International Criminal Tribunals
Expected Council Action
In June, the Security Council is scheduled to hold its semi-annual debate on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). The President of the IRMCT, Judge Graciela Gatti Santana, and the Chief Prosecutor of the IRMCT, Serge Brammertz, are expected to brief during the debate and meet with the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals prior to that.
The Council is also expected to adopt a resolution on the IRMCT in June. The term of the Chief Prosecutor expires on 30 June.
Background and Key Recent Developments
With branches in The Hague, the Netherlands, and Arusha, Tanzania, the IRMCT is mandated to complete the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which closed in December 2017 and December 2015, respectively. The IRMCT was established by resolution 1966 of 22 December 2010, which stated that “the Mechanism shall continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and ICTR” and that it “should be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions”. The IRMCT has implemented its mandate through five main modalities: supervising the enforcement of sentences; protecting victims and witnesses; providing assistance to national jurisdictions; preserving and managing the archives of the Mechanism and the predecessor tribunals; and conducting other judicial activities within its jurisdiction, such as managing requests for review of judgments.
Pursuant to resolution 1966, the IRMCT was mandated to operate for an initial period of four years and for subsequent periods of two years unless the Council decides otherwise. The Council last reviewed the work of the IRMCT through resolution 2740 of 27 June 2024. Adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (Russia), the resolution extended Brammertz’s term for an additional two years and recalled the Council’s request in resolution 2637 of 22 June 2022—its prior resolution on the IRMCT—for the Mechanism to produce “clear and focused projections of completion timelines” for its activities, taking note of the information that it had submitted to the Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals in response to this request.
Resolution 2740 also requested two reports from the Secretary-General: one regarding “the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations of the archives of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the [IRMCT]”; and another concerning options for transferring certain remaining functions of the IRMCT, including supervision of sentences and the provision of assistance to national jurisdictions. Both reports were issued on 1 December 2025.
Gatti Santana and Brammertz briefed the Council at its most recent semi-annual debate on the IRMCT, held on 10 December 2025. During her briefing, Gatti Santana updated Council members on the IRMCT’s work, noting that IRMCT judges had issued nearly 80 decisions and orders during the reporting period, approximately 90 percent of which pertained to the Mechanism’s judicial functions. She also welcomed the recommendations made in the Secretary-General’s reports. Regarding options for transferring the remaining functions of the IRMCT, Gatti Santana supported the Secretary-General’s proposal to transfer to the UN Secretariat the technical functions of the prosecution’s assistance to national jurisdictions and the management of the archives, which she said would materially decrease the Mechanism’s activities and resource requirements.
In his briefing to the Council, Brammertz highlighted his office’s work in assisting national authorities with pursuing accountability for crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. He emphasised that his office had increased the amount of evidence that it had shared with national prosecutors and prepared investigative dossiers for national authorities concerning suspects whom it had investigated but not indicted. Brammertz also provided an update on the case against Fulgence Kayishema, one of the last fugitives indicted in connection with the 1994 Rwandan genocide, who remains in South Africa more than three years after his arrest, despite an IRMCT order directing his transfer to its custody.
On 27 February, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) issued its evaluation report on the methods and work of the IRMCT. The report assessed “the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the approach of the [IRMCT] to fulfilling … its residual functions”, observing that the IRMCT’s mandate remained relevant and was adequately implemented through its five modalities and appropriate adaptations to evolving circumstances. At the same time, the report concluded that the Mechanism’s “current organizational architecture is no longer fit for purpose, and the absence of a clearly articulated, institution-wide completion strategy and transition plan risks extending its operations beyond what is justified and delaying its intended downward trajectory”. In light of these findings, the report recommended that the IRMCT should:
- Develop a list of strategic priorities for digitisation and preservation from among the remaining archival work, with a focus on ensuring access for ongoing national investigative and prosecutorial processes; and
- Pending the Security Council’s decision regarding the future of the Mechanism, develop a time-bound plan with resource implications for the various scenarios emanating from the options to transfer or complete its residual functions.
Typically, the Council adopts a biennial presidential statement that requests the IRMCT to submit a progress report, which is reviewed by the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. The findings and recommendations of the Informal Working Group then inform the Council’s biennial resolution on the IRMCT. This year, however, the Council was unable to achieve consensus on the presidential statement. As a workaround apparently agreed upon by Council members, China, as the May Council president, requested the UN Secretariat to engage with the IRMCT to facilitate the provision of relevant information to the Council for the Mechanism’s review. A progress report from the IRMCT was circulated to Council members in mid-May.
On 16 May, the IRMCT issued a statement confirming the passing of Félicien Kabuga, a Rwandan businessman who stood charged with six counts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to genocide, and crimes against humanity, including persecution, extermination, and murder, committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. An arrest warrant for Kabuga was issued by the ICTR on 29 April 2013, with his arrest in May 2020 and subsequent transfer to the Mechanism’s Hague branch on 26 October 2020. On 20 May, the Trial Chamber of the IRMCT issued a decision formally terminating the proceedings in the case of Prosecutor v. Félicien Kabuga.
Key Issues and Options
Appointing a Chief Prosecutor is an immediate issue for the Council, as Brammertz’s term is set to expire on 30 June, pursuant to resolution 2740.
Continuing to monitor the work of the IRMCT and the implementation of its mandate is another key issue for the Council.
Members could use the closed format of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals to have a frank discussion with Gatti Santana and Brammertz regarding the IRMCT’s completion timelines. Reflecting on the recommendations presented in the Secretary-General’s December 2025 reports, as well as the OIOS and IRMCT progress reports, Council members could also use this format to seek the views of Gatti Santana and Brammertz regarding appropriate avenues for the possible transfer of certain functions of the IRMCT and locations for the archives. They could also consider related informal consultations to examine in greater detail the legal, operational, and budgetary implications of the options mapped out in the reports, with a view to identifying areas of convergence and fostering more constructive future negotiations on Council products concerning the IRMCT. Members might also ask how the Council can assist the IRMCT in completing its remaining work.
Council Dynamics
Council members generally have a positive assessment of the IRMCT and the progress it has made, with the exception of Russia. During the December 2025 semi-annual debate, Russia strongly criticised the IRMCT, asserting that “the Mechanism’s ongoing existence seems absurd when viewed against the backdrop of a completely empty judicial basket and the UN80 Initiative”. Russia therefore called for all residual functions, including judicial ones, to be handed over to national authorities and UN entities. Other Council members expressed support for the IRMCT and its work and urged member states to cooperate with the Mechanism as it carries out its remaining functions.
Russia has also regularly criticised the appointment of Brammertz—who served as ICTY prosecutor from 2008 until its closure in 2017—abstaining on the resolution initially appointing him in 2016 and on each of the subsequent resolutions biennially extending his term.
The negotiations on resolution 2740, which most recently extended Brammertz’s term, were lengthy, difficult, and contentious. Russia apparently objected to many aspects of the draft text, provided comments on almost every paragraph, reiterated long-held criticisms of the IRMCT, and strongly pushed for a concrete timeframe and deadline for the transfer of the Mechanism’s remaining functions. While some of Russia’s suggestions were supported by China, they were largely opposed by other Council members.
It seems that such dynamics also played a role in negotiations on the Council’s most recent biennial presidential statement on the Mechanism, penned by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as the Council’s penholder on the IRMCT. In accordance with past practice, the draft text—initially circulated to members in March—would have requested the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals to review by 15 May a progress report from the IRMCT, as well as the two Secretary-General reports and the OIOS evaluation report, with a view to identifying concrete options to address the Mechanism’s remaining functions and the aim to conclude them.
Similar to resolution 2740, the negotiations on the draft presidential statement were arduous. During the negotiations, Russia apparently maintained its long-held criticisms of the IRMCT, objecting to several aspects of the draft text and reiterating its call for a concrete timeframe and deadline for transferring the Mechanism’s residual functions. To facilitate consensus among Council members, the DRC circulated several revised drafts of the presidential statement and convened several informal consultations, including closed consultations held under “any other business” on 14 and 23 April and 7 May. Russia still expressed reservations about the text, however, and the penholder ultimately decided not to pursue the presidential statement further. The Council instead opted for the workaround solution involving the Secretariat, as described above.
These dynamics are likely to colour the negotiations in June on the IRMCT resolution.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 June 2024S/RES/2740 | This resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and Russia abstaining. Among other matters, resolution 2740 re-appointed Serge Brammertz as Chief Prosecutor of the IRMCT for another two years, until 30 June 2026. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 10 December 2025S/PV.10059 | This was the semi-annual debate on the work of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 1 December 2025S/2025/785 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations of the archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), requested by resolution 2740 of 27 June 2024. |
| 1 December 2025S/2025/786 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on options for transferring certain remaining functions of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), including supervision of sentences and the provision of assistance to national jurisdictions, requested by resolution 2740 of 27 June 2024. |
