Bosnia and Herzegovina
Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). High Representative for BiH Christian Schmidt is expected to brief on the latest report of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
The current authorisation for the EU-led multinational stabilisation force (EUFOR ALTHEA) expires on 31 October.
Key Recent Developments
On 26 February 2025, the BiH state court sentenced former Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik to one year in prison and banned him from holding political office for six years for defying the decisions of the High Representative. The trial began in February 2024 following the filing of charges in August 2023 by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office. In response to the verdict, the RS National Assembly (RSNA) passed legislation the following day banning BiH state-level judicial and law enforcement institutions from operating in RS—a move described by the OHR as “hint[ing] at de facto secession”.
On 1 October 2025, Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) party named RS Interior Minister Siniša Karan as its candidate for the 23 November 2025 snap presidential election in RS. On 18 October 2025, the RSNA appointed Ana Trišić-Babić as acting president and repealed several laws adopted since 2023 that had been annulled by BiH’s Constitutional Court, including legislation on the non-application of the court’s decisions.
These steps coincided with—and, according to Washington’s own account, were influenced by—a notable shift in US policy on BiH. On 17 October 2025, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) lifted sanctions on four associates of Dodik; on 29 October, it lifted sanctions on Dodik himself, along with his allies, family members, and companies associated with them. At the Council’s 31 October 2025 debate on BiH, the US framed the lifting of sanctions as a “responsive measure” to the “significant steps” taken by the RSNA to set BiH on a “more stable footing”. It further acknowledged that, in the months preceding the October 2025 developments, the US had led discreet diplomatic efforts aimed at “defus[ing] the crisis and promot[ing] stability” in BiH.
On 23 November 2025, Karan, who campaigned to continue Dodik’s policies, narrowly won the early presidential election in RS. On 24 December 2025, BiH’s Central Election Commission (CEC) annulled the results in 136 polling stations across 17 constituencies, reportedly citing “numerous irregularities”. In the partial re-run held on 8 February, Karan again narrowly defeated opposition candidate Branko Blanuša and is expected to serve out the remainder of Dodik’s mandate until the general elections scheduled for October 2026.
In the days following the election, Dodik reiterated divisive and separatist rhetoric. He said that he would propose to the RSNA that competences—which he argues were originally vested in RS under the Dayton Agreement, including those relating to the army, border police, intelligence services, and the fiscal system—be restored to the entity, and that this would be a condition for political talks.
Against this backdrop, RS leaders have increasingly sought to strengthen ties with the US administration. On 6 February, Dodik travelled to Washington, alongside Trišić-Babić and Željka Cvijanović, the Serb member of the rotating tripartite inter-ethnic presidency of BiH, to ask for the US’ support to define RS’ status. In an interview during the visit, Dodik said he had “high expectations” of US President Donald Trump and suggested that Trump’s “America First” message encouraged a “Republika Srpska first” approach. On 7 April, Donald Trump Jr. visited Banja Luka, where he met with local political and business figures. The US embassy in Sarajevo said that the visit was conducted in a private capacity.
On 25 February, Council members discussed BiH under “any other business” (AOB) at the UK’s request, following a 11 February letter submitted to the Security Council by BiH Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković. The letter highlighted a lobbying contract filed with the US Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act between RS authorities and the Canadian firm Dickens & Madson, which, according to Konaković, identified the independence of RS from BiH as the ultimate objective. Konaković argued that the filing constituted the clearest formal articulation to date of the secessionist objectives pursued by Dodik and the SNSD party and warned that it represented an attempt to “internationalise and legitimise” actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the Dayton Peace Agreement.
On 29 December 2025, the Council adopted a presidential statement marking the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The statement reaffirmed the Council’s unwavering commitment to BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and to its multi-ethnic character. It welcomed the continued presence of EUFOR ALTHEA under the Council’s Chapter VII authorisation and encouraged dialogue among the three constituent peoples (along with others) on shared priorities to ensure a transition of the international presence.
Human Rights-Related Developments
At the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders Mary Lawlor presented a report on her June 2025 visit to BiH, during which she assessed the situation of human rights defenders in the country. In the report, Lawlor observed that human rights defenders face significant challenges at both the state and entity levels, particularly in RS. She also noted that legislative initiatives in RS have “contributed to a further shrinking of civic space, with human rights defenders exercising self-censorship and caution when deciding on their advocacy work”. In this regard, Lawlor found that the “Law on the Special Registry and Transparency of the Work of Non-Profit Organizations”, although never enforced and despite its annulment by the Constitutional Court of BiH, has contributed to a climate of fear and legal uncertainty for civil society organisations. In light of these findings, she recommended proactive measures by the BiH authorities to address negative narratives concerning the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. Among other recommendations, Lawlor called on RS authorities to refrain from legislative action that would violate freedom of association or restrict civic space.
Key Issues and Options
The role of the OHR and Schmidt’s legitimacy as High Representative for BiH remain key divisive issues for the Council. China and Russia do not recognise Schmidt as High Representative and have called for the closure of the OHR. Western Council members, including France, the UK, and the US, have traditionally opposed imposing a time frame for the OHR’s closure without referencing the 5+2 Agenda, which is a set of five objectives and two conditions established by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that need to be fulfilled prior to the OHR’s closure.
One option the Council could consider is to request the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and UN Legal Counsel, Elinor Jane Britt Hammarskjöld, to provide a legal opinion on the procedures for designating High Representatives under Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement and on whether the PIC Steering Board’s decision of 27 May 2021 designating Christian Schmidt complied with those procedures. Such an opinion would likely analyse the Council’s own record of acting on earlier designations and assess whether endorsement by the Council, unanimity in the Steering Board, or consent of the Bosnian parties is legally required. By providing an authoritative legal baseline, the request could provide a common point of reference for future Council discussions on the OHR.
A continuing key issue for the Council is how to preserve stability in BiH while discouraging unilateral actions that undermine BiH’s constitutional order and the Dayton framework. While the steps taken by RS authorities since October 2025 have helped reduce immediate tensions, a related issue is whether the de-escalation is sustainable given the persistence of underlying drivers of instability, particularly disputes over state competences and the legitimacy of the High Representative. The formal articulation of secessionist objectives by RS authorities, raised by BiH in its 11 February letter and discussed by Council members at the 25 February AOB, remains a related concern. One option for Council members would be to issue a press statement taking note of the de-escalatory steps taken by RS since October 2025, while reaffirming the Council’s commitment to BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order, and calling on all parties to address remaining disputes through dialogue and in accordance with BiH’s constitutional framework and judicial decisions.
Council Dynamics
Council members have similar concerns about BiH’s divisive ethnic politics. The presidential statement adopted by the Council on 29 December 2025 demonstrates unity on fundamental matters, including support for BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and its multi-ethnic character, as well as the continued role of EUFOR ALTHEA.
Underlying divisions on the OHR nonetheless remain pronounced. At the Council’s 31 October 2025 debate on BiH, Russia described the OHR as “incompatible with the sovereignty of [BiH]” and accused certain Western countries of eroding the Dayton system to the detriment of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. China reiterated that the OHR and the Bonn Powers should not become long-term, let alone permanent, arrangements and argued that their invocation had exacerbated divisions. European members, by contrast, have continued to support the OHR and emphasise BiH’s EU accession trajectory as the country’s principal anchor for reform.
The US appears to have recalibrated its approach to BiH, stating at the October 2025 debate that it was “no longer pursuing nation-building or heavy-handed international intervention” and that the time had come for “local solutions, led by local actors representing [BiH’s] three constituent peoples”. The US’ decision to lift sanctions on RS authorities, which it framed as part of a deliberate diplomatic effort, marked a notable departure from years of US policy. Although this approach appears to have contributed to a reduction in political tensions, its longer-term sustainability remains uncertain. Moreover, a 27 March bipartisan congressional letter to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, urging the reimposition of sanctions on Dodik and his associates, suggests that the administration’s posture is not uniformly shared across Washington.
| Security Council Presidential Statements | |
| 29 December 2025S/PRST/2025/8 | This was a presidential statement marking the 30th anniversary of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 11 February 2026S/2026/72 | This was a letter from the permanent representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to the UN addressed to the president of the Security Council. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 31 October 2025S/PV.10028 | This was the Security Council’s semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
