Yemen
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council will hold a briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Yemen. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg and an official from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are expected to brief on political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Key Recent Developments
The situation in Yemen remains tense following clashes between factions of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) of Yemen’s internationally recognised government over control of the country’s southeastern governorates of Hadramut and Al-Mahra, which took place between December 2025 and early January. The Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a faction within the PLC with secessionist aspirations that is reportedly backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—attempted to expand its control over southern Yemen in December 2025, but its efforts were thwarted by forces aligned with the rest of the PLC and Saudi Arabia by 10 January.
On 6 February, the recently appointed Yemeni Prime Minister Shaya Mohsen al-Zindani formed a new government, comprising a 34-member cabinet which includes ten ministers from the previous government and three women. In a 9 February statement, Grundberg welcomed the formation of the cabinet, including the return of women ministers, and underlined the importance of the new government being allowed to function “in a constructive environment” to promote stability, alleviate suffering, and create the conditions for lasting peace in Yemen.
On 20 February, security forces reportedly opened fire on a group of people linked to the STC that attempted to storm the al-Maashiq Presidential Palace in Aden following the new government’s first cabinet session at the palace, killing at least one person and wounding at least 11. The STC condemned the security forces’ actions and refused to recognise the legitimacy of the newly formed government. Earlier, on 11 February, STC-affiliated demonstrators in the city of Ataq in Shabwah governorate reportedly attempted to storm a local government building and remove the national flag, with security forces intervening and killing five people and wounding 39. Both incidents reflect the unresolved tensions stemming from the STC’s forced retreat from southern Yemen in January and point to challenges the new government faces in consolidating its authority.
The escalation in the Gulf region, which started on 28 February following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, further complicates the situation in Yemen. The Houthis—a Yemeni rebel group that has de facto control of the northwest of the country, including the capital Sana’a—are considered to be part of a coalition of regional armed groups dubbed the “axis of resistance”, which are supported by Iran, and have launched hundreds of attacks against Israel and on shipping in the Red Sea since the onset of the war in Gaza in October 2023.
On 28 March, the Houthis claimed responsibility for firing several missiles at southern Israel, in what was their first attack on the country since the start of the Israeli-US war with Iran. The Israeli military said it had intercepted one missile shot from Yemen. In a statement the following day, Grundberg warned that the escalation “risks drawing Yemen into the regional war”, making it harder to resolve the conflict in Yemen. Furthermore, he stressed that “no single actor has the right to unilaterally drag the country into a wider conflict.” The attack also raised renewed concerns regarding the possibility of the Houthis restarting their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, which could create another commercial shipping chokehold and would be akin to Iran’s strategy in the Strait of Hormuz.
On 15 March, a missile strike also reportedly attributed to the Houthis hit a gathering of civilians in the Hairan district of Hajjah governorate, killing at least 15 people, including children. In a 16 March statement on social media, Grundberg expressed alarm at the attack and underscored the need to protect civilians and hold those responsible accountable.
The Houthis also continue to arbitrarily detain personnel from the UN, non-governmental and civil society organisations, and diplomatic missions. According to the UN, 73 of its personnel are detained, three of whom were referred to a special criminal court on charges related to their duties.
In his most recent briefing to the Council on 12 February—delivered from Riyadh, where he met al-Zindani and members of the PLC—Grundberg outlined his efforts to explore pathways to restart an inclusive political process, setting out three guiding reflections:
- First, that any political process must be designed for Yemen’s current reality, acknowledging the increased complexity of the conflict rather than relying on “outdated assumptions”;
- Second, that Yemen’s political, economic, and security files are interlocking and must be engaged simultaneously, rather than sequentially; and
- Third, that a credible process must deliver results on two time horizons—near-term agreements that reduce suffering and demonstrate progress, alongside space for longer-term negotiations on the future shape of the state, security arrangements, and governance.
In pursuit of broader diplomatic support for restarting the process, Grundberg also visited Moscow on 17 February, where he met with senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry to discuss the path to a political settlement in Yemen. On 26 March, he also visited Washington, where he met senior US government officials and emphasised the need to avoid Yemen from being drawn into the current regional escalation.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen continues to deteriorate. The 2026 Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), published on 18 March, projects that over 22 million people—approximately half the population—will require humanitarian assistance in 2026, an increase of 2.8 million from the previous year. Food insecurity remains the most acute dimension of the crisis: 18.3 million people are acutely food insecure, with the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis indicating further deterioration, including districts shifting from crisis to emergency levels and pockets of catastrophic conditions. More than 2.2 million children under five are acutely malnourished, including over half a million suffering from severe acute malnutrition.
To address these needs, the Yemen HNRP calls for $2.16 billion in 2026, though Yemen’s 2025 appeal was just 29 percent funded, forcing agencies to scale back life-saving services across all sectors. Compounding the crisis, on 29 January, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced it was terminating the contracts of all 365 of its staff in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen—where 70 percent of the country’s humanitarian needs are situated—citing the insecure operating environment and mounting restrictions imposed by the Houthis, including the arbitrary detention of UN personnel, as the primary drivers of the decision.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to help mitigate the risk of renewed escalation in Yemen, including the possibility that the country could be drawn into the broader regional confrontation with Iran. While frontlines remain relatively static, rising regional tensions and the Houthis’ willingness to militarily support Iran increase the risk of spillover, while instability in southern Yemen adds further volatility.
In this context, Council members could consider convening an informal interactive dialogue (IID) with regional stakeholders, countries supporting the Yemen political process, and the Special Envoy to assess the implications of regional developments and identify ways to insulate Yemen from escalation. The meeting could also be used for members to discuss ways to support the Special Envoy’s efforts to resume a credible and inclusive political process and how regional actors can better align towards supporting a renewed political framework that reflects current realities.
A further key issue is the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation, compounded by severe access constraints. The detention of UN and other personnel by the Houthis, as well as increasing restrictions on humanitarian operations—including the suspension of the WFP activities in Houthi-controlled areas—have significantly curtailed the delivery of assistance.
In this regard, the Council could consider adopting a resolution or presidential statement demanding the immediate and unconditional release of detained personnel and calling for the cessation of interference in humanitarian operations. Members could also consider holding a dedicated meeting focused on the protection of humanitarian personnel in Yemen or inviting a senior OCHA official to brief specifically on access constraints and operational impacts.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Despite being critical of the Houthis, most Council members continue to support an inclusive intra-Yemeni political process under UN auspices and emphasise the need to advance mediation efforts. Several Council members have expressed support for the newly formed government, which has faced challenges in legitimising its control over the southern part of the country.
Regional dynamics remain complex. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which escalated during the recent fighting in southern Yemen, highlight underlying differences in their approaches. At the same time, the escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the US has added a new layer of complexity, particularly in light of heightened tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia has been a principal backer of the newly formed government, Iran continues to support the Houthis, underscoring the risk that Yemen could again become a more active arena for regional competition. These dynamics raise concerns in light of Yemen potentially being drawn further into the broader regional conflict, undermining recent de-escalation efforts.
The Council’s five permanent members remain divided on how to approach the Houthis. France, the UK, and the US have argued that the Council needs to increase pressure on the group—whom they believe are obstructing a political process and fostering instability in Yemen—including by strengthening the Yemen sanctions regime. The US has adopted a particularly hawkish position on the Houthis, unilaterally sanctioning the group and accusing Iran of supporting it. Conversely, China and Russia have argued that expanding the Yemen sanctions regime would escalate tensions and undermine prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Differences also persist regarding the Council’s engagement on maritime security in the Red Sea. China and Russia have expressed reservations about maintaining the issue prominently on the Council’s agenda, particularly where it intersects with military action undertaken by some member states, which they argue risks exacerbating tensions and undermining the political track. Other members, including the UK and the US, continue to emphasise the importance of addressing threats to freedom of navigation.
Council members have also diverged over the future of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA). Resolution 2813 (2026), adopted on 27 January, provided for a final extension of the mission’s mandate until 31 March, after which it shut down and entered a liquidation phase. China and Russia have maintained that the mission played a stabilising role, while the US argued that persistent obstruction by the Houthis had limited its effectiveness and pushed for it to be drawn down.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 27 January 2026S/RES/2813 | This resolution renewed the mandate of UNMHA for a final two-month period, until 31 March 2026. |
| 14 January 2026S/RES/2812 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 July 2026. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 23 December 2025SC/16265 | This press statement called for de-escalation and underlined strong support towards a political settlement in Yemen and for the Presidential Leadership Council, while also reiterating condemnation of detentions by the Houthis and the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 12 February 2026S/PV.10105 | This was a Security Council meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Yemen. |