Libya
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to renew the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. It is also expected to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. Through resolution 2769 of 16 January 2025, the Council renewed the authorisation of petroleum-related measures until 1 May 2026 and extended the PoE’s mandate until 15 May, to be reviewed by 15 April.
The Security Council is also scheduled to hold its 60-day briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Libya remains mired in a political impasse between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council (HSC), and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The parties remain deadlocked over draft legislation to hold national elections that would reconcile the country’s divided government. A key point of contention is over the proposal to form a unified interim government to organise the elections—a proposal favoured by the GNS and HoR but opposed by the GNU and some segments of the HSC. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections.
In August 2025, Tetteh presented the Council with a roadmap to lead Libya to national elections and unified institutions. The roadmap is built on three pillars: adopting an electoral framework for presidential and legislative elections; unifying institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues to support the elections and address key conflict drivers.
During the Security Council’s most recent briefing on Libya, held on 18 February, Tetteh reiterated that despite UNSMIL’s efforts, no meaningful progress was made on completing the first two pillars of the roadmap. A crucial step in this process is the reconstitution of the Board of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC). While the HoR and the HCS previously reached an agreement on a mechanism for selecting the HNEC Board, Tetteh noted that both institutions had taken unilateral steps that could undermine their unity.
During the February briefing, she elaborated on a two‑step approach involving the formation of a small group of Libyan representatives to address the two roadmap milestones related to elections. The first step appears designed to bring together key institutional and political actors from the eastern- and western-based authorities in a compact format focused on the blocked milestones. Tetteh stated that, should this group fail to agree, “a broader convening will be necessary to take forward the implementation of the roadmap”. This step seems to imply the use of existing Libyan agreements, such as the Libyan Political Agreement of 2015, to overcome the current impasse.
In her February briefing, Tetteh warned the Council that Libya’s political situation is deteriorating amid further fragmentation of state institutions. She highlighted competing mandates and conflicting rulings issued by courts in Benghazi and Tripoli, which risk undermining the integrity of the judicial system. She also stressed that the economic situation remains dire, citing currency devaluation, high inflation, and persistent fuel shortages.
In a 3 March press statement, Council members reiterated their support for Tetteh’s mediation efforts and urged all Libyan stakeholders to engage fully and without delay with Tetteh on the political roadmap. In this regard, the statement called on them to demonstrate the political will and compromise needed to advance a Libyan-led process, and refrain from unilateral actions that could deepen divisions, undermine reconciliation, or worsen Libya’s economic situation.
On 3 February, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Muammar Gaddafi, was killed in Zintan by unknown assailants. The authorities in Libya have issued warrants for the arrest of three suspects whose identities have not been revealed. To date, no arrests have been made.
A November 2025 investigative report by The Sentry—an international investigative and policy organisation that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—highlighted the escalating scale of fuel smuggling in Libya, estimating the government losses at $20 billion over the 2022–2024 period. The report attributes the crisis to systemic exploitation of fuel subsidies and crude-for-fuel swaps by political elites across the country. It concludes that more than 50% of imported fuel is currently diverted to illicit networks, severely undermining domestic supply.
Sanctions-Related Developments
Pursuant to resolution 2769, which last renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and extended the petroleum-related sanctions measures, the Panel submitted its final report by 15 March. On 24 March, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee met to discuss the PoE’s final report. At the time of writing, the report had not yet been published.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 17 February, UNSMIL and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a joint report on human rights abuses and violations against migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Libya. Based on interviews with almost 100 migrants from 16 countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, the report exposes an exploitative business model in which grave violations and abuses against migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees have evolved into deliberate, profit-driven practices. It also uncovers that trafficking networks, often with ties to state or non-state actors, prey on the extreme situations of vulnerability faced by migrants for profit through violent practices, including forced labour, sexual exploitation, ransom, and extortion.
Libya’s approach to migration governance, compounded by restrictive migration policies across Europe’s Mediterranean borders and the absence of sufficient protective measures and rights-based migration laws, has also provided a conducive environment for actors in the illicit economy to perpetrate human rights violations and abuses with impunity, further perpetuating the cycle of exploitation that has become “business as usual”, according to the report. UNSMIL and OHCHR underscored the need to dismantle such an exploitative model and bring an end to systematic violations, calling on Libyan authorities to, among other things, immediately release all arbitrarily detained migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in both unofficial and official detention centres and to decriminalise irregular entry, stay, and exit from the country.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue facing the Council in April is the renewal of the PoE’s mandate and extension of the authorisation of measures contained in resolution 2146, which allow member states to inspect designated vessels on the high seas suspected of facilitating the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. The main findings and recommendations from the final PoE report are likely to inform negotiations on the PoE’s mandate renewal.
Past PoE reports have drawn attention to unprecedented levels of oil smuggling operations that also serve as a major source of revenue for armed groups in Libya. Given the significance of this issue, the Council could consider further strengthening the sanctions regime by targeting illicit payments taking place outside legitimate Libyan institutions or consider new listing criteria in this regard. Another option would be to explore the possibility of expanding the maritime interdiction regime on illicit oil smuggling.
On the political front, a key issue for the Council is how to best support the roadmap for a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process that Tetteh presented in August 2025. One of the main objectives for the Council is to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival governments to reach an inclusive agreement on electoral laws, including the possible establishment of a unified interim government to organise the elections. Council members have issued two press statements in support of the ongoing process. In the absence of progress, the Council could consider adopting a resolution that supports Tetteh’s efforts to advance the political process.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan‑led, inclusive political process leading to elections as the only way to restore political, security, and economic stability in the country. They are also broadly supportive of the UN’s mediation role in pursuing this objective, and they share concerns about the volatile security situation.
Positions diverge more sharply on sanctions. The US, UK, and European members generally view the Libya sanctions regime as an important tool to support stability, constrain spoilers, and safeguard Libya’s oil wealth. Russia, China, and some other members, such as Somalia and Pakistan, have criticised the long‑standing restrictions on frozen Libyan assets and have argued in favour of giving Libyan authorities greater ability to reinvest and manage these funds, while repeatedly warning against attempts by external actors to control or reshape Libya’s financial architecture for their own interests.
Both China and Russia have also expressed concern over what they see as intrusive maritime authorisations, in particular, the EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI, which is currently the only regional arrangement conducting inspections of vessels on the high seas off Libya when there are reasonable grounds to believe they are violating the UN arms embargo.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2796 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate for twelve months and encouraged the mission to implement the recommendations from the strategic review. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 3 March 2026SC/16309 | This statement urged Libyan stakeholders to fully engage with UNSMIL’s political roadmap and demonstrate political will to advance a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned process. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 18 February 2026S/PV.10107 | This was a briefing on Libya. |
