Maritime Security
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council will hold an open debate on maritime security under the agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security”. This will be one of the signature events of Bahrain’s presidency. Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani is expected to chair the meeting.
Key Recent Developments
On 20 May 2025, the Council held a high-level open debate titled “Strengthening Maritime Security through International Cooperation for Global Stability”, which was chaired by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. In his briefing at the meeting, Christian Bueger, a research fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), stressed the need for sustained attention to the proliferation of autonomous weapons systems, naval mines, maritime cybersecurity threats, and sub-standard shipping linked to sanctions evasion, as well as the need to protect critical maritime infrastructure. He suggested that the Council consider supporting efforts to strengthen coordination, information-sharing, and strategic thinking, including through the establishment of a standing item on the Council’s agenda dedicated to maritime security or creating an office of a special rapporteur on the issue. (For more information, see our 19 May 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
On 11 August 2025, the Council held a high-level open debate titled “Maritime Security: Prevention, Innovation, and International Cooperation to Address Emerging Challenges”, which was chaired by Panama’s President, José Raúl Mulino. In his remarks at the meeting, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Arsenio Domínguez highlighted that emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence-driven surveillance and satellite monitoring systems, provide tools to anticipate and deter threats. He also underscored that the digitalisation of shipping and the move towards autonomous vessels increase the need for robust cybersecurity governance. (For more information, see our 8 August 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
Recent developments in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz show how land-based conflicts can spill over into the maritime domain, exposing the fragility of global trade routes and demonstrating how disruptions at critical chokepoints can affect international commerce and undermine economic stability. Against the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war that started on 7 October 2023, Yemen’s Houthi rebel group began launching sophisticated attacks against merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea in mid-November 2023. In response, the Council adopted resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024, which, among other things, demanded that the Houthis cease attacks on vessels and requested the Secretary-General to provide written monthly reports on further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Resolution 2812 of 14 January extended the monthly reporting requirement for another six months, until 15 July. (For more information, see our 13 January 2026 What’s in Blue story.)
Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transit. The escalation comes against the backdrop of the US and Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)
Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. While initially Iran signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”, with reports suggesting the emergence of a de facto controlled transit system in which ships are directed through a corridor overseen by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities.
On 11 March, the Council adopted resolution 2817, which was co-sponsored by 136 countries and condemned any actions or threats by Iran aimed at closing or obstructing international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz or threatening maritime security in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. The resolution, which was penned by Bahrain on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Jordan, affirmed that any attempt to impede lawful transit passage or freedom of navigation in these international waterways constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. (For more information, see our 11 March What’s in Blue story.)
On 21 March, US President Donald Trump threatened to “hit and obliterate” Iran’s power plants if the Strait of Hormuz was not fully reopened, initially issuing a 48-hour ultimatum before subsequently extending the deadline to 6 April. In a statement on social media, he called for the establishment of a multinational naval coalition, encouraging countries to deploy ships to secure the waterway.
Meanwhile, a 28 March Houthi missile attack on Israel has raised concerns about a potential new front in the conflict and risks to shipping through the Bab Al-Mandab Strait. At the same time, the US has deployed thousands of troops to the Middle East in recent weeks, including marine expeditionary units and airborne forces, amid speculation of potential operations targeting strategic sites such as Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export hub, and along Iran’s coastline to neutralise capabilities that could threaten commercial and military shipping.
On 27 March, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the establishment of a UN Task Force led by Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Jorge Moreira da Silva, with participation from IMO, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the International Chamber of Commerce, to develop technical mechanisms to address humanitarian needs in the Strait of Hormuz. The Task Force will support the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy on the Middle East conflict, Jean Arnault, who is mandated to lead political engagement with relevant member states.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for the Council is how to address the increasingly complex and interconnected threats to maritime security. An urgent concern relates to growing disruptions to freedom of navigation, particularly in strategic chokepoints and heavily trafficked maritime routes, as seen in the Strait of Hormuz. Such disruptions pose a serious threat to international trade and global economic stability, with cascading impacts on food and energy security.
The number of vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz has declined significantly since late February, amid heightened risks, driving up insurance costs and contributing to a surge in global oil prices. These developments have raised concerns about broader supply chain disruptions, price volatility, and the resilience of global energy and trade flows.
A related issue for the Council is the safety of seafarers and maritime workers, who have been increasingly exposed to risk, with reports of casualties and crews stranded amid recent hostilities. According to some estimates, around 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf, with at least seven fatalities reported, as a result of the current conflict that began in late February.
Another concern is the growing threat from emerging technologies and the proliferation of advanced weaponry, including unmanned systems and precision-guided missiles, which have transformed the nature of maritime conflict. Recent years have seen a rise in attacks on critical maritime infrastructure—such as port facilities and navigation systems—often exploiting cyber vulnerabilities, with potentially far-reaching geopolitical and economic consequences.
Also, an area of concern for Council members is the persistent violation of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at curbing the illicit transport of sanctioned commodities and weapons. Several members have also raised alarm over the growing number of maritime activities designed to circumvent sanctions imposed on both state entities and terrorist-designated groups.
Another important issue for the Council is the lack of a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis of maritime security threats at the global level, which limits understanding of how these threats are evolving and escalating, and how they can be effectively addressed.
One option for the Council would be to request the Secretary-General to enhance system-wide analysis and reporting on maritime security trends, including by strengthening coordination across relevant UN entities and integrating maritime security considerations into existing global assessment processes. The Council could also encourage enhanced cooperation among member states, as well as with regional organisations, civil society, the private sector, and local authorities, to develop coherent and coordinated responses to maritime security threats.
The Council could also consider adopting a resolution reaffirming that navigational rights and freedoms must be respected, while noting the right of member states to defend their vessels and calling for a coordinated international approach to maritime security. The Council could support humanitarian-focused measures, including the Secretary-General’s Task Force, to ensure the continued flow of essential goods and mitigate the humanitarian impact of maritime disruptions. It could also consider requesting regular reporting from the Secretary-General on maritime security developments in the Strait of Hormuz.
To galvanise efforts and keep the Council’s attention on the issue, Council members may also consider organising informal briefings, including Arria-formula and expert-level briefings, to consider adequate responses to contemporary challenges in the maritime domain and invite industry experts to share insights, best practices, and emerging trends that could promote policy coherence.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members acknowledge that promoting maritime security demands coherent and effective multilateral approaches, particularly because of the transnational nature of these challenges. All Council members are also state parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), except for Colombia and the US, which nonetheless consider many of the convention’s provisions as part of customary law. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our August 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
The US and China differ sharply in their legal interpretations of UNCLOS, particularly regarding the principle of freedom-of-navigation and China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, which are rejected by the US and several other countries as excessive. To reinforce its interpretation of navigational rights and freedoms, the US routinely conducts freedom-of-navigation operations across several regions using its naval and air forces.
Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Similar efforts were pursued during the escalation in the Red Sea, including the US-led multinational maritime security initiative Operation Prosperity Guardian (December 2023), in addition to air campaigns: Operation Poseidon Archer (January 2024), led by the UK and the US, and Operation Rough Rider (March 2025), led by the US.
A 19 March joint statement initially issued by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK was ultimately endorsed by a total of 36 countries, condemning what it described as the de facto closure of the Strait by Iranian forces. The statement called on Iran to immediately cease threats, the laying of mines, drone and missile attacks, and other actions impeding commercial shipping, while reaffirming that the freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of international law. It stressed that interference with international shipping and the disruption of global energy supply chains constitute a threat to international peace and security. Among Council members, in addition to France and the UK, the statement has been endorsed by Bahrain, Denmark, Latvia, and Panama.
Greece, the largest ship-owning nation in commercial shipping, has reportedly indicated that it does not intend to participate in any operation in the Strait of Hormuz.
French President Emmanuel Macron has indicated that France and its partners are preparing a possible international mission to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz once the intensity of military operations subsides. He said France is engaging with partner countries to assess whether such an effort could be placed within a UN framework. On 26 March, France said that the Chief of the Defence Staff of its armed forces, Fabien Mandon, had held talks with around 35 countries about the initiative, which has been described as independent of ongoing military operations and strictly defensive in nature.
In light of continued disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz following the adoption of resolution 2817, Bahrain circulated a draft resolution to Council members on 21 March, again on behalf of the GCC countries and Jordan. The draft, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, would authorise member states to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation. It also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those impeding freedom of navigation.
Responding to this initiative, China and Russia apparently expressed concerns about the draft, particularly its invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that it could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined parameters. They also raised concerns about the potential use of sanctions referenced in the text. At the time of writing, deliberations on the Bahrain-led initiative were ongoing, with a second revised draft circulated on 29 March.
It appears that France has also penned a draft resolution, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for broader discussion. The French draft calls for a cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, and takes note of the right of member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It is not a Chapter VII text, however.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 10 January 2024S/RES/2722 | This resolution demanded that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels and took note of the right of member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. |
| 14 January 2026S/RES/2812 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 July 2026. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 11 August 2025S/PV.9977 | This was a meeting titled “Maritime Security: Prevention, Innovation, and International Cooperation to Address Emerging Challenges”, organised by Panama as one of its signature events. |
| 20 May 2025S/PV.9919 | This was a meeting titled “Strengthening Maritime Security through International Cooperation for Global Stability”, organised by Greece as one of its signature events. |