DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In May, Council members are scheduled to discuss the 90-day report on the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations.
Ordinarily, the Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee briefs Council members on the report. At the time of writing, the Chair had not been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on this year’s allocation of subsidiary bodies. If the Chair is not appointed by the time the meeting is scheduled to take place, China, the president of the Council during May, is likely to brief members on the report in its capacity as president. Greece served as Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee last year, after the appointments were finalised in May 2025.
Background and Key Recent Developments
The mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee—which monitored and submitted biannual reports on sanctions implementation—expired on 30 April 2024 after Russia vetoed a draft resolution that would have extended it.
In October 2024, 11 countries—including the P3, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—established the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to “monitor and report violations and evasions of sanctions measures” stipulated in relevant Security Council resolutions on the DPRK. Since then, the MSMT has published two reports: one dated 29 May 2025 on alleged unlawful military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia following the latter’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and another dated 22 October 2025 on the DPRK’s alleged violations and evasion of UN sanctions through cyber and information technology (IT) activities. On 12 January, the participating member states of the MSMT held an open briefing on its second report at UN Headquarters. On 19 February, the participating countries held the inaugural meeting of the MSMT Steering Committee in Washington, DC.
Between 19 and 25 February, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)—the DPRK’s ruling party—held its ninth congress, during which the party leadership reportedly reaffirmed the country’s status as a nuclear-armed state. (The WPK convenes for a congress every five years, with the last one taking place in 2021.) On 15 April, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that the country had made “very serious” advances in its nuclear weapons programme, including the likely construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and increased activity at other nuclear sites. He assessed the DPRK’s current nuclear arsenal at “a few dozen” warheads.
On 19 April, the DPRK reportedly fired short-range ballistic missiles with cluster munitions at an island target in the Sea of Japan. Earlier this month, it conducted a three-day weapons test, which included missile-carried cluster bombs, electromagnetic weapon systems, and anti-aircraft missile systems. In March, the country reportedly tested an upgraded solid-fuel engine for missiles capable of reaching the US mainland.
Military cooperation continues to be reported between the DPRK and Russia. According to a report published last month by the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a public research institute funded by the ROK government, the DPRK had sent four troop deployments to Russia as at December 2025, comprising a total of 21,000 personnel. Another report published in March by the Open Source Centre (OSC)—a UK-based non-profit organisation that uses publicly accessible information to produce open-source research products on security issues—found that sanctioned Russian vessels had transferred between eight and 11 million rounds of ammunition from the DPRK to Russia since mid-2023.
Reflecting their political support for the DPRK, both China and Russia sent letters of congratulations to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in connection with the WPK congress, emphasising their countries’ strong ties and strategic partnerships. On 26 April, Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly travelled to Pyongyang to negotiate an agreement on military cooperation for the 2027-2031 period. The countries previously signed a mutual defence treaty in June 2024.
On 30 April, the Security Council convened for an open briefing under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”. The meeting was requested by Council members Bahrain, Denmark, France, Latvia, the UK, and the US, as well as non-Council members Japan and the ROK, to discuss the DPRK’s “continued violations of multiple Security Council resolutions” two years after the disbandment of the PoE assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. The briefers were Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and James Byrne, the Chief Executive Officer of the OSC.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 16 February, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Elizabeth Salmón, submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council on the country’s political and human rights landscape. In the report, Salmón assesses the progress made in the implementation of recommendations made during the country’s universal periodic review (UPR). The report’s findings observed that, despite engagements with UN human rights mechanisms and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2025, the country’s human rights landscape over the past 10 years has shown no improvement and, in many instances, has degraded, even with some isolated steps taken. It also highlighted challenges in monitoring the implementation of recommendations made during the UPR, noting the DPRK’s lack of political will, the genericity of some recommendations, as well as contradictions in the DPRK’s position concerning specific rights.
In a subsequent press release, Salmón underscored the importance of concrete steps and international cooperation for improving the realisation of human rights in the country. Noting the report’s findings, she called on the DPRK to urgently seek international cooperation in the areas in which it has committed to act and implement its human rights obligations.
Key Issues and Options
The Council is dealing with several long-term issues on the DPRK file. The DPRK’s ongoing development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which violates numerous Council resolutions, is a major concern. Sanctions evasion continues to be a problem, as is the overall effectiveness of the sanctions regime, particularly given that the DPRK is widely believed to have increased its nuclear arsenal since the sanctions regime was first introduced in 2006. The DPRK’s continuing refusal to participate in denuclearisation dialogue and the humanitarian and human rights situations are also challenges for the Council.
Council members could consider holding an informal meeting to discuss strategies for enhancing member state compliance with existing resolutions on the DPRK and compelling the DPRK to return to dialogue.
The lack of a panel of experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee is another major issue. Some members appear to feel that the MSMT does not carry the same authority as an entity mandated by the Council. Given this concern, Council members, who are also part of the MSMT or who support its work, could explore options for enhancing its credibility, such as expanding its membership and providing more information about the way in which it operates. These members could also hold an informal meeting to discuss how the MSMT’s reports can be used to assist the Council and the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
UN agencies with relevant expertise, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), could also be asked to brief the Committee on the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Council Dynamics
The Council is sharply divided over the DPRK, and this dynamic appears to have worsened as cooperation between the DPRK and Russia has increased. The P3 (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded Council members generally favour using sanctions to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK and regularly call on member states to comply with existing Council resolutions. Many of these members have urged the DPRK to engage in dialogue and abandon its nuclear weapons programme while emphasising that it is responsible for escalating tensions. Some have also called for the Council to show unity and respond to the DPRK’s weapons tests and argue that China and Russia have emboldened the DPRK by blocking Council action on the file. Several of these members have strongly criticised the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, including by highlighting evidence of arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia and noting that these transfers violate Council resolutions. Some have also called for the reinstatement of the PoE assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.
China and Russia, on the other hand, blame the US and its allies for heightening tensions and have accused the US of not doing enough to incentivise the DPRK to participate in denuclearisation talks. These two members have previously argued that sanctions should be eased because of their impact on the humanitarian situation in the country and have also blocked attempts to issue a Council product responding to missile launches carried out by the DPRK in recent years.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 30 April 2026S/PV.10147 | This was an open briefing held under the “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)” agenda item. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 7 March 2024S/2024/215 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. |
