Syria
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is expected to hold two meetings on Syria: the monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria, and another on the chemical weapons track. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, and a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief at the political and humanitarian meeting. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu is expected to brief at the chemical weapons meeting.
Key Recent Developments
On 9 May, Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a reshuffle of several members forming the country’s interim government—which was constituted in March 2025—and administrative officials. New officials were appointed to the positions of secretary-general for the presidency, information minister, agriculture minister, and governors in the Deir Ezzor, Homs, Latakia, and Quneitra governorates. The reshuffle followed reported criticism that some government roles were chosen through nepotism. Sharaa’s brother Maher served as secretary-general for the presidency prior to the overhaul.
On 24 May, legislative elections for the People’s Assembly took place in the formerly Kurdish-controlled areas of Hasakah governorate and Ain al-Arab district (Kobane) to fill 11 seats which, due to the government’s lack of control over the northeast at the time, were left vacant following the September 2025 elections.
In his 15 May briefing to the Council, Cordone described Syria’s tentative progress and persistent challenges. He highlighted accountability developments in recent weeks, including the trial which started on 10 May of Atef Najib, a high-level security official in former President Bashar al-Assad’s government, and the arrests in April of suspects linked to the 2013 Tadamon massacre and Eastern Ghouta chemical attack, welcoming them as meaningful steps towards transitional justice.
Cordone visited Syria from 17 to 25 May, during which he met with interim Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to discuss cooperation between the government and the Office of the Special Envoy. In the 15 May briefing, he informed the Council that he hoped to reach an agreement with the government on “broad areas of cooperation” for his office to support the transition, including the relocation of his team from Geneva to Damascus.
In the northeast, the implementation of the 29 January agreement to integrate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) into government institutions continues to advance, but not without obstacles. Judicial issues have emerged as a point of contention, with protests erupting in Hasakah after Kurdish was removed from the Judicial Palace sign. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi subsequently reportedly announced an understanding with Damascus, including the acceptance of DAANES judges in government judicial institutions and a government pledge to restore bilingual Arabic-Kurdish signage in Kurdish-majority cities. Abdi called on protestors to allow the understanding to be implemented and not disrupt the broader integration process.
Israel has continued its military activities in southern Syria, which it says are necessary for its national security. In May, these reportedly included incursions, shelling, and arrests in the governorate of Quneitra in southwestern Syria. (For more information, see the brief on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan in our June 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Insecurity linked to terrorism remains a persistent issue. On 1 May, a Shia cleric was killed in the Sayyida Zeinab district of Damascus, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) later claimed responsibility for the attack. Later, on 19 May, a car bomb exploded near a defence ministry building in the Bab Sharqi area of Damascus, killing one soldier and wounding 23 people. Additionally, on 6 May, Syrian forces conducted raids in Idlib to arrest Uzbek militants who had held armed protests against the arrest of one of the militants. The incident renewed concerns regarding the presence of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in Syria.
Syria has also continued its efforts to combat the threat posed by Hezbollah-affiliated cells. On 5 May, the Syrian interior ministry said that it had successfully conducted multiple security operations across several governorates to dismantle a cell affiliated with the Lebanese militia, which had infiltrated Syrian territory with the aim of planning assassinations of “high-ranking government figures”. Sharaa has said that he supports Lebanon in disarming Hezbollah and will prevent the militia from operating in Syria.
In Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher’s 15 May briefing to the Council, he warned that despite some progress, Syria’s humanitarian situation remains critical and that delayed recovery would ultimately cost more lives. He noted that while large amounts of returnees are a positive development, they are placing mounting pressure on already strained services, with over 390,000 people having crossed from Lebanon since early March. Fletcher highlighted the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz as an additional pressure point, driving up the cost of food and fuel with immediate consequences for Syrians. He cautioned that the 2026 humanitarian appeal is only 18 percent funded and that the World Food Programme (WFP) has had to cut food assistance by half. Fletcher also called on Council members to support sustained diplomatic engagement, scale up immediate funding, and invest in Syria’s long-term recovery.
Syria continues to take steps to normalise its economy following the lifting of sanctions. On 11 May, the European Council reinstated the full application of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Union (EU) and Syria, which had been suspended in response to serious human rights violations by the Assad government. The Cooperation Agreement provides the framework for economic and trade relations between the parties, and its reinstatement facilitates Syria’s socio-economic recovery while sending a political message underlining the EU’s commitment to Syria’s transition. In another development regarding the Syrian economy, on 4 May, the Central Bank announced that global payment networks such as Mastercard and Visa will be resuming operations in the country.
Regarding the chemical weapons track, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Adedeji Ebo noted in his 10 March briefing to the Council that engagement between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Syrian government on eliminating remnants of Assad’s chemical weapons programme was continuing. Ebo emphasised the OPCW’s concerns regarding the potential existence of large quantities of undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions in Syria, including indications that more than 100 sites may have been involved in Assad’s chemical weapons activities, aside from the 26 declared sites. He stressed the importance of the international community providing adequate support to assist Syria in closing the chemical weapons file. On 24 May, the OPCW published its monthly report by the Director-General on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
On 26 May, Syria’s Permanent Mission to the OPCW said that, together with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, it conducted investigations in May that led to the identification of sites linked to Assad’s chemical weapons programme and to the reported discovery of more than 70 rockets and aerial bombs, as well as raw ingredients used to produce sarin. Additionally, 18 suspects have been arrested for alleged involvement in the programme.
Women, Peace and Security
On 30 April, the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) convened on the situation in Syria. Cordone briefed. Among other issues, the meeting apparently focused on women’s participation in politics and public life, human rights concerns, women’s economic empowerment, the drafting of a transitional justice law, and accountability for conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated before the fall of Assad’s regime. The meeting also addressed patterns of violence since the fall of the regime, including abductions and violence targeting Alawite, Druze, and Bedouin women. Members were also apparently briefed on the humanitarian situation, including calls from women-led organisations for increased gender-responsive humanitarian assistance.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 28 April press briefing note, the Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thameen Al-Kheetan, provided an update on Syria’s human rights situation. He noted firsthand testimonies and accounts of past and present human rights violations and abuses following a visit to Hasakah governorate in the northeast of the country, including reports of significant numbers of killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and deportation of detainees. He also cited “mounting protection concerns for civilians in southern Syria, where expanding operations by Israeli forces occupying these areas have placed lives at risk”. Al-Kheetan underscored the need for accountability to extend to all parties that have committed serious violations and abuses in the country. He further echoed High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk’s calls on the Israeli authorities to “bring an end to all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Syria”.
In a 15 April press statement, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic voiced concern over the impact of regional hostilities on Syria’s stability and the enjoyment of rights in the country. More than 277,000 people, including 234,000 Syrians who had previously been displaced, have fled Lebanon into Syria since 2 March due to recent shelling in Lebanon. Underscoring the importance of Syria’s recovery and transition after decades of repression and war, the Commission urged all parties to redouble their efforts to end hostilities and reiterated the need to ensure that the human rights of all peoples in the region are at the forefront of negotiation efforts.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is ensuring that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. By maintaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members could consider linking enhanced political support for the Syrian government to concrete progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through accountability and reconciliation processes.
To address the many-faceted challenges facing Syria, the Council could consider adopting a presidential statement that:
- calls for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, urges adherence to the 1974 agreement between Israel and Syria, and calls on both parties to engage constructively in US-facilitated talks on sustainable security arrangements;
- encourages progress on both the SDF integration agreement and the Suweida roadmap (agreed by Jordan, Syria, and the US to address the tensions in Suweida in September), while pressing the government to ensure the protection and rights of Druze and Kurdish civilians;
- highlights the importance of Damascus continuing its counter-terrorism efforts against a resurgent ISIL and FTFs in the region;
- urges Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms, including through their cooperation with existing international mechanisms on Syria, while also meaningfully engaging with victims and civil society on transitional justice and reconciliation; and
- calls for enhanced financial support to address humanitarian needs and long-term recovery and development.
The Council could also consider encouraging the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the Syria file. The PBC’s convening role and its capacity to mobilise sustained, coordinated international support for countries navigating fragile transitions could be of value at this juncture. Council members, in close collaboration with Syria, could consider the possibility of an advisory opinion from the PBC ahead of the Council meetings on how best to support the country’s transition.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue. Cordone’s office is actively negotiating its relocation to Damascus and areas of cooperation with the Syrian government. Council members could express support for an expedited agreement and early relocation, as a meaningful UN presence on the ground is essential to supporting Syria’s political transition. Members could also continue pressing for progress on the appointment of a Special Envoy following Geir O. Pedersen’s resignation in October 2025.
Council Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice, alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus and its decisions to delist Sharaa, Syria’s interior minister Anas Khattab, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list signaled unified support for Syria’s interim government and the overall transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
Furthermore, several Council members have taken steps to normalise bilateral relations with Syria and to support its recovery. High-level officials of the Syrian government have visited all the capitals of the Council’s five permanent members. The 11 May decision by the EU—which includes Council members France, Denmark, Greece, and Latvia—to fully resume its 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and begin formal talks on strengthening economic and security ties demonstrates the bloc’s shift towards increased support for the transition.
The regional escalation triggered by the US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February, however, could potentially strain Council dynamics on the Syria file. Members that have traditionally aligned themselves or expressed support for Iran—most notably Russia and China—are likely to take a more critical posture towards the US and its regional actions, potentially complicating the unified approach to Syria that has characterised the past year. While Council members have so far managed to keep Syria-specific discussions relatively insulated from these broader tensions—in part due to Syria’s efforts to insulate itself from the escalation—a prolonged regional conflict risks eroding that separation.
Many Council members agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by FTFs and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 15 May 2026S/PV.10151 | This was a Security Council meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
| 10 March 2026S/PV.10117 | This was a meeting on the chemical weapons track in Syria. |
| Other | |
| 31 March 2026S/2026/257 | This was a report of a visiting mission to Lebanon and Syria, which took place from 3 to 7 December 2025. |