Iran
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is expected to hold the 90-day briefing on the work of the 1737 Sanctions Committee concerning Iran.
The Council will also receive the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Background and Recent Developments
The 1737 Sanctions Committee was established by resolution 1737 of 23 December 2006, which required the Committee to report to the Council every 90 days on its activities. Prior to the agreement on the JCPOA and the adoption of resolution 2231, these briefings were held every three months under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
Resolution 2231 suspended all prior sanctions resolutions on Iran, including resolution 1737, rendering defunct the 1737 Committee and its reporting requirement. Subsequently, the Council held biannual briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231, which also took place under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
In August 2025, the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the deal’s “snapback” mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to do so and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. On that date—absent an activation of the snapback—resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.
By contrast, the E3 and like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and therefore that only specific paragraphs of resolution 2231 related to the suspension of sanctions have expired. As such, they maintain that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been re-activated and that the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored.
In March, the US, in its capacity as Council president, included the 1737 Committee’s 90-day briefing in that month’s programme of work in an attempt to resume the Committee’s reporting. Since the disagreement regarding the Committee has prevented the Council from agreeing on this year’s allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the US, as Council president, also assumed the functions of Committee chair and proposed a draft report that it intended to deliver at the briefing. The Committee agrees on such reports by consensus.
Given their position that UN sanctions on Iran have expired and that the 1737 Committee no longer exists, China and Russia objected to the US proposal to include the briefing in the March programme of work. They therefore blocked the adoption of the programme at the beginning of the month. For the same reason, these two members also objected to the draft report on the Committee’s activities that the US proposed to deliver.
The US still convened the briefing, however, which it sought to hold under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item in accordance with past practice. At the beginning of the meeting, Russia requested a procedural vote on the agenda, reiterating its position that “Non-Proliferation” had been removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. The agenda was subsequently adopted with 11 votes in favour, two against (China and Russia), and two abstentions (Pakistan and Somalia). Following the meeting—which took place on 12 March—the Council adopted the monthly programme of work.
Similar dynamics have affected the Council’s consideration of the Secretary-General’s biannual reports on resolution 2231. The first such report following the snapback was due in December 2025. Slovenia, as Council president that month, did not include the regular meeting on its programme of work because of members’ diverging positions, but the briefing was subsequently convened under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item at the request of several members. China and Russia raised a point of order objecting to the agenda item but did not call for a procedural vote.
This month, it seems that Colombia—the Council president in June—is following the precedents set by the US presidency in March regarding the 90-day briefing of the 1737 Committee and by the Slovenian presidency in December 2025 regarding the biannual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231.
Meanwhile, activity in the 1737 Committee itself remains blocked. In April, China and Russia apparently opposed a request by the US to update entries on the sanctions list and rejected candidates proposed by the Secretariat for the PoE. On 30 April, Council members convened in closed consultations requested by France and the UK to discuss the issue. Most members apparently reiterated their established positions in that session.
The gridlock has been exacerbated by the broader Middle East crisis triggered by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began in February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region. On 11 March, the Council adopted resolution 2817, drafted by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Jordan, which condemned Iran’s strikes against these countries and any actions or threats by Iran aimed at obstructing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz—the critical waterway that Iran has effectively closed during the conflict. The text was co-sponsored by 136 UN member states and adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). A competing draft resolution penned by Russia, which did not mention individual countries but urged all parties to stop their military activities and return to diplomacy, failed to be adopted due to insufficient votes. It received four votes in favour (China, Russia, Pakistan, and Somalia), two votes against (Latvia and the US), and nine abstentions.
On 7 April, the US and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, during which they attempted to negotiate a permanent end to the war that would include an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and the sanctions issue. After those talks failed to achieve a breakthrough, Trump announced an indefinite extension of the ceasefire on 21 April to allow more time for negotiations. Although an Iranian official stated that the announcement “means nothing” as long as the US maintains its blockade of Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz, large-scale hostilities between the parties have not resumed. According to media reports, Iran and the US have subsequently neared agreement on a memorandum of understanding to formally end the war and begin negotiations on a broader deal to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief, but they had not yet finalised the terms at the time of writing.
Council activity has continued alongside these developments. On 7 April, China and Russia vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Bahrain—again in coordination with several other member states of the GCC and Jordan—that encouraged states to coordinate efforts to protect commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. On 8 May, Bahrain and the US put in blue a draft resolution that they had co-penned on de-mining in the Strait. That text apparently had 138 co-sponsors at the time of writing, but it was also expected to face opposition from China and Russia, which have expressed concerns about its provisions. A vote on the text had not been scheduled at the time of writing.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 29 April press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk deplored Iranian authorities’ crackdown on dissent, particularly through the use of national security-related charges. Since the onset of the US-Israeli strikes against Iran, at least nine people have been executed in connection with the domestic protests that took place in December 2025 and January 2026, ten for alleged membership in opposition groups, and two on espionage charges. In light of these developments, Türk called on the authorities to halt all further executions and fully ensure due process and fair trial guarantees, among other recommendations.
In response to the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFM), which the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) established in November 2022, called on all parties to the ongoing conflict to cease hostilities, end rhetoric that incites or justifies violence, and fully comply with international law.
On 25 March, the HRC adopted a resolution on the human rights implications of Iran’s attacks against GCC countries and Jordan. Among other recommendations, the resolution demands Iran’s full compliance with Security Council resolution 2817 and with its obligations under international law, and calls for its immediate, unconditional cessation of all unprovoked attacks, threats, and provocations against the aforementioned countries.
On 19 March, the FFM submitted a report to the HRC on human rights violations in the country, including during and after the June 2025 hostilities between Israel and Iran, as well as in the context of the domestic protests that began in December 2025. The report’s findings detail Iranian authorities’ use of similar repressive measures in both contexts to suppress dissent, including through large-scale arbitrary arrests and detention, unlawful use of lethal force by security forces, and an increase in executions, among other measures.
Key Issues and Options
The key proximate issue for the Council is overcoming the procedural gridlock that has stymied its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file since the triggering of the snapback in August 2025. Members remain divided over the status of resolution 2231 and the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item and the validity of the 1737 sanctions regime, which has prevented the appointment of a Committee chair and hindered the operationalisation of the PoE. As a result, the Committee has been unable to exercise effective oversight over the sanctions regime.
A broader issue for the Council is the current Middle East crisis that began with the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran in February. Important objectives in this regard include sustaining the fragile ceasefire and preventing a return to large-scale hostilities; restoring the verification and monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran; safeguarding freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; and protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure across the region.
While Council members could continue to engage in informal consultations to identify common ground on the 1737 sanctions regime or pursue products addressing aspects of the broader crisis, the most effective and sustainable solution to both issues would be a political settlement agreed by Iran and the US, and endorsed by the Council, that ends the war and addresses Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the re-lifting of UN sanctions.
Council Dynamics
The Council remains deeply divided on the Iran file. France, the UK, the US, and most other members maintain that the snapback was valid, that the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item and key provisions of resolution 2231 remain in force, and that the 1737 Committee and its PoE have been reactivated. China and Russia reject these positions, arguing that resolution 2231 has expired in its entirety and that the Council has concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue. These divisions have had spillover effects across the Council’s work, preventing the adoption of its monthly programme of work and blocking agreement on subsidiary body chairs. They have also polarised the Council’s response to the ongoing Middle East crisis, influencing votes on resolution 2817 and the competing Russian-drafted text in March, as well as the Bahrain-led draft on the Strait of Hormuz that China and Russia vetoed in April.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 11 March 2026S/RES/2817 | This resolution was authored by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—as well as Jordan. It condemned Iran’s strikes against these countries; determined that these acts constitute a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security; deplored that civilian objects had been targeted and that the attacks resulted in civilian casualties; and demanded that Iran immediately halt the attacks against these countries and fully comply with its obligations under international law. The text also condemned any actions or threats by Iran aimed at closing or obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. |
| 20 July 2015S/RES/2231 | This was a resolution that endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 15 December 2025S/2025/814 | This was the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the JCPOA. |
