Libya
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is expected to hold its 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Libya remains mired in a political impasse between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over draft legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention is over the proposal to form a unified interim government to organise the elections—an arrangement favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections.
To help break the deadlock over the electoral framework and institutional fragmentation, UNSMIL presented in August 2025 a political roadmap comprising three core pillars: the adoption of a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative elections; the unification of state institutions under a new government; and the launch of a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues to pave the way for elections and address longer-term conflict drivers.
Since then, UNSMIL has continued its engagement to facilitate an inclusive political process, but no major breakthroughs have been achieved. Agreement remains elusive on key issues, including electoral laws and the formation of a unified government. In her April briefing to the Council, Tetteh described progress on the political roadmap as inadequate. In recent months, UNSMIL has sought to advance the roadmap through a broader “Structured Dialogue” and targeted small-group diplomacy to resolve the political deadlock and pave the way for the holding of national elections.
On 27 April, the Structured Dialogue held its second plenary session virtually, bringing together participants from all tracks. The Structured Dialogue is envisioned as an inclusive, countrywide consultative mechanism to inform decisions on the design of elections, the mandate of the interim executive, and institutional unification. UNSMIL has indicated that the Structured Dialogue is not a decision-making body for selecting a new government; rather, its purpose is to develop concrete recommendations to support an enabling environment for elections and address immediate governance, economic, and security challenges. It is expected to conclude its work in June, when it will present a final report to Libyan political leaders and the public.
UNSMIL has also begun engaging a smaller group of Libyan stakeholders, comprising representatives from the two rival governments, to unblock the two election-related milestones in the political roadmap: the adoption of a viable electoral framework and the establishment of a unified government to support the electoral process. Tetteh has noted that this format is intended to identify practical steps that Libyan institutions can take to move the process forward. The first such meeting took place on 29 April in Rome under UNSMIL auspices. Participants agreed on reconstituting the Board of the High National Elections Commission and committed to maintaining ongoing UN-facilitated talks.
Over the past year, the US has maintained sustained diplomatic engagement in Libya through its Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, and broader interagency efforts across political, security, and economic tracks. In April, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) held its annual special operations exercise in Sirte, bringing together military personnel from eastern and western Libya, as well as 11 other countries, to enhance coordination on counter-terrorism and border security. On the economic front, the US has supported efforts to facilitate agreement on Libya’s first unified budget in over a decade, which was signed on 11 April. Boulos has said that the agreement is intended to help stabilise the economy and enable the National Oil Corporation to invest in increasing oil production. He has also reiterated US support for UNSMIL’s ongoing efforts to advance the political roadmap, with the aim of holding national elections and promoting Libyan unity.
While the 2020 ceasefire continues to hold and there have been no major nationwide violations, the security situation in Libya remains fragile. On 8 May, Libya’s largest oil refinery in Zawiya temporarily shut down operations following armed clashes between GNU-affiliated state security forces and local armed groups near the facility. The clashes involved the use of heavy weapons and indiscriminate shelling, with some projectiles striking surrounding civilian areas and the refinery grounds. The facility did not suffer major structural damage and resumed operations on 10 May. According to media reports, at least three civilians and one refinery security officer were killed, while several others were injured. In an 8 May statement, UNSMIL condemned the clashes and the use of heavy weapons and indiscriminate fire in densely populated residential neighbourhoods and called on national authorities to investigate the incident and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure.
On 25 May, the authorisation established by resolution 2804 (2025) to inspect vessels bound to or from Libya, where there are reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying arms or related materiel in violation of the arms embargo, expired. The EU naval force in the Mediterranean (Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was the only regional organisation conducting such inspections under this authorisation. While Operation IRINI is expected to continue carrying out its core tasks of surveillance and capacity building, in the absence of renewed authorisation, it lacks a mandate to inspect vessels on the high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of violating the arms embargo.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to best support the roadmap for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process presented by Tetteh in August 2025. Council members have emphasised the importance of fostering common political ground between Libya’s rival authorities to reach agreement on an electoral framework, including modalities for a unified interim government to organise elections.
Council members have also issued two press statements in support of the ongoing process. In the absence of progress, it may consider further Council products, including a resolution to urge the Libyan political stakeholders to narrow their differences and send a strong signal in support of advancing the political process through the UN roadmap.
Another concern for the Council is the fragile security situation, underscored by the recent escalation of violence in Zawiya. Although the violence has subsided, the UN has warned of the risk of broader destabilisation. The underlying drivers of the clashes highlight the need for sustained attention to Libya’s political and security dynamics.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan‑led, inclusive political process leading to elections as the only way to restore political, security, and economic stability in the country. They are also broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role in pursuing this objective, and they share concerns about the volatile security situation.
During the 22 April briefing on Libya, several Council members such as the UK, Latvia, and Bahrain commended the US for its role in facilitating the signing of the unified national budget. France and Greece welcomed the US mediation role in efforts to support military integration in Libya.
China and Russia seem to have a more nuanced perspective. China has emphasised that all international efforts must strictly adhere to the “Libyan-led and Libyan-owned” principle, prioritising support for mediation facilitated by the UN. Russia views external proposals as mere recommendations rather than binding solutions, warning that “backroom deals” are unlikely to yield results and insisting that the process remains exclusively in the hands of Libyans.
Council members generally agree that the arms embargo is essential for Libya’s stability and for preventing further military escalation. Members remain deeply divided on the effectiveness of its enforcement, however.
Operation IRINI was the only regional organisation that was inspecting vessels based on authorisation granted under resolution 2780. It seems that Libya was opposed to renewal of this authorisation in May, which appears to be one of the reasons why France and Greece (co-penholders) did not pursue renewal. The US and European members of the Council have traditionally been very supportive of Operation IRINI. On the other hand, China and Russia, which abstained during the vote on resolution 2804, described Operation IRINI as ineffective and lacking transparency. Similar views were expressed by A3 members and Pakistan as well.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 25 November 2025S/RES/2804 | This resolution renewed for six months the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from Libya, that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 22 April 2026S/PV.10142 | This was a briefing on Libya. |
