The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). Bahrain—the Council president for April—intends to convene the debate as a high-level signature event.
Key Recent Developments
April’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of a sharp escalation in hostilities in the Middle East, triggered by joint Israeli–US strikes on Iran that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region. Israel and the US have targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, ballistic missile facilities, and naval assets and killed several top military and political officials, including Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani. Iran has retaliated by striking Israel as well as US bases and allied assets in the Middle East, in addition to effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz. It appears that both sides have hit critical infrastructure and civilian objects, including residential buildings, energy infrastructure, fuel depots, and desalination plants.
The Security Council convened an emergency briefing on the situation on 28 February. On 11 March, the Council adopted resolution 2817, drafted by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan. The resolution condemned Iran’s strikes against these countries, deplored the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, and demanded that Iran immediately halt the attacks and fully comply with its obligations under international law. The text also condemned any actions or threats by Iran aimed at obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. It was co-sponsored by 136 UN member states and adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). A competing draft resolution, penned by Russia, which did not mention individual countries but urged all parties to stop their military activities and return to diplomacy, failed to be adopted due to insufficient votes. It received four votes in favour (China, Russia, Pakistan, and Somalia), two votes against (Latvia and the US), and nine abstentions.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), the regional escalation has injected additional uncertainty into international efforts to advance the US-proposed peace framework known as the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict“, which the Security Council endorsed through resolution 2803 of 17 November 2025. The first phase of the Comprehensive Plan established the current ceasefire in Gaza, secured the return of the remaining hostages held by Hamas, and called for Israel to partially withdraw from the enclave, as well as to facilitate the entry of more humanitarian aid. The second phase—which began in January—entailed the formation of an interim technocratic government comprising Palestinian experts under the oversight of an international Board of Peace (BoP), which is chaired by US President Donald Trump. According to the plan, this body is to eventually cede control of Gaza to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA), at which point it says that “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood”.
The ceasefire remains fragile and has been interrupted by periodic violence. According to the latest update from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), dated 27 March, airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire have continued across Gaza. Citing figures from local health authorities, OCHA reported that 13 Palestinians were killed between 17 and 25 March. Since the announcement of the ceasefire in October 2025, 689 Palestinians have reportedly been killed.
Impediments to humanitarian access remain another concern. In late January, following the return of the remains of the last hostage held by Hamas, Israel announced that the Rafah border crossing to Egypt would partially re-open for pedestrian passage. The crossing is the only one in Gaza that does not border Israel and had been closed since May 2024, preventing medical evacuations and the return of Palestinian refugees. Following the outbreak of regional hostilities on 28 February, Israel closed all Gaza border crossings, including Rafah, blocking the entry of all humanitarian aid and again preventing medical evacuations and the return of refugees. On 2 March, Israel re-opened the Kerem Shalom crossing, which remains the only operational crossing point for humanitarian and commercial supplies. According to OCHA, this has resulted in a “major bottleneck” and declining stocks in partner warehouses due to the imbalance between items entering Gaza and those being distributed. On 15 March, Israel announced that the Rafah crossing would partially open again for pedestrians.
On the political track, the BoP held its inaugural meeting on 19 February in Washington, D.C. There, Trump announced that the US and nine other BoP member states had pledged a total of $17 billion for Gaza relief and reconstruction efforts, which the UN estimates will cost approximately $70 billion. US Major General Jasper Jeffers also announced that five countries—Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Morocco—had pledged to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) that resolution 2803 authorised the BoP to deploy. According to Jeffers, who serves as ISF commander, the force will consist of a total of 12,000 police officers and 20,000 soldiers and initially deploy to Rafah. Subsequent media reports, however, have indicated that Indonesia—which had pledged up to 8,000 troops, making it the largest prospective troop contributor—may have put its participation on hold due to the current Middle East crisis.
Briefing the Security Council on 24 March (S/PV.10125), BoP High Representative to Gaza Nickolay Mladenov said that mediators had presented Hamas with a formal proposal for decommissioning its weapons, which the ISF would be responsible for overseeing. According to Mladenov, the proposal is based on five principles: 1) reciprocity linking the decommissioning of weapons to Israel’s staged withdrawal from Gaza; 2) sequencing whereby heavy weapons are decommissioned before small arms; 3) verification of compliance as a condition for reconstruction; 4) reintegration and amnesty programs for Hamas members; and 5) the possibility of timeline extensions if “parties are making good faith efforts” toward implementation. Hamas had not responded to the proposal at the time of writing.
In the occupied West Bank, settlement expansion, settler violence, and Israeli military operations have continued. According to a 19 March update from OCHA, the monthly average number of Palestinians injured in Israel settler attacks so far this year has risen to 105, from 69 in 2025 and 30 in 2024. In its 27 March update, OCHA reported that the number of Palestinians displaced in the context of settler violence and access restrictions has reached 1,697, surpassing the whole of 2025. These developments have occurred alongside a series of recent Israeli government measures intended to accelerate settlement activity in the West Bank, deepening Israeli administrative control over parts of the territory and facilitating the expropriation of Palestinian land. (For more information, see our 17 February What’s in Blue story.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 17 March, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published its annual report on Israeli settlements in the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. The report provides an update on unlawful Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and examines their impact on the individual and collective rights of the Palestinian people. Over the course of the reporting period, between 1 November 2024 and 31 October 2025, OHCHR observed that the Israeli government undertook “concerted measures” to consolidate its annexation of large parts of the OPT, through the authorisation and expansion of settlements, outposts, and associated infrastructure and the transfer of governance powers from the military to Israeli civilian authorities in the occupied West Bank, among other measures. It also found that the implementation of these measures has accelerated the displacement of Palestinians from increasingly large parts of the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, reshaping the physical and demographic reality of the occupied territories. In light of these findings, the report concludes with the High Commissioner calling on Israel to immediately and completely cease and reverse the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and evacuate all Israeli settlers, among other recommendations.
In a 6 March press release, UN experts warned that “irreparable harm is being inflicted on Jerusalem, as violence engulfs the region, and genocide continues in Gaza and spills into the West Bank”. In occupied East Jerusalem, extrajudicial killings, large-scale demolitions, and forced displacement have escalated. The experts also reported that between 2021 and 2025, 144 Palestinians were killed in Jerusalem Governorate and at least 11,555 were arrested, amid allegations of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment. Among other matters, the experts urged immediate international action, especially in the wake of the July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which declared Israel’s occupation of the OPT unlawful and called on all states to refrain from recognising or aiding the occupation.
On 16 February, OHCHR submitted its annual report on the human rights situation in the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and the obligation to ensure accountability and justice. The report raises concerns over ethnic cleansing by Israeli authorities in both Gaza and the West Bank amid increased attacks and forcible transfers in the occupied territories. During the reporting period from 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025, OHCHR observed that “intensified attacks, the methodical destruction of entire neighbourhoods and the denial of humanitarian assistance appeared to aim at a permanent demographic shift in Gaza”. It also noted that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups continued at that time to hold Israeli and foreign hostages seized on 7 October 2023—along with the bodies of those who died or were killed in captivity—as bargaining tools over the course of the reporting period. (All remaining hostages have since been released and the bodies of deceased hostages have been returned.) Among other recommendations, the report calls on Israel to immediately end its unlawful presence in the OPT and urges states to ensure Palestinians’ immediate participation in governance structures to determine and shape the reconstruction of Gaza.
Women, Peace and Security
In a 19 March statement, the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls highlighted the impact of Israel’s restrictions on humanitarian operations in Gaza and the West Bank on women and girls. The statement references the regulations issued by Israel in December 2025 restricting the operations of 37 international humanitarian organisations noting that “in an already catastrophic context” people who are “in vulnerable situations often experience the most severe impacts”. The statement says that the collapse of Gaza’s healthcare system has put women’s lives in immediate danger and that “[d]enying access to maternal and reproductive healthcare in these conditions puts lives at direct risk”. It notes that when humanitarian aid is obstructed, girls face higher risks of hunger, illness, and disrupted schooling, and women and girls may be forced to compensate for aid shortfalls through unpaid care work and harmful coping strategies, often at the expense of their own health and well-being. The Working Group concludes that, by obstructing access to aid, “Israel is denying women and girls protection and support they are entitled to under international law”.
Key Issues and Options
An immediate issue for the Council is preventing the ongoing regional crisis in the Middle East from further destabilising Gaza and the wider OPT, including by undermining implementation of resolution 2803 and diverting attention from the ceasefire, humanitarian access, and transitional governing arrangements that it endorsed. Another immediate issue is the fragility of the Gaza ceasefire itself. Despite the current cessation of large-scale hostilities, violence has continued in the enclave, while the closure and partial re-opening of crossings have highlighted the continued vulnerability of humanitarian operations and medical evacuations.
A related issue is the Council’s ability to advance the implementation of the second phase of the Comprehensive Plan in a politically credible and legally compliant manner amid the current regional crisis. Important questions remain concerning the BoP’s authority and terms of reference, the mandate and deployment timeline for the ISF, and the pathway by which governing authority will eventually be transferred to the PA. Council members could seek additional clarity on these issues by requesting more regular briefings from representatives of the BoP, the ISF, or other actors involved in implementing resolution 2803. They could also request reporting on how the regional escalation is affecting the ceasefire, humanitarian access, and preparations for Gaza’s transitional governance and security arrangements.
Another key issue is the deterioration of conditions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, where settlement expansion, settler violence, and Israeli military operations have continued to intensify. For some members, this reinforces the view that any approach focused narrowly on Gaza will be insufficient unless it is tied to a broader political horizon addressing the unity of the OPT and the viability of the two-state solution. In this regard, Council members could use the open debate to reiterate opposition to unilateral measures in the West Bank, call for compliance with international law, and stress that any transitional arrangements for Gaza should not contribute to the fragmentation of Palestinian governance or territory. Members could also encourage closer alignment between the implementation of resolution 2803 and other multilateral frameworks on the conflict, including the New York Declaration that the General Assembly endorsed in September 2025.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The adoption of resolution 2803 in November 2025 reflected a rare moment of convergence in the Council, shaped by broad regional backing for the US-brokered Comprehensive Plan and by the importance that many members attached to consolidating the Gaza ceasefire and easing the humanitarian catastrophe in the enclave. At the same time, several members—including China and Russia, which abstained on the resolution—signalled reservations about the framework’s lack of clarity regarding the role of the BoP, the scope of the ISF’s mandate, the timeline for a full Israeli withdrawal, and the pathway to restored Palestinian governance and statehood.
These underlying fault lines have been sharpened by the recent regional escalation. The Council’s adoption of resolution 2817 demonstrated strong support among most members for condemning Iran’s attacks against Gulf states and Jordan, while also revealing deep divisions over the causes and framing of the conflict. China and Russia—which again abstained—criticised the resolution as unbalanced for failing to address the initial Israeli–US strikes on Iran, while several other members stressed the need to respond to the concerns of affected countries and to protect regional security and maritime navigation. The failure of the competing Russian draft resolution calling for a general ceasefire and de-escalation further underscored these divisions, highlighting disagreements within the Council over attribution of responsibility and the appropriate framing of the crisis.
Against this backdrop, dynamics on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are likely to be shaped by competing priorities. On the one hand, most members are expected to continue supporting efforts to preserve the Gaza ceasefire, sustain humanitarian access, and advance implementation of resolution 2803. On the other hand, there is a risk that the regional confrontation with Iran will dominate Council attention, potentially sidelining sustained engagement on Gaza and the broader Palestinian question. Members such as Bahrain and Pakistan are likely to continue emphasising Palestinian self-determination, the centrality of the PA, and the need to preserve the unity of the OPT, while China and Russia can also be expected to maintain their criticism of what they view as selective or imbalanced Council responses to the regional crisis. Western members, for their part, are likely to continue framing regional stability in terms of both de-escalation and addressing security concerns related to Iran, while seeking to preserve momentum behind the Gaza framework established by resolution 2803.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 11 March 2026S/RES/2817 | This resolution was authored by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—as well as Jordan. It condemns Iran’s strikes against these countries; determines that these acts constitute a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security; deplores that civilian objects have been targeted and that the attacks resulted in civilian casualties; and demands that Iran immediately halt the attacks against these countries and fully comply with its obligations under international law. The text also condemns any actions or threats by Iran aimed at closing or obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. |
| 17 November 2025S/RES/2803 | This resolution endorsed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, welcoming the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) and authorising the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The resolution received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). |
| 23 December 2016S/RES/2334 | This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. |
