Syria
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold its monthly meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and a civil society representative are expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
On 15 March, Syrians marked the 15th anniversary since the start of the uprising against former President Bashar al-Assad in March 2011, which culminated in his ouster in December 2024 and the rise to power of interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa.
March saw heightened regional escalation following Israel and US strikes on Iran, with spillover effects on Syria. Since the outbreak of the conflict on 28 February, both Israeli and Iranian strikes—targeting each other’s assets—have violated Syrian airspace with missile debris, causing deaths and injuries inside Syrian territory. On 23 March, Syria said that one of its military bases in northeastern Hasakah governorate—a formerly US-controlled base close to the Iraqi border—was targeted by missiles launched from Iraq, reportedly attributed to an Iraqi armed group. Pro-Iranian Iraqi armed groups have claimed multiple attacks against US regional assets since the beginning of the war in Iran.
The regional escalation has also had other impacts on Syria, including the closure of Syrian airspace and wider economic disruptions, such as interruptions to natural gas supplies, which have led to increased electricity rationing.
Spillover effects of the conflict have also included intensified Israel-Hezbollah hostilities in Lebanon. This led to Syria reinforcing its border with Lebanon, including by deploying thousands of troops. Syrian officials have said that these measures are aimed at tightening border control to prevent arms and drug smuggling, as well as to block infiltration by Hezbollah and other militant groups. The Syrian army accused Hezbollah of targeting its positions when, on 9 March, shells fired from Lebanese territory landed near the town of Serghaya, west of Damascus. In his briefing to the Council on 18 March, Cordone said that Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon have resulted in approximately 140,000 persons—mostly Syrians—crossing into Syria seeking safety.
Sharaa, who has expressed support for Lebanon’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah, characterised the broader regional escalation as an existential threat to the Middle East.
On 20 March, southern Syria witnessed renewed Israeli strikes following clashes between government forces and Druze factions in Suweida, in southern Syria. Israel characterised its strikes on Syrian military compounds in the south as a response to attacks on the Druze community and reiterated its stated commitment to protecting Syria’s Druze population. The strikes are the latest example of Israeli military intervention in Syrian territory, which has compounded pressure on the interim government as it grapples with fragile social and territorial cohesion in the south.
On 17 March, the Syrian National Investigation Committee submitted its report on the violence that erupted in Suweida in July 2025 between Bedouins and government forces on the one hand, and Druze militias on the other. According to the report, a total of 1,760 people were killed and 2,188 were injured, and approximately 36 villages were destroyed or burned, leading to mass displacement. The committee characterised the violations as individual rather than systematic, and 23 security and military personnel have reportedly been detained and are facing trial. Some human rights observers criticised the findings. They noted that framing the violations as individual acts effectively exempts leadership from accountability and that the committee’s lack of independence—having been appointed by the government, itself implicated in the events—raised questions about whether the process constitutes meaningful transitional justice.
Regarding northeast Syria, Cordone told the Council on 18 March that “the integration process between the government and the [Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)] is moving forward on the basis of the 29 January agreement”. Positive steps have included the appointment of an SDF-nominated Assistant Minister of Defense, the beginning of returns to Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) and other areas, and the 19 March exchange of around 600 detainees between the two sides in Hasakah. Cordone noted, however, that a number of key issues remain to be resolved, from security sector integration and the status of Kurdish women’s forces (the Women’s Protection Units) to the integration of civil employees and Kurdish-language education.
Underlying tensions surfaced when reportedly on 21 March the Syrian flag was lowered during Nowruz celebrations—a Persian traditional festival that is also celebrated by Kurds in Syria—in Kobane, triggering angry social media posts and protests in several areas. The following day, local groups reportedly linked to the SDF stormed government internal security forces’ headquarters in Qamishli, damaging vehicles and removing the Syrian flag from the city’s airport, while in Aleppo there were attacks on Kurdish civilians. The government condemned both the flag incident and the retaliatory attacks and stated that the integration process would continue.
On 17 March, indirect elections were held for four vacant seats in Raqqa governorate, marking a further step in completing the People’s Assembly that was partially elected in October 2025, when votes in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Suweida governorates and the Kobane district were postponed due to security concerns. In his most recent briefing to the Council, Cordone noted that the voting for a further 11 seats in Hasakah and in Kobane would follow in the coming weeks, after which Sharaa is expected to announce his list of 70 presidential appointees and the opening of the parliament. Cordone stressed the importance of Syria’s regions and diverse communities—particularly women—being meaningfully represented in the Assembly, “given its role in shaping legislation and potentially Syria’s permanent constitution”.
Briefing the Council on 18 March, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya noted that while conditions in northern and eastern Syria have recently stabilised, significant humanitarian needs persist. Over 100,000 people remain displaced in Aleppo and Hasakah governorates, and water systems, hospitals, and water stations across the country continue to be disrupted by irregular electricity supply. Key roads linking northeastern governorates and Damascus have reopened, improving people’s mobility. Humanitarian partners are reaching over 200,000 people per month in areas of return, though Msuya stressed that aid is not a substitute for state-led services. She noted that Syria’s humanitarian appeal for 2025 received only around a third of the $3.2 billion required, and urged Council members to bolster funding, support diplomatic efforts to resolve remaining flashpoints, and accelerate Syria’s economic reintegration to reduce the country’s long-term dependence on humanitarian assistance.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is to ensure that Syria’s interim government pursues a credible, transparent, and inclusive political transition, while navigating a fraught security context compounded by intercommunal tensions, terrorism, and external interference. By sustaining a united position anchored in the principles of resolution 2254, Council members can condition increased support for the Syrian government on concrete progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); transitional justice; and social cohesion—including through accountability and reconciliation processes.
The regional escalation represents a growing and distinct challenge for the Council, and one that carries particular risks for Syria, given its fragile transition. At a moment when the interim government is working to consolidate institutions, restore services, and build public trust, the spillover effects of the conflict in the region risk destabilising hard-won gains and diverting political and economic attention away from the transition process.
Another issue is the SDF integration process, which is advancing but remains incomplete. Key pending issues will require sustained attention, while the unrest in Qamishli and Aleppo illustrates the communal tensions that could undermine the process if left unaddressed.
Accountability for the July 2025 Suweida violence and persistent tensions in that region remain an important issue. The submission of the national investigative committee’s report is a step forward, but criticism from human rights observers suggests the process had shortcomings.
Another issue is the need to raise funding for humanitarian aid in the near term and to support Syria’s transition into long-term recovery and development. Council members could consider holding a public briefing focused on the humanitarian situation and the country’s need for support in reconstruction and economic rehabilitation. Such a meeting could include briefings from OCHA and representatives of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank and provide an opportunity to amplify calls for an international pledging conference to support Syria’s reconstruction.
To address the many-faceted challenges facing Syria, the Council could also consider adopting a presidential statement that:
- calls for full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and urges all parties to the regional conflict to take measures to prevent further spillover into Syrian territory;
- encourages both Damascus and the SDF to prioritise confidence-building measures and to engage constructively on outstanding issues of the comprehensive agreement, while pressing the government to ensure the protection and rights of Kurdish civilians;
- highlights the importance of Damascus continuing its counterterrorism efforts against a resurgent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the region;
- urges Damascus to strengthen independent accountability mechanisms, including through their cooperation with existing international mechanisms on Syria, while also meaningfully engaging with victims and civil society on transitional justice and reconciliation; and
- calls for enhanced financial support to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria.
The UN’s future role in Syria is another key issue. Cordone’s office is actively negotiating its relocation to Damascus and areas of cooperation with the Syrian government. Council members could express support for an expedited agreement and early relocation, as a meaningful UN presence on the ground is essential to supporting Syria’s political transition. Members should also continue pressing for progress on the appointment of a Special Envoy following Geir O. Pedersen’s resignation in October 2025.
Council Dynamics
Council members are broadly aligned on the need for the Syrian authorities to advance an inclusive, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process based on the key principles of resolution 2254. They broadly agree that the threat of intercommunal violence cannot be addressed without progress on DDR, SSR, and transitional justice, alongside a credible political process. The Council’s December 2025 visit to Damascus represented an important signal of unified support for Syria’s transition following years of deep divisions on the file.
Furthermore, the Council’s decision to delist the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham [HTS]) from the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list on 27 February was a significant step towards legitimising the interim government. This followed an earlier decision to delist Sharaa and his interior minister from the same list through the US-authored resolution 2799 of 6 November 2025.
The US has played a particularly active role on the Syria dossier in recent weeks. US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack—who also serves as US Ambassador to Türkiye—chaired the 18 March Council meeting. In his remarks, Barrack highlighted the significant transformations Syria has undergone in the past 15 months and reaffirmed the US commitment to facilitating Syrian-led processes and supporting a unified Syria at peace with itself and its neighbours. The UK, in its statement at the 18 March meeting, explicitly credited the US—and Barrack personally—for brokering the January SDF integration agreement.
The regional escalation triggered by the US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February, however, could strain Council dynamics on the Syria file. Members that have traditionally aligned themselves or expressed support for Iran—most notably Russia and China—are likely to take a more critical posture towards the US and its regional actions, potentially complicating the unified approach to Syria that has characterised the past year. While Council members have so far managed to keep Syria-specific discussions relatively insulated from these broader tensions, a prolonged regional conflict risks eroding that separation.
Many Council members agree on the need for the Syrian interim government to take decisive measures to address the threat posed by FTFs and ISIL/Da’esh. China has been particularly vocal in calling on Damascus to take a stronger stance on FTFs in the country, some of whom have reportedly been integrated into the Syrian armed forces. Several FTFs constitute part of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China considers a terrorist organisation and is also listed under the ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 6 November 2025S/RES/2799 | This resolution removed interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and interim Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list |
| 18 December 2015S/RES/2254 | This was the first resolution focused exclusively on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was adopted unanimously. |
| Security Council Presidential Statement | |
| 10 August 2025S/PRST/2025/6 | This was a presidential statement condemning violence against civilians in Suweida in July 2025, calling for unhindered humanitarian access to the region, and calling on the Syrian interim authorities to ensure accountability. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 12 February 2026SC/16293 | This press statement welcomed the comprehensive agreement between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces regarding the integration of northeast Syria, and Syria’s commitment and actions to counter ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaeda. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 18 March 2026S/PV.10123 | This was a Security Council meeting on political and humanitarian developments in Syria. |
