Sudan
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is expected to receive the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan.
During the month, the Council is also scheduled to receive a briefing on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. At the time of writing, however, the Committee’s chair had not yet been appointed, as Council members have yet to agree on the allocation of subsidiary bodies for the year.
Key Recent Developments
As the conflict in Sudan has entered its fourth year, it increasingly resembles a war of attrition, sustained by continued external support to the parties and the steady flow of arms from multiple sources, contributing to regional spillover risks and proxy dynamics. While front lines have largely evolved into a de facto territorial division between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Sudanese militia, hostilities have intensified across several theatres, particularly in Kordofan and Darfur, accompanied by the growing use of drones and other sophisticated weaponry. The conflict has further fragmented the country and weakened already fragile governance structures.
The RSF has continued to target SAF-held areas through long-range drone attacks, including strikes against strategic facilities in the Khartoum area. On 4 May, a series of drone attacks targeted Khartoum International Airport and several military installations in the capital, disrupting all flights. Additional drone strikes were reported in various parts of Khartoum and its twin city of Omdurman between 28 April and 5 May. Sudan accused Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of facilitating recent drone attacks, which both countries have denied. Ethiopia, in return, accused the SAF of supporting the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a politico-military group that fought a two-year war against the Ethiopian government and its allies from November 2020 to November 2022.
Meanwhile, in recent weeks, the SAF intensified drone operations against RSF-held areas, particularly in Nyala, South Darfur, reportedly targeting several strategic sites, including Nyala International Airport, fuel depots, ammunition and missile storage facilities, and air defence systems.
At the same time, the conflict has raged across front lines in other parts of the country. Kordofan remained the principal theatre of military operations during the reporting period, with major escalations reported in and around El Obeid, Dilling, Kadugli, and Babanusa, as the SAF and RSF continued to contest strategic positions and key supply routes across the region. The security situation in Blue Nile State also remained volatile, with continued clashes between the SAF and an alliance of RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) al-Hilu forces in Kurmuk, Geissan, and Bau localities.
Recent weeks have also witnessed the defection of several senior commanders from the RSF to the SAF, highlighting signs of growing internal strains within the group. Reports have attributed these developments, in part, to tensions in the RSF’s decentralised and transactional alliance structure, which appears to be coming under increasing pressure amid resource constraints and shifts in territorial control towards less economically lucrative areas. Against this backdrop, the RSF has reportedly undertaken a broad restructuring of its command leadership aimed at strengthening internal cohesion, tightening oversight, and preventing further defections. At the same time, the SAF has begun implementing plans to integrate allied armed groups and fighting forces into the state’s security institutions.
Efforts by regional and international interlocutors to identify avenues for de-escalation and bring an end to the conflict have continued; however, prospects for a breakthrough remain remote at present. Following his appointment in February, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, visited Khartoum, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi as part of a regional tour aimed at engaging with Sudanese stakeholders and regional actors on options for resolving the conflict. (For more information, see our 17 April What’s in Blue story.)
From 4 to 11 May, Haavisto visited Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh, where he met with government officials, Sudanese civilian stakeholders, and members of the diplomatic community. At a 13 May press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that Haavisto had underscored the urgent need for immediate de-escalation, including through confidence-building measures in support of ongoing peace efforts. He also called on relevant actors to use their influence to reduce violence, curb the flow of arms, and support a truce, while emphasising the importance of sustained coordination among key stakeholders in advancing a Sudanese-led political process.
Meanwhile, SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan travelled to Jeddah on 20 April to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman amid reports of renewed Saudi-US efforts to revive talks between the warring parties. According to media reports, discussions focused on proposals to establish humanitarian corridors, advance localised truces, and secure maritime corridors. On 21 April, Burhan visited Muscat, where he held discussions with Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tarik. Subsequently, on 13 May, Burhan travelled to Manama and met Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, amid media reports of possible efforts to facilitate a rapprochement between Sudan and the UAE.
The humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, with access severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions. According to the 14 May Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, approximately 19.5 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity through May, including around 135,000 people in catastrophic conditions characterised by extreme food shortages, critical levels of acute malnutrition, and an elevated risk of death. The IPC warned that the situation remains precarious, with 14 areas across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan at risk of famine. Meanwhile, humanitarian access remains severely constrained by insecurity, bureaucratic impediments, and logistical challenges, particularly in areas affected by active fighting.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 4 May statement, two UN experts highlighted widespread attacks on medical facilities and personnel in Sudan, despite the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016, which addresses the protection of the wounded and sick, medical and humanitarian personnel, and hospitals and other medical facilities in armed conflict. The experts noted that, since the outbreak of hostilities in April 2023, hospitals, ambulances, patients, and health workers have repeatedly come under aerial attack, severely undermining civilians’ access to healthcare. They urged the international community to take concrete action to end attacks on health care, protect medical personnel, and ensure accountability for violations of international law.
In an 11 May press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk strongly condemned the increasing use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles in Sudan and their devastating impact on civilians. He noted that the parties to the conflict have repeatedly used drones to strike civilian objects and critical infrastructure, exacerbating humanitarian conditions amid growing shortages of food and essential services. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), drone strikes accounted for at least 880 civilian deaths between January and April, more than 80 percent of all conflict-related civilian fatalities recorded during that period. Türk reiterated his call on all parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), protect civilians, and facilitate the safe movement of people fleeing areas of active hostilities.
Women, Peace and Security
On 23 February, the Informal Experts Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) met on the situation in Sudan. UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Denise Brown briefed. According to the summary of the meeting, issued on 10 April by Colombia and Denmark as the IEG co-chairs, together with the UK as the penholder on WPS, Council members discussed issues such as women’s exclusion from diplomatic processes to end the war in Sudan, atrocities committed against women and girls, and UN-supported specialised services, including for the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence. Most documented violations have been committed by the RSF. In 2023, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten engaged with the RSF’s leadership, leading to the issuance by the RSF of a unilateral communiqué on conflict-related sexual violence. The summary notes, however, that these commitments have yet to produce concrete results. UN Women, as the IEG secretariat, recommended that Council members request member states, regional organisations, and the UN to report to the Council on steps taken to ensure women’s inclusion in all diplomatic and peace initiatives and political dialogues. Among other recommendations, UN Women also called for expressing alarm at evidence of widespread and systematic sexual violence; obstruction of humanitarian aid; the use of starvation as a method of warfare; reproductive violence; and holding perpetrators accountable, including through sanctions and justice mechanisms.
Key Issues and Options
The overarching issue for the Council remains how to help bring an end to the fighting, support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan, and advance a credible civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and attacks against civilians, as well as civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. A related issue is the growing use of advanced weaponry, particularly drones, which has expanded the geographical scope of hostilities, contributed to rising civilian casualties, and further exacerbated humanitarian suffering.
Despite sustained engagement by regional and international actors, mediation efforts have thus far failed to generate meaningful momentum towards a negotiated settlement. As the conflict enters its fourth year, shifting front lines, growing fragmentation, and weakened governance structures continue to compound widespread civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity.
Another issue for Council members is how to promote justice and accountability for ongoing violations of IHL and international human rights law committed by the parties to the conflict.
Council members remain concerned about the regional implications of the conflict, including the risk of cross-border spillover. Reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, the movement of fighters, and the use of neighbouring countries as transit routes for weapons and supplies, as well as staging grounds for attacks into Sudan, have heightened concerns about broader regional destabilisation.
One option for the Council would be to adopt a presidential statement condemning the continued violence across Sudan, including attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and reiterating its call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Another option would be to request the Secretary-General to provide more frequent reporting on Sudan than the current 120-day cycle, given the scale, severity, and rapidly evolving nature of the crisis.
Council members could also consider following up on the 16 December 2025 informal interactive dialogue (IID) organised by the UK and Denmark by convening a similar meeting with key regional and international stakeholders, including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts. Such a meeting could explore ways to better coordinate diplomatic initiatives, leverage comparative advantages, and support a coherent political strategy for resolving the conflict. It could also examine the regional implications of the conflict, including displacement dynamics, arms flows, and risks to regional peace and security. (For more information, see our 16 December 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
During the June briefing, Council members could further consider inviting a civil society representative to provide perspectives on the human rights situation, civilian protection concerns, and evolving conflict dynamics across Sudan.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members share similar concerns about the dire political, security, and humanitarian situations in Sudan and have emphasised the need for a ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access, respect for IHL, and the importance of protecting civilians in the conflict.
However, critical divisions persist within the Council, shaped by differing priorities and approaches to key issues, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of ceasefire mechanisms, and addressing accountability for violations of IHL. Several Council members, such as China, Pakistan, and Russia, tend to be more sympathetic to the Burhan-led government, underscoring its sovereign authority and its efforts to protect civilians and coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Other Council members, particularly the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), however, consider both the RSF and SAF to be responsible for the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and unfit to govern the country. Such differences in views have continued to hinder Council action on the situation in Sudan, including multiple attempts to issue press elements. (For more information, see our 17 April What’s in Blue story.)
In recent months, Council members appear to have shown greater convergence regarding the use of sanctions designations under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, particularly in targeting the RSF and its affiliates. On 24 February, the Committee designated four RSF commanders, including the group’s deputy commander, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, following proposals submitted by the P3 members. At these members’ proposal, on 28 April, the Council also designated four individuals, including three Colombian nationals involved in facilitating RSF’s military operations.
The UK is the penholder on Sudan.
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 28 April 2026SC/16351 | This is a press release indicating that the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee added four entries to its sanctions list. |
| 24 February 2026SC/16303 | This is a press release indicating that the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee added four entries to its sanctions list. |
