Security Council Elections 2026
On 3 June, the 80th session of the UN General Assembly is scheduled to hold elections for membership of the Security Council. The five seats available for election in 2026, according to the regular distribution among regions, will be as follows:
- one seat for the African Group (currently held by Somalia);
- one seat for the Asia-Pacific Group (currently held by Pakistan);
- one seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC, currently held by Panama); and
- two seats for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG, currently held by Denmark and Greece).
The Eastern European Group is not contesting any seats this year, as its seat, held by Latvia through 2027, comes up for election every other year. The five new members elected this year will take up their seats on 1 January 2027 and will serve until 31 December 2028.
The 2026 Candidates
Seven member states—Austria, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe—are currently running for the five available seats. Austria, Germany, and Portugal are vying for two WEOG seats, while Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines are competing for the single Asia-Pacific Group seat. Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe are both running for uncontested seats. Six out of the seven candidates have served on the Council previously: Germany has served six times, the Philippines four times, Austria and Portugal three times, Zimbabwe twice, and Trinidad and Tobago once. Kyrgyzstan has never served on the Council.
Potential Council Dynamics in 2027
Shifting global power dynamics and continued geopolitical uncertainty are expected to continue to shape the multilateral landscape and Security Council dynamics in 2027. The priorities advanced by candidates during their campaigns, together with their long-standing interests, offer valuable insight into how they may approach some of the key issues that may dominate the Council’s agenda in the next year.
Entrenched divisions among permanent members are likely to continue affecting the Council’s ability to respond effectively to several protracted conflicts in 2027. A clear manifestation of these divisions is the increasing use of the veto in recent years, as analysed in a 2026 SCR research report on the topic.[1] These tensions are likely to persist in 2027, making it difficult for the Council to adopt meaningful outcomes on highly politicised crises. At the same time, the number of previously unscheduled Council meetings, which accounted for approximately 27 percent of the Council’s meetings in 2025, is also expected to remain high in 2027, reflecting the increasingly reactive and unpredictable nature of the Council’s work amid a growing number of emerging and unforeseen conflicts.[2] A significant proportion of these meetings in 2025 and during the first five months of 2026 focused on Ukraine; “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (MEPQ)”; Sudan; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and Iran-related and non-proliferation issues.
Although it is unclear what course the war in Ukraine will take in the future, the situation is likely to continue to occupy an important portion of the Council’s agenda in 2027. Among the WEOG candidates, there is sustained interest in the situation in Ukraine. Together with Latvia, which will remain on the Council in 2027, the European members are likely to stay closely engaged on the file.
The positions of the 2027 candidates on Ukraine are likely to reflect differing regional and political perspectives. Kyrgyzstan and Zimbabwe abstained from the vote on the 24 February 2025 General Assembly resolution titled “Advancing a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine”, while the other candidate countries voted in favour. Kyrgyzstan’s and Zimbabwe’s abstentions reflect a growing reluctance among some Global South countries to take sides, which continued in 2026 and is likely to persist in 2027.
At the same time, the WEOG candidate countries have expanded their military preparedness, in line with a broader European trend since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and the growing uncertainty surrounding the long-term US security commitment to Europe under the Trump administration. Divisions between members prioritising deterrence and military preparedness and those advocating de-escalation and negotiated solutions are therefore likely to persist in 2027.
The situation in the Middle East is likely to continue to feature prominently in the Council’s work in 2027. The repeatedly violated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, instability along the Israel-Lebanon border, and the wider regional escalation triggered by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region risk extending well into 2027, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and other conflict-affected areas and a strained economic outlook across parts of the region.
In addition, tensions within the transatlantic alliance are likely to complicate coordination among the WEOG members on the Middle East in 2027, requiring them to strike a delicate balance between supporting collective security measures and avoiding deeper military entanglement in the region.
The Council’s work on African files is likely to remain heavily focused on mandate renewals, sanctions regimes, and civilian protection concerns, particularly in relation to the DRC, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, and Sudan. Insurgencies in the Sahel region may also be an important focus in the coming year.
The new group of African members (A3) will consist of the DRC, Liberia, and Zimbabwe. The fact that two of its members—the DRC and Zimbabwe—belong to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) could strengthen coordination on peace and security issues affecting the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa. More broadly, the A3 in 2027 is expected to continue to align closely with AU positions and to emphasise African ownership, sovereignty, and support for AU-led responses to conflict situations in Africa. Zimbabwe is likely to reinforce these positions, while favouring cautious approaches to sanctions and other externally driven pressure initiatives, reflecting its longstanding emphasis on dialogue, non-interference, and negotiated solutions.
It remains unclear if Trinidad and Tobago will join the African members of the Council as part of the “A3 Plus” grouping, similar to the role played by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines during its 2020-2021 Council term and by Guyana during its 2024-2025 tenure. Having an additional member from another region has benefited both the “A3” and the “plus” members in recent years and has come to symbolise the strengthening of Africa–Caribbean coordination at the UN. This growing cooperation was reinforced by a memorandum of understanding signed between the AU and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 2024 to enhance collaboration between the two organisations and their peoples.
The outcome of the election for the Asia-Pacific seat may likewise influence the regional perspectives represented on the Council. A Kyrgyzstan victory would return a Central Asian voice to the Council for the first time since Kazakhstan’s 2017-2018 term. This could bring additional attention to developments in Afghanistan and their implications for regional stability. The election of the Philippines, on the other hand, would restore Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) representation to the Council, absent since Viet Nam’s 2020-2021 term, and could elevate attention to Southeast Asian perspectives on issues such as Myanmar, maritime security, and regional cooperation.
In 2027, elected members (including all the candidate countries) are likely to continue emphasising compliance with international humanitarian law, humanitarian access, accountability, and civilian protection across both thematic and country-specific files. However, translating these commitments into concrete Council action may remain difficult because of divisions among major powers, differing interpretations of sovereignty and humanitarian obligations, and broader disagreements over accountability and enforcement mechanisms.
Several candidates have indicated peacekeeping as a priority, with some emphasising the need to reform peace operations in order to make them more effective, adaptable, and fit for purpose in responding to evolving global challenges. These discussions are likely to unfold against the backdrop of continuing peacekeeping liquidity challenges, driven by persistent delays in the payment of assessed contributions. The resulting gap between approved budgets and available cash is expected to continue constraining peacekeeping operations in 2027 and may necessitate further expenditure reductions. Recommendations emerging from the ongoing review of peace operations by the UN Secretariat may also inform Council deliberations in 2027 on mandate renewals and the future of peacekeeping.
Additionally, all candidates have expressed interest in supporting UN peacebuilding efforts, with Austria also emphasising the links between peacebuilding and counter-terrorism efforts. Germany, which was the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2025, as well as other candidates who champion peacebuilding, are likely to advocate for stronger integration of peacebuilding considerations across the Council’s work and closer engagement with the PBC. Such efforts, however, may face resistance amid growing scepticism among permanent members towards thematic and prevention-oriented agendas.
Most candidate countries have expressed an interest in advancing Women, Peace and Security (WPS) issues. Several may sign on to the Shared Commitments on WPS initiative, which started in late 2021. Divisions on WPS issues are likely to deepen, fuelled by growing US scepticism towards some aspects of the agenda alongside longstanding reservations expressed by Russia and China. At the March 2026 session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the agreed conclusions were adopted through a vote rather than by consensus for the first time in the Commission’s history, following US efforts to alter and narrow the scope of gender-related language. Against this backdrop, Council dynamics on WPS in 2027 are likely to remain difficult, particularly regarding WPS outcomes and gender-related language.
Several candidate countries have identified artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies as important priorities, highlighting the need to better understand and address the implications of these technologies for international peace and security. As these technologies increasingly intersect with many of the crises already on the Council’s agenda, 2027 may see growing efforts by the elected members of the Council to examine the security implications of AI and other emerging technologies for terrorism, disinformation, maritime security threats, autonomous weapons systems, and nuclear and non-proliferation risks, among other issues.
Trinidad and Tobago has indicated that it plans to place a particular focus on peace and security challenges facing small island developing states (SIDS). The last open debate specifically focused on SIDS was held in 2015 under New Zealand’s presidency of the Council. The fourth international conference on SIDS, held in 2024 in Antigua and Barbuda, highlighted interconnected challenges facing SIDS countries and territories, such as transnational crime and trafficking, climate change, economic vulnerability, food and energy insecurity, and uneven development. In 2027, Trinidad and Tobago may seek to draw the Council’s attention to the security implications of some of these challenges.
One member of the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT) Group—Denmark—will leave the Security Council at the end of 2026. Among the current candidates, Austria and Portugal are members of the group. The ACT member(s) are likely to seek improvements in Security Council working methods, including proposals advocated by the ACT Group. Among the candidate countries, only Kyrgyzstan and Zimbabwe have not signed the ACT Group’s Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, which calls on all Council members to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities. Among the permanent members of the Council, only France and the United Kingdom have signed the Code of Conduct.
In 2027, the Security Council will also begin working with a new Secretary-General amid heightened geopolitical tensions, financial constraints, and growing scepticism towards the current global governance structure. The relationship between the Council and the incoming Secretary-General is likely to be an important factor shaping UN peace and security efforts. All the current candidates for the Secretary-General position have emphasised the importance of diplomacy and the UN’s peace and security functions, including conflict prevention, mediation, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, although the degree of emphasis has varied. A new Secretary-General who seeks to strengthen the UN’s role in these areas could create opportunities for meaningful cooperation with the Council.
[1] Security Council Report. Living with the Veto, Research Report no.1. (23 March 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/Veto_report_2026_F.pdf>.
[2] Previously unscheduled Council meetings are meetings that are added to the Council’s programme of work after its adoption.