Syria
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone and a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
In April, the Syrian interim government continued efforts to insulate the country from the Middle East crisis triggered on 28 February by Israeli and US military strikes on Iran. Spillover effects of the conflict have had a direct impact on Syria. These have included multiple missile and drone attacks by pro-Iranian militias from Iraq aimed at US military bases in northeastern and southeastern Syria, launched prior to the 7 April announcement of a two-week ceasefire between Iran and the US. On 16 April, the US reportedly finalised the redeployment of its forces out of Syria and the handover of bases to the interim government—a process which started in 2025. On 8 April, Syria reopened its airspace, which had been closed due to the regional hostilities.
Israel has continued its military activities in southern Syria, which it says are necessary for its national security. In April, these included incursions, arrests, and road closures in the governorate of Quneitra in southwestern Syria. On 3 April, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) reported that an Israeli tank fired across the ceasefire line established by the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. The mission has launched an investigation into the incident, which coincided with reports of a civilian death caused by Israeli tank fire in the municipality of al-Rafid in Quneitra that was condemned by the Syrian government.
On 11 April and 19 April, the Syrian Interior Ministry said that it had foiled plots by Hezbollah-affiliated cells to conduct attacks in Damascus and Quneitra, respectively. Hezbollah has denied the accusations and said that it has no presence in Syrian territory. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has said that he supports Lebanon in disarming Hezbollah and will prevent the militia from operating in Syria.
As the government continues its efforts to promote Syrian national unity, intercommunal tensions have also persisted in recent weeks. On 28 March, individuals from the Sunni-majority town Qalaat al-Madiq reportedly stormed the neighbouring Christian town of Suqaylabiyah and attacked shops, homes, and cars before government forces calmed the situation. In the southern governorate of Suweida, although the ceasefire between Damascus and Druze factions continues to hold, on 11 April, hundreds of Druze reportedly held protests and called for self-determination and accountability for violence committed in the July 2025 clashes.
Meanwhile, in the northeast, the implementation of the 29 January agreement to integrate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) into government institutions continues. However, several significant issues remain unresolved. On 15 April, DAANES Foreign Relations co-chair Ilham Ahmed and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi met with Sharaa in Damascus to discuss accelerating the process. Reportedly, Ahmed subsequently acknowledged that disputes over administrative appointments are posing a key obstacle and that recognition of educational certificates issued by the DAANES remains unresolved. Women’s representation has also emerged as a sticking point, with Ahmed noting that appointments approved so far have been limited to men despite DAANES’ broad inclusion of women in its own structures. A number of issues continue to be discussed, including the status of the Women’s Protection Units, the management of border crossings, the modalities of Kurdish representation in the People’s Assembly, and the role of Kurds in the eventual constitutional drafting process.
In his 22 April briefing to the Security Council, Cordone described Syria as making tentative progress towards stabilisation and political transition despite significant challenges. He said that although overall violence has declined to its lowest levels in years, localised insecurity, sectarian tensions, and the continued threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) persist, compounded by serious human rights concerns stemming from past abuses. Cordone said that deteriorating economic conditions are driving social unrest and emphasised the need for inclusive governance, credible transitional justice, and the importance of international support. He also highlighted ongoing preparations for indirect elections for nine vacant seats in the new People’s Assembly in Hasakah governorate—left unfilled during the September 2025 vote—and stressed the importance of swiftly establishing a functioning and broadly representative legislature.
Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher noted progress on the humanitarian front in his 2 April visit to Syria and his subsequent briefing to the Council on 22 April. In that briefing, Fletcher expressed cautious optimism about the millions of returnees, growing markets, and improvements in essential infrastructure, while underscoring the need to support development, resilience, and recovery.
During the visit, he was joined by UN Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator Alexander De Croo and together they launched the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) for Syria. The plan recognises ongoing challenges, including that millions remain in need of food, clean water, and healthcare support, with high numbers of displaced persons particularly vulnerable. It identifies three strategic objectives: saving lives and alleviating suffering; protecting safety and rights; and restoring life-saving services and livelihoods in support of national recovery priorities. The HNRP seeks $2.92 billion to assist 8.6 million of the 15.6 million people in need across all sectors—a prioritised approach reflecting resource constraints due to acute funding cuts.
At the 22 April Council meeting, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Vanessa Frazier also briefed, in her first formal briefing to the Council since she was appointed to this role. Frazier spoke of her three-day visit to Syria, which concluded on 19 February, and said that she was encouraged by Damascus’ willingness to engage with the UN on the child protection file and its commitment to international obligations, including those in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. She also highlighted challenges, including those pertaining to displaced and detained children, access to education, and the threat of widespread contamination of explosive remnants of war. Frazier noted that in 2025, the level of grave violations against children in Syria remained elevated, and that the Syrian government has agreed to develop an action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use, and the killing and maiming of children, as well as to prevent other grave violations by its forces.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 24 March, the Human Rights Council (HRC) renewed the mandate (A/HRC/61/L.25) of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) for another year. The renewal maintained the COI’s independent investigative duties pertaining to all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 and to, where possible, identify those responsible with a view to ensure accountability. Additionally, the renewal expanded the COI’s mandate to provide advice to the Syrian government in support of national investigations into allegations of human rights violations and to Syrian national entities, including the National Commission for Transitional Justice, “in areas related to ensuring justice and accountability, preventing violations and improving the human rights situation”.
On 27 March, the COI released a comprehensive report examining international human rights and humanitarian law violations in the context of and following the July 2025 escalation in Suweida governorate, which left more than 1,700 people dead and forcibly displaced up to 155,000. The report found that the July escalation entailed human rights violations involving widespread executions, torture, and gender-based violence, among other abuses, which may amount to war crimes and, should such elements be established through further investigation, crimes against humanity. Considering these findings, the COI called on the Syrian government to urgently strengthen accountability and accelerate concrete efforts to resolve key human rights issues affecting communities in Suweida, among other recommendations.
On 13 March, the COI published an earlier report on the progress and challenges facing Syria as it continues its political transition. Among other recommendations, it urges the government to expand efforts to advance reforms, accountability, and professionalism in the security sector, and to integrate human rights education across all sectors.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is ensuring that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. By maintaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members could consider linking enhanced political support for the Syrian government to concrete progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through accountability and reconciliation processes.
While the Iran-US ceasefire announced on 7 April has reduced some of the immediate pressure on Syria, Israeli military activity in the south continues to pose a risk to Syria’s sovereignty and to the stability of the transition and represents a distinct challenge for the Council.
Another issue is the SDF integration process, which is advancing but remains incomplete.
Accountability for the July 2025 violence in Suweida also remains a pressing concern. The recent COI and the national investigative committee’s reports on the violence point to recommendations that would improve accountability efforts. Members could encourage confidence-building steps laid out in the 16 September roadmap agreed by Jordan, Syria, and the US to address the tensions in Suweida.
To address the many-faceted challenges facing Syria, the Council could consider adopting a presidential statement that:
- calls for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, urges adherence to the 1974 Agreement, and calls on Israel to cease violations and on both parties to engage constructively in US-facilitated talks on sustainable security arrangements;
- encourages progress on both the SDF integration agreement and the Suweida roadmap, while pressing the government to ensure the protection and rights of Druze and Kurdish civilians;
- highlights the importance of Damascus continuing its counterterrorism efforts against a resurgent ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the region;
- urges Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms, including through their cooperation with existing international mechanisms on Syria, while also meaningfully engaging with victims and civil society on transitional justice and reconciliation; and
- calls for enhanced financial support to address humanitarian needs and long-term recovery and development.
The Council could also consider encouraging the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the Syria file. The PBC’s convening role and its capacity to mobilise sustained, coordinated international support for countries navigating fragile transitions could be of value at this juncture. Council members, in close collaboration with Syria, could consider the possibility of an advisory opinion from the PBC on how best to support the country’s transition.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue. Cordone’s office is actively negotiating its relocation to Damascus and areas of cooperation with the Syrian government. Council members could express support for an expedited agreement and early relocation, as a meaningful UN presence on the ground is essential to supporting Syria’s political transition. Members could also continue pressing for progress on the appointment of a Special Envoy following Geir O. Pedersen’s resignation in October 2025.
Council Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice, alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus and its decisions to delist Sharaa, Syria’s interior minister Anas Khattab, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list signaled unified support for Syria’s interim government and the overall transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
Furthermore, several Council members have taken steps to normalise bilateral relations with Syria and to support its recovery. High-level officials of the Syrian government have visited all the capitals of the Council’s five permanent members. Most recently, on 31 March, Sharaa and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer met in London and discussed, among other things, opportunities for British businesses to contribute to the restoration of Syria’s infrastructure. The European Union (EU)—which includes Council members France, Denmark, Greece, and Latvia—also announced plans to fully resume its 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and begin formal talks on strengthening economic and security ties on 11 May; on 24 April, Sharaa attended the informal meeting of the EU and regional partners in Cyprus.
The regional escalation triggered by the US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February, however, could strain Council dynamics on the Syria file. Members that have traditionally aligned themselves or expressed support for Iran—most notably Russia and China—are likely to take a more critical posture towards the US and its regional actions, potentially complicating the unified approach to Syria that has characterised the past year. While Council members have so far managed to keep Syria-specific discussions relatively insulated from these broader tensions—in part due to Syria’s efforts to insulate itself from the escalation—a prolonged regional conflict risks eroding that separation.
Many Council members agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by FTFs and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 22 April 2026S/PV.10143 | This was a Security Council meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
