Libya
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution renewing the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from Libya, that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo.
The current authorisation expires on 25 May 2026.
During May, the Council is also expected to receive the semi-annual briefing on the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) activities related to the situation in Libya.
Key Recent Developments
Libya remains mired in a political impasse between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over a draft legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention is over the proposal to form a unified interim government to organise the elections—a proposal favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections.
On 22 April, the Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, briefed the Council on political and security developments in the country. She said that progress on the UN‑facilitated political roadmap remained inadequate. She noted that some Libyan actors continue to disregard public expectations for democratic participation and instead operate through parallel structures that undermine institutional reunification. (The roadmap announced by UNSMIL in August 2025 consists of three core pillars: adopting a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unifying institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues to pave the way for these elections and address long-term conflict drivers.) Tetteh noted that while UNSMIL had advanced the structured dialogue across security, governance, economic reform, and reconciliation and human rights tracks, this has yet to translate into the political compromises needed to move toward elections. She warned that maintaining “business as usual” may entrench the status quo and carry significant national and regional risks, underscoring the need for sustained political will and concrete implementation to reunify institutions and restore democratic legitimacy. In addition to political challenges, Tetteh warned of Libya’s deteriorating economic situation, characterised by inflation, fuel shortages, and rising poverty. She called for urgent governance reforms in the hydrocarbon sector to strengthen transparency, prevent money laundering, and address the diversion of national wealth.
Elaborating on the approach outlined in her February briefing, Tetteh said in April that UNSMIL has begun engaging a smaller group of Libyan stakeholders to unblock the two election‑related milestones in the political roadmap: the adoption of a viable electoral framework and the establishment of a unified government to support the electoral process and governance. She explained that this format is intended to identify practical steps that Libyan institutions can take to move the process forward. She noted that these efforts draw on the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, established by UNSMIL in 2025 to address outstanding issues hindering the holding of elections in Libya. The committee comprises a diverse group of Libyan personalities whose selection was based on several criteria, including expertise in legal, constitutional, and electoral issues; the ability to build compromise; and an understanding of the political challenges facing Libya. She reiterated that if this approach fails to produce sufficient progress, she would return to the Council with proposals based on existing Libyan political agreements.
The first such meeting with a smaller group of Libyan stakeholders took place on 29 April in Rome under the auspices of UNSMIL. At the meeting, this group reached an agreement on reconstituting the Board of the High National Elections Commission and committed to maintaining ongoing talks facilitated by UNSMIL.
On 14 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2819, extending the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 August 2027, and renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 August 2027. In addition, under strict conditions, the resolution allows frozen Libyan Investment Authority assets to be transferred between custodial institutions within the same jurisdiction, solely to facilitate a change of global custodian.
On 1 December 2025, the German authorities surrendered Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri to the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC). German authorities arrested El Hishri on 16 July 2025 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. El Hishri was a senior official in the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), an armed group in Tripoli, and one of the top officials at Mitiga Prison in Tripoli. The ICC Prosecutor’s Office alleges that he is responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in and around Mitiga Prison between February 2015 and early 2020.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 24 March, the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee was published. The Panel concluded that armed groups have entrenched themselves as the main drivers of governance in Libya. It noted that these groups exert coercive and cartel‑like control over political, security, and economic institutions, operating with near‑total impunity and undermining accountability mechanisms and the rule of law. The Panel found that this situation has enabled widespread violations of the arms embargo, facilitated the movement of fighters and weapons across borders, and contributed to regional instability. It also reported that armed groups have interfered in elections, committed serious human rights abuses, and enabled unprecedented levels of illicit petroleum exports. According to the Panel, these activities diverted billions of dollars from state institutions and reinforced cycles of conflict within Libya and across the region.
Key Issues and Options
The key issue for the Council in May is the renewal of the authorisation for maritime inspections off the coast of Libya, which is limited to arms embargo enforcement.
Ahead of the mandate renewal, Council members could continue the regular practice of holding an informal interactive dialogue with an EU representative to discuss the implementation of these measures.
An option for the Council is to consider whether and how to expand the mandate to also include authorisation to member states acting through regional organisations in enforcing measures related to the illicit export of petroleum. The EU naval force in the Mediterranean (Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) has remained the only regional organisation to inspect vessels under the authorisation.
Given that the two most recent renewals of the maritime inspections’ authorisation were for six‑month periods, the Council could consider extending the mandate to one year. This was the standard practice prior to the renewal in May 2025.
A key issue relevant to the ICC is how to promote accountability for the crimes committed in Libya in recent years. An option would be for Council members who are parties to the ICC to hold a joint press stakeout in connection with the meeting to assert their support for the court’s work in Libya and encourage the Libyan authorities to cooperate closely with the ICC.
Council Dynamics
During the early rounds of negotiations on resolution 2819 in April, the UK (penholder on Libya) sought to introduce a substantive proposal concerning the role of member states acting through regional organisations in enforcing measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. One of the aims of this was to align the oil smuggling enforcement framework more closely with existing maritime provisions applicable to the Libya arms embargo. Russia, supported by some other members, raised concerns about the scope and oversight of the proposed enforcement role for the regional organisations and suggested alternative approaches, including a limited pilot phase combined with enhanced reporting to the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. China, for its part, questioned the appropriateness of considering the issue in the context of the sanctions renewal and suggested instead that the text express a willingness to revisit the matter at a later stage following further consultations. The A3 members also expressed reservations, including on issues related to oversight arrangements. The UK ultimately dropped this proposal. However, France and Greece (co-penholders on maritime inspection authorisation) might raise this issue during the maritime inspection authorisation in May.
Prior to 2022, the Council unanimously renewed the annual maritime inspections authorisation. Since 2022, however, Russia has abstained on the votes. In May and November 2025, the Council renewed the authorisation for six months. In both cases, China and Russia abstained, raising concerns about the effectiveness and transparency of the EU‑led Operation IRINI. China has also called for the Council to conduct an assessment of Operation IRINI’s mandate.
Regarding the ICC, Russia has consistently accused the court of inefficiency and pro-Western bias. It has argued that the court lacks credibility due to politicisation, double standards, and selective justice, and said it has failed to deliver meaningful results in Libya more than 14 years after the Council’s referral. While not as forceful in their criticisms as Russia, some other Council members have also expressed reservations about the Court’s work. China has emphasised the need for the ICC to respect national sovereignty, adhere strictly to its mandate, and uphold the principle of complementarity, while avoiding politicisation and double standards. African members have also long raised concerns about the Court’s perceived disproportionate focus on their continent and its implications for national justice systems.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 14 April 2026S/RES/2819 | This resolution extended the authorisation of measures related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya until 1 August 2027, as well as renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee until 15 August 2027. |
| 25 November 2025S/RES/2804 | This resolution renewed for six months the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya, bound to or from Libya, that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 24 March 2026S/2026/224 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. |
