Haiti
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to hold its 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Carlos Ruiz Massieu is expected to brief on recent developments in the country and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH, which is due on 14 July. The Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Monica Juma, is also expected to brief on the latest UNODC report on transnational organised crime, including illicit arms trafficking and financial crimes, in Haiti and the region. Special Representative for the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) Jack Christofides may also brief. Closed consultations are expected to follow.
Background and Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by extreme violence, political deadlock, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun large parts of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics including murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence amid widespread impunity.
The situation remains volatile. While security operations have weakened gang control in some PortauPrince neighbourhoods, the ability of the security forces to maintain control remains uncertain. The latest BINUH report on the human rights situation in the country, covering developments from January to March, documents extremely high levels of violence, with 1,642 people killed and 745 injured during the reporting period. The report says that 69 percent of the casualties occurred during security force operations against gangs carried out by the Haitian National Police (HNP), “sometimes supported” by the GSF and a private military company, and during summary executions involving police personnel. According to the report, 196 members of the population not associated with gangs were killed during these operations.
The report says that the private military company supporting security force operations continued to use explosive drones, stating that “[a]t least 69 members of the population were killed or injured by explosive drones, including five children”. While the report does not name the private military company, previous UN and media reports identified it as US company Vectus Global, which was hired by the Haitian government to combat gangs.
The report attributes 27 percent of the casualties to gangs, and 4 percent to self-defence groups. During the reporting period, gang members subjected at least 291 women and girls and one man to sexual violence. (For more information on sexual violence in Haiti, see the brief on Women, Peace and Security in our July Forecast.)
The situation of children in Haiti remains particularly concerning. The latest Secretary‑General’s annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 16 June, documents 2,088 grave violations against 1,661 children in 2025, including large‑scale recruitment and use of children by gangs (892 children), many in combat roles. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; abductions; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; and the denial of humanitarian access.) The report also records 620 children killed or maimed, mainly during armed confrontations and drone strikes. Other grave violations include sexual violence against children, abductions, and nearly 100 attacks on schools and hospitals. Three gangs (Gran Grif, Kraze Barye, and 400 Mawozo) have been added to the annexes of the Secretary-General’s report, which list parties that have committed grave violations against children. (The Viv Ansanm gang coalition was listed in the 2025 report.) The Secretary‑General also noted that the number of children killed and maimed by the HNP and the Special Security Task Force—a unit within Haiti’s security apparatus operated with support from Vectus Global—increased substantially in 2025, and that “[i]f the high number of violations against children were to be repeated in 2026, without meaningful improvement”, the HNP and the Special Security Task Force “should be listed” in next year’s report.
The GSF, which the Security Council authorised in September 2025 through resolution 2793, is still in an early deployment phase, with approximately 1,000 personnel reportedly on the ground. Kenyan personnel who formed the bulk of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, which preceded the GSF, remained in the country during the initial phase of the transition, but the last Kenyan contingent departed in April. While some contingents from new troop-contributing countries, such as Chad, are already in Haiti, the GSF is not expected to reach full operational capacity until October. (The GSF has an authorised personnel ceiling of 5,550, including 5,500 military and police personnel and 50 civilians.)
Resolution 2793 also requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide support to the GSF. UNSOH has been fully operational since 1 April.
On 29 May, the Secretary-General issued a report containing options for disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration (DDR) and stabilisation in Haiti. The report was requested by the Security Council in resolution 2814, which in January renewed BINUH’s mandate. In his report, the Secretary‑General identified four “target groups” requiring differentiated approaches:
- Group one: Children associated with gangs who have disengaged from gang involvement;
- Group two: Low-risk young people and adults associated with gangs;
- Group three: High‑risk individuals who are “not eligible” for DDR programmes and “will be addressed exclusively through justice and detention mechanisms”; and
- Group four: Vulnerable children and at-risk youth not associated with gangs.
The report outlines three progressively comprehensive options targeting groups one, two and four, which allow for both phased and stand-alone implementation, depending on the level of resources mobilised:
- a “rapid, quick-win programme” establishing the minimum architecture for DDR, but with “limited disengagement and reintegration” support, with an initial duration of 12 months at a cost of $13.5 million annually;
- a comprehensive DDR programme with structured exit programmes supporting the systematic dismantling of gangs, expanded reintegration and prevention efforts, over an initial 12‑month period at a cost of $34 million annually; and
- a multi‑year programme delivering a comprehensive package of support to individuals disengaging from gangs, from exit through to long-term reintegration, while supporting broader recovery, peacebuilding, and development efforts, costed between $100 and $150 million.
The Secretary‑General recommended the third option and proposed the establishment of a multi‑partner trust fund, co‑chaired by the government of Haiti and the UN, to provide pooled, predictable, flexible, multi‑year DDR financing.
On the political front, there is uncertainty regarding the holding of general elections, which would be the first since 2016. Following the dissolution in February of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC)—the temporary body established in April 2024 after a dramatic surge in gang violence—the Prime Minister of Haiti, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who was appointed by the TPC in November 2024, remains the country’s sole executive authority.
Voters and candidates’ registrations, initially expected to take place in April, have been postponed. A dispute between the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and Fils-Aimé over the text of the draft electoral decree and the designation by Fils-Aimé of the CEP’s executive director as director general—interpreted by most CEP members as concentrating control over the electoral process in the hands of the executive—may further delay the electoral calendar. (Haitian authorities had previously indicated that elections were expected to begin in August.) Despite objections from the CEP, on 2 June the government adopted an electoral decree. Nonetheless, Haitian news outlets estimate that the decree may still be amended following ongoing discussions between the CEP and the government over contentious aspects.
The humanitarian situation remains dire. According to a recent International Organization for Migration (IOM) update, internal displacement has reached 1.47 million people, including over 300,000 in the Port‑au‑Prince metropolitan area. In addition, more than 25,000 migrants were forcibly returned to Haiti from neighbouring countries in May, many requiring urgent assistance. Nearly 6 million people in the country face acute food insecurity. At the same time, the UN humanitarian appeal for Haiti remains underfunded, limiting the ability of agencies to respond effectively to displacement, food insecurity, and protection needs.
On 25 June, the US Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to proceed with terminating Temporary Protected Status for Haitian nationals. The US Department of Homeland Security announced the decision in November 2025 following its determination that there are “no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals” from safely returning to the country.
The severity of the security crisis and the urgency of international support were among the key messages of Secretary‑General António Guterres during his visit to Haiti on 16 June. Guterres held meetings with Fils-Aimé and with representatives of the GSF, UNSOH, and civil society. Speaking to the press before concluding his visit, he said that the deployment of the GSF provides an opportunity to push back violence and re-establish state authority. He also stressed the need to respect human rights in the context of security operations, as well as the importance of a functioning justice system, and of stemming the flow of weapons fuelling the violence.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 2 June press briefing note, the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Marta Hurtado, welcomed the opening of two specialised judicial units in Haiti as “a significant step toward tackling widespread impunity in the country”. The two specialised units are expected to address complex corruption cases, including illicit arms trade, and cases of serious human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by gangs, including killings, sexual violence, kidnappings, and child trafficking. The note said that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk urges the Haitian authorities to promptly implement the units in accordance with international human rights law and best practices, with the support of the international community.
Key Issues and Options
The Security Council’s overarching objective in Haiti is to support the restoration of security, the country’s political transition, and efforts to address the root causes of instability.
Secretary‑General António Guterres, several Council members, and analysts have emphasised that security responses alone will not be sufficient to sustainably reduce violence in Haiti. An option would be for Council members to express their views on the Secretary-General’s DDR options during July’s briefing on Haiti, including whether they intend to contribute to the multi-partner trust fund for DDR.
An additional issue for the Security Council is how to ensure it receives comprehensive and timely information on the GSF’s deployment, oversight arrangements, and operational conduct. Resolution 2793 requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution as part of his regular reporting on Haiti. The resolution also requested the GSF Special Representative, “in coordination with the government of Haiti and the UN, to keep the Security Council abreast of relevant developments”. An option would be for Council members to regularly invite Christofides to brief the Council on such issues as deployment levels, cooperation protocols being established between the GSF and national security forces, and measures to prevent the excessive use of force.
In 2025, the UN received four allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) involving personnel from the MSS mission. All four allegations were substantiated by investigations conducted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Members could ask Christofides to brief on measures to prevent SEA involving GSF personnel.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on the Haitian population. Views also converge on the continuing need for a sanctions regime and the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges. At the same time, positions differ among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti.
The US was the main architect of the transition from the MSS mission to the GSF. China and Russia broke silence during the negotiation of resolution 2793 and, together with Pakistan, abstained in the vote, citing concerns about issues such as rules of engagement, sources of funding, troop composition, oversight, and accountability. While these concerns were shared by many other members, other Council members opted for negotiating the inclusion of language on human rights, child protection, and Haitian sovereignty into the text in an attempt to mitigate these concerns.
Panama and the US are the co-penholders on Haiti.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 29 January 2026S/RES/2814 | This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for a year, until 31 January 2027. |
| 30 September 2025S/RES/2793 | This resolution authorised UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. The text also requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). The resolution received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia). |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 23 April 2026S/PV.10144 | This was the meeting record of the Council’s quarterly open briefing on Haiti. |