UNOCA (Central Africa)
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the implementation of the UN’s regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Pobee is expected to brief. UNOCA’s mandate expires on 31 August 2027.
Key Recent Developments
Following elections in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Cameroon last year, which returned incumbent presidents to office, the Central African region witnessed another major election this year in the Republic of Congo. Incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso was re-elected on 15 March with 94.82 percent of the vote, extending his nearly 42-year rule. Opposition parties reportedly decided not to field candidates, citing a lack of transparency in the electoral process. Another country in the region, São Tomé and Príncipe, is also expected to hold presidential and parliamentary elections later this year in July and September, respectively. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has been providing support to the country, including the reform of the justice and security sectors.
On 18 May, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) received an update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin. The MNJTF is a regional security coalition comprising forces from Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, mandated to combat Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin. The force has been instrumental in degrading the capacity of these groups in the region but continues to face persistent capability gaps, including shortages of air assets, amphibious equipment, counter-drone systems, and improvised explosive device (IED) detection and disposal capabilities.
Additionally, the decision by Niger to withdraw from the MNJTF last year raised concerns about the weakening of the region’s counter-terrorism framework and the potential creation of a security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups. The situation has been further compounded by Chad’s threat to scale back or withdraw its participation in the force, raising further questions about the effectiveness and cohesion of regional counter-terrorism efforts. In addition to the challenges it faces in the Lake Chad Basin, Chad is also confronting mounting pressure along its border with Sudan. Drone strikes and border incursions by armed groups have reportedly prompted the country to close its border with Sudan and deploy additional troops to secure the frontier.
Meanwhile, Boko Haram and ISWAP have intensified their attacks in the Lake Chad Basin. In one of the attacks attributed to Boko Haram in January, at least eight Nigerian soldiers were reportedly killed and 50 wounded in Borno State, Nigeria. In another attack in Nigeria’s western state of Kwara, 75 Muslims who refused to join the group were also reportedly killed. The Nigerian government has reportedly deployed an army battalion to the affected area.
In early May, a Boko Haram attack on a military base near Lake Chad reportedly killed at least 24 Chadian soldiers and wounded several others. A few days later, the group staged another ambush in which two Chadian generals were killed. The incidents prompted the Chadian government to declare three days of national mourning. The deteriorating security situation also led authorities to declare a state of emergency and launch a counteroffensive against the group. However, air strikes carried out in the Lake Chad region as part of Chad’s military operations reportedly killed at least 40 Nigerian fishermen, raising concerns about civilian casualties.
The activities of Boko Haram and its splinter groups have attracted significant attention in the US, with the Trump administration framing the conflict largely as an existential threat to Christians and criticising the Nigerian government’s handling of the crisis. At the same time, the US and Nigeria have cooperated in efforts to combat Boko Haram and ISWAP, including through intelligence-sharing and joint operations. In May, Abu Bakr al-Mainuki, considered a key figure within ISWAP, was reportedly killed alongside other militants during a joint military operation conducted by Nigerian and US forces in the Lake Chad Basin.
In early May, the Trump administration released its counter-terrorism strategy identifying the Lake Chad Basin as one of the critical new fronts, warning that ISIS-linked fighters and allied extremist groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP are regrouping in the region following the collapse of their strongholds in Iraq and Syria.
Key Issues and Options
The political and security situations in several parts of Central Africa continue to be key concerns for the Council. In June, Council members are likely to be interested in hearing Onanga’s assessment of country-specific situations in the region, including the recent elections in the Republic of Congo and preparations for the upcoming elections in São Tomé and Príncipe.
The continued threat of terrorism in the Lake Chad basin remains a matter of serious concern that has been heightened by the intensified attacks of Boko Haram and ISWAP in recent months. Reports indicate that these groups have become increasingly adept in their tactics, conducting more complex attacks using drones and IEDs to target military camps, bases, and troop routes.
A related issue is how to address the root causes of the conflicts in the region. Council members continue to support the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, developed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 2018 and updated last year.
The worsening humanitarian situation in the region is also a source of concern for Council members. According to OCHA, the surge in violence in the Lake Chad Basin has contributed to the displacement of approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 325,000 refugees, while sharply increasing humanitarian needs across the region, where an estimated 8.2 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance.
Resource constraints remain a major concern for all UN peace operations, including special political missions such as UNOCA. During his 11 December 2025 briefing, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOCA Abdou Abarry informed Council members of the challenges facing the mission in carrying out its good offices’ role, noting that resource limitations had hindered its ability to travel to countries across the region.
The Council could consider adopting a presidential statement raising alarm at terrorist activity in the region and expressing support for the MNJTF in combating this threat. The statement could also call for expedited implementation of the RS-SRR and appeal for international support in this regard.
The Council’s Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Climate, Peace and Security visited the Lake Chad Basin in early December 2025. Although this is an informal group, the co-chairs of the IEG could choose to brief interested Council members in an informal format following their visit.
Council Dynamics
Council members support a holistic regional approach to addressing the peace and security challenges in Central Africa, based on cooperation between UNOCA and various regional mechanisms. Several members tend to underscore challenges in the region related to political transitions; humanitarian crises, including the rising number of refugees and IDPs; the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism; and the adverse effects of climate change. However, some members remain opposed to Council engagement on climate change and peace and security in general, including in the Central Africa region, believing that climate change is primarily a development issue best handled in other fora.
Council members recognise the important role played by the MNJTF in fighting Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin. In this month’s meeting, many of them will likely condemn the recent attack in the region and underscore the need to continue supporting the MNJTF in neutralising these groups. In its December 2025 meeting on the MNJTF, the AUPSC requested the AU Commission, in consultation with the UN, to consider the application of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 to address the force’s financial and logistical challenges. This is a framework resolution on the funding of AU-led peace support operations through UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. However, there is no public indication that the possibility of the MNJTF benefitting from support under the framework of this resolution has been formally discussed between the UN and the AU.
Council members that have an interest in the situation in the north-west and south-west regions of Cameroon may draw particular attention to the country’s political and security challenges in light of the violence following the October 2025 presidential elections.
The UK is the penholder on UNOCA.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 1 November 2024S/PRST/2024/7 | This statement expressed the Council’s full support for UNOCA. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 28 November 2025S/2025/772 | This was the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 11 December 2025S/PV.10060 | This was an open briefing on the situation in Central Africa. |
