogue, including in support of arrangements to monitor a cessation of hostilities. Regarding the UN uniformed presence after the end of UNIFIL, the three options are:
- Option 1: A robust deployment of approximately 5,525 uniformed personnel, including 350 unarmed military observers, four infantry battalions of 750 armed troops for force protection, and a force reserve of 700 armed troops. The letter says that this configuration would provide “the capacity to most credibly observe” developments along the Blue Line and up to the Litani River, with strong liaison, inter‑positioning and deconfliction capacity, and significant ability to verify violations of resolution 1701 and any cessation of hostilities arrangement, and to support LAF deployment. This configuration could carry out verification and investigations of violations, “including north of the Litani River”.
- Option 2: A medium‑sized presence of approximately 3,370 uniformed personnel, including 285 unarmed military observers, two infantry battalions of 750 armed troops each, and a force reserve of 450 armed troops, focused primarily on the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River, with capacity to conduct verification and investigations of violations of resolution 1701 in this area, but only partial monitoring capacity, more limited liaison and interposition functions, and reduced support to the LAF.
- Option 3: A smaller presence of approximately 1,980 uniformed personnel, including 215 unarmed military observers, two light infantry battalions of 450 armed troops each, and a quick-reaction force of 350 armed troops. This deployment would have no inter-positioning capability and only limited capacity to support LAF deployment. It would also have limited capacity to carry out monitoring and verification; provide information about developments on the ground, including violations; and offer liaison and coordination activities between the parties.
Women, Peace and Security
On 29 May, the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) convened on the situation in Lebanon. Deputy Special Coordinator and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon Imran Riza briefed. It seems that IEG members were briefed on the impact of the conflict in Lebanon on women and girls, including regarding livelihoods, shelters, psychosocial support, and women’s participation in political and conflict-resolution processes. Among other issues, members apparently inquired about the anticipated consequences of the withdrawal of UNIFIL, which, paired with uncertainties over the security arrangements, is expected to have significant socioeconomic consequences. UN Women, as the IEG Secretariat, apparently recommended that members request that technical gender expertise, comprehensive gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives, and consultations with women’s organisations be central to all options for the UN’s future in Lebanon after the withdrawal of UNIFIL. It seems that UN Women also recommended inviting diverse Lebanese women to brief the Council and ensure that women’s perspectives inform discussions and decisions on Lebanon.
Key Issues and Options
While the Council is largely uninvolved in facilitating negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, resolution 1701 remains the framework established by the Council towards peace and stability between Lebanon and Israel. The Trilateral Framework agreement does not mention resolution 1701, nor any role for UNIFIL, a successor UN uniformed presence, or for the Security Council. A key issue for the Council is to consider what role it will play in the future in supporting the full implementation of resolution 1701 and in promoting peace and stability between Lebanon and Israel.
A related task for the Security Council is to decide on how to respond to the options outlined by the Secretary-General for the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1701 after the drawdown of UNIFIL. While consultations among some Council members have apparently been taking place informally, Council members have yet to discuss the options during a meeting. It seems that this was at least in part because members were awaiting the outcome of the negotiations in Washington, DC, among Lebanon, Israel, and the US.
In parallel, on 25 June, France and Italy announced that they will co-lead an “international coalition to support Lebanon in a post-UNIFIL context” and support the establishment of an EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to Lebanon which “will be consistent with bilateral initiatives in the country”. This would be aimed at avoiding a potential security vacuum in southern Lebanon and supporting Lebanese sovereignty, including the role of the LAF. Key aspects remain undefined, however, including the potential mandate of such a force.
The July closed consultations on resolution 1701 could provide an opportunity to have a frank conversation among Council members and Secretariat representatives on a future UN presence along the Blue Line in light of the evolving diplomatic, security, and humanitarian situation. Another option would be for members to request a separate private meeting focused specifically on discussing the various international arrangements that are being proposed for the post-UNIFIL context. This meeting format would allow Italy to participate.
In their deliberations, Council members can also be guided by the recommendations put forward by UN Women during the 29 May IEG meeting and by resolution 2594 of September 2021, which, among other issues, highlighted the importance of including throughout transition processes a comprehensive gender analysis, gender expertise, and the meaningful participation of women.
A pressing concern remains how to avoid a deterioration in the diplomatic and security situation, which could see Lebanon drawn into a dual crisis, facing both internal strife and a wider regional confrontation. Depending on developments, members may assess whether additional Council engagement this month is warranted beyond the scheduled consultations on resolution 1701.
Council Dynamics
There is broad consensus among Council members in support of Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and unity.
Several Council members have accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon into a confrontation that the Lebanese population did not seek and expressed support for efforts by the Lebanese authorities to extend state authority over the whole Lebanese territory. On the other hand, Russia does not see Hezbollah as the primary problematic actor and has focused its criticism on Israel and on wider regional dynamics.
Members have expressed strong support for UNIFIL and condemned attacks against peacekeepers. The US, the main driver behind the Council’s decision to terminate UNIFIL by 31 December, has joined Council press statements in response to attacks against UNIFIL. At the same time, it seems unwilling to revisit its position on the mission’s drawdown. In contrast, several other Council members have interpreted the recent escalation as evidence of the need for a sustained UN presence even after UNIFIL’s mandate ends in December.
France is the penholder on Lebanon.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 28 August 2025S/RES/2790 | This resolution extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a final time until 31 December 2026 and established several functions that UNIFIL is authorised to fulfil during the drawdown and withdrawal period. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June 2026, “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL. |
| 11 August 2006S/RES/1701 | This resolution called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. It also expanded UNIFIL’s mandate. |
| 2 September 2004S/RES/1559 | This resolution urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory and free and fair presidential elections. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 1 June 2026S/PV.10163 | This was the meeting record of a Security Council meeting on Lebanon. |
| 31 March 2026S/PV.10127 | This was the meeting record of a Security Council meeting on Lebanon. |
| Security Council Letter | |
| 1 June 2026S/2026/453 | This was a letter from the Secretary-General outlining options for the implementation of resolution 1701 after the withdrawal of UNIFIL. |