Western Sahara
Expected Council Action
In April, Security Council members are expected to receive a briefing in closed consultations on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Alexander Ivanko and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General Staffan de Mistura are the anticipated briefers.
In line with resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, which extended MINURSO’s mandate for another year, the Secretary-General is expected to submit a strategic review regarding MINURSO’s future mandate in April.
Key Recent Developments
In resolution 2797, the Council expressed its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in facilitating and conducting negotiations, taking Morocco’s autonomy proposal as a basis, aimed at achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute. (The plan, which Morocco submitted to the UN in 2007, calls for integrating the territory into Morocco, with the Sahrawi people managing their internal affairs while being represented externally by Morocco.) The resolution also called on the parties to engage in discussions without preconditions, using the proposal as a basis, with a view to reaching a final and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, and recognises that genuine autonomy could represent a feasible outcome. The resolution was adopted with 11 votes in favour, three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia), while then-Council member Algeria did not vote. (For background and more information, see the brief on Western Sahara in our October 2025 Monthly Forecast and our 31 October 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
Recent months have seen increased US momentum to reinvigorate efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. On 22 January, a delegation from the Polisario Front (which represents the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara), led by its Foreign Minister Mohamed Yeslem Beissat, visited Washington.
On 26 January, the US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos visited Algiers and met with several senior Algerian officials, including President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf.
According to media reports, the US convened ministerial-level delegations from Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and the Polisario Front for direct talks in Madrid in early February. US Permanent Representative to the UN Mike Waltz and Boulos attended the meeting, which was co-chaired by de Mistura. It marked the first time since 2019 when all stakeholders met in person, which was under UN auspices.
Algeria has long opposed formats that bring all four stakeholders together in this manner—like the “roundtable meetings” initiated by former Personal Envoy Horst Köhler—arguing that such an approach risks reframing the issue as a regional dispute rather than one primarily between Morocco and the Polisario Front. In this context, Algeria and Mauritania have traditionally characterised their roles as observers rather than parties to the dispute. The Madrid meeting also marked a rare instance of Algerian and Moroccan representatives engaging on this issue since they severed their bilateral ties in 2021.
During the meeting, Morocco reportedly presented a revised version of its 2007 autonomy proposal with a detailed plan intended to provide a more concrete basis for negotiations. Following the Madrid meeting, the US hosted the four delegations in Washington, DC for another round of talks on 23 and 24 February, with de Mistura co-chairing. At the time of writing, the outcome of these meetings remained unclear, with no official or substantive results reported.
On 5-6 February, the UN Acting Military Advisor Lieutenant General Cheryl Pearce visited MINURSO headquarters in Laayoune, where she held bilateral meetings with Ivanko and MINURSO Force Commander Major General Md Fakhrul Ahsan. During the visit, she also travelled to the Smara and Bir Lahlou team sites. Media reports indicate that a UN team comprising senior officials visited Laayoune in late March as part of broader discussions on the mission’s strategic review.
Key Issues and Options
MINURSO is one of the longest-running UN peacekeeping missions, having been established in 1991 with the key objective of facilitating a referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The underlying issue for the Council remains how to facilitate and support a viable and lasting resolution to the long-standing deadlock over the status of Western Sahara.
Two fundamentally diverging positions have made a resolution to the conflict difficult. On the one hand, the Polisario Front demands the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, which has been recognised by the International Court of Justice in its 16 October 1975 advisory opinion and supported by several member states. On the other hand, Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory, and its autonomy plan has received support from an increasing number of member states in recent years. With renewed US efforts, including the convening of quadripartite meetings and Morocco’s expanded proposal, there appears to be a cautious but renewed prospect for progress.
MINURSO’s limited ability to implement its mandate has also been an ongoing issue. This is due to the protracted nature of the conflict and the intransigence of the parties. The lack of progress perpetuates instability and heightens the risk of renewed hostilities. Moreover, Council members must navigate competing interests of key stakeholders, which continue to shape the Council’s deliberations on this file.
Another important issue remains how to preserve MINURSO’s operational effectiveness amid severe financial constraints and ensure that the mission continues to address evolving dynamics on the ground and advance the implementation of its mandate. In their deliberations in April, Council members are likely to be guided by the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s strategic review.
An option for Council members could be to issue a presidential statement expressing support for ongoing mediation efforts and urging the relevant parties to negotiate in good faith and demonstrate the necessary flexibility with a view to breaking the current impasse and achieving progress towards a political solution.
Council Dynamics
Council members differ starkly in their national positions on Western Sahara. The US, the penholder on Western Sahara, recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over the region in December 2020 during the first administration of President Donald Trump and has continued to support genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for Western Sahara.
The US position on UN peacekeeping is likely to influence discussions in April as members consider the Secretary-General’s strategic review. It has emphasised the need for missions to be more cost-effective and streamlined, with a focus on core peace and security priorities and clearly defined benchmarks.
France supports the Moroccan autonomy plan as the “only basis” for achieving a political solution, while the UK describes the autonomy proposal as the “most credible, viable and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute”. Countries such as France and the US have also sought to make significant investments in projects in Western Sahara. Denmark views Morocco’s autonomy plan as “a good basis for an agreed solution between all parties”, while Greece considers it a “serious and credible” approach. Somalia maintains cordial relations with both Algeria and Morocco but does not recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) nor endorse Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
Among the newly elected Council members Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia support Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have opened consulates in the territory. Latvia maintains cordial relations with both Algeria and Morocco but does not recognise the SADR nor endorse Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Meanwhile, Colombia, under the Presidency of Gustavo Petro, reinstated its recognition of SADR and re-established diplomatic relations in 2022.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2797 | This resolution renewed the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2026. |
