Kosovo
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold its first briefing this year on the situation in Kosovo. Special Representative and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Peter Due will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest report.
Key Recent Developments
There has been no meaningful progress in the EU-facilitated dialogue on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina. In an effort to revive the process, EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Peter Sørensen met separately with senior officials in Pristina and Belgrade in mid-January, and again with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo on separate occasions in late February. On 22 January, Sørensen also convened the chief negotiators of Kosovo and Serbia in Brussels for the first meeting of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons, a trilateral body bringing together Kosovo and Serbia under EU chairmanship and with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as observer, to oversee implementation of the 2023 Declaration on Missing Persons.
On 16 January, Kurti announced plans to gradually integrate Serbia-supported health and education institutions in Serb-majority areas into Kosovo’s system. Following engagement within the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, Sørensen stressed in press remarks on 14 March that any such integration should be inclusive, consistent with prior dialogue commitments, and designed to avoid disrupting essential services. He also underscored the need for structured consultations with representatives of the Kosovo Serb community throughout the process in order to secure their buy-in.
Regional security rhetoric also intensified in recent months. On 11 February, Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo agreed to hold their first joint training of 2026 following a meeting of their defence officials. The move drew a sharp response from Belgrade, with the Serbian Ministry of Defense condemning the trilateral meeting and related security plans as a violation of Security Council resolution 1244 and arguing that the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) remains the only legitimate armed formation in Kosovo with a clearly defined mandate.
On 20 November 2025, President Vjosa Osmani of Kosovo called snap parliamentary elections for 28 December 2025 after the ruling Vetëvendosje party failed to secure enough votes in parliament to form a government. Ahead of the vote, the EU announced that it was moving forward with lifting measures imposed on Kosovo in 2023 in response to tensions in the north and would programme 216 million euros in financial assistance following gradual improvements in local governance in northern municipalities after the 2023 local elections. Vetëvendosje won roughly half of the vote in the 28 December 2025 election and later secured 57 seats in the 120-member assembly.
The post-election process was then prolonged by a nationwide recount and a vote tampering investigation in which authorities detained more than 100 people, although the outcome of the election did not change. On 11 February, parliament approved a new Kurti-led government, ending more than a year of political deadlock.
Expectations that the new government would restore political stability, however, proved short-lived. On 5 March, Kosovo’s parliament failed to elect a president by the constitutional deadline after the ruling party was unable to secure the support and participation needed to proceed with a vote on its nominee. Osmani dissolved parliament on 6 March and called snap elections, but the Constitutional Court subsequently intervened. After first temporarily barring Osmani from setting an election date before 31 March, the court ruled on 25 March that the decree dissolving parliament had no legal effect and gave the assembly 34 days to elect a president.
Key Issues and Options
Maintaining stability in Kosovo and promoting the de-escalation of tensions in the north remains a key priority for the Council.
A second key issue is whether the Council can help sustain momentum behind the EU-facilitated dialogue and the implementation of existing commitments.
Another issue facing the Council is how to foster constructive discussion on this politically charged file. During the Council’s open briefings on Kosovo, Belgrade and Pristina typically present sharply contrasting accounts of the sources of regional instability. These meetings often become an arena for public posturing rather than substantive engagement. This dynamic can eclipse any positive momentum and shift attention back to mutual recrimination. Instead of open briefings, Council members may therefore wish to consider holding closed consultations—or private meetings, which would be closed as well but would allow Kosovar and Serbian officials to participate, unlike closed consultations. This could allow for a more candid exchange on the obstacles to implementing commitments under the EU-facilitated dialogue and to advancing the normalisation process.
In response to the many challenges facing Kosovo, the Council could also consider adopting a presidential statement that:
- expresses support for Sørensen;
- urges Belgrade and Pristina to engage in good faith and implement pending commitments without preconditions; and
- stresses that any measures affecting the Kosovo Serb community should avoid disruption of essential services and encourage inclusive implementation in line with prior dialogue commitments.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members support the EU-facilitated dialogue to establish conditions for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Deep divisions among permanent members, however, continue to characterise the Council’s approach to the issue.
Among the five permanent Council members, France, the UK, and the US recognise Kosovo’s independence and tend to be supportive of its government; China and Russia do not recognise its independence and strongly support Serbia’s position and its claim to territorial integrity. Elected members Bahrain, Colombia, Denmark, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, and Panama recognise Kosovo’s independence, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Greece do not. Somalia reportedly recognised Kosovo’s independence in May 2010, although its recognition has been disputed by Serbian officials in recent years and subsequently reaffirmed by Kosovar authorities.
The modification of UNMIK’s mandate, with a view to its possible drawdown, is another matter of contention among Council members. The US has been the most vocal proponent of reviewing UNMIK’s operations and ultimately phasing it out, a position it has maintained well before the current financial constraints of UN peace operations and the introduction of the UN80 Initiative. At the Council’s 21 October 2025 briefing on Kosovo, the US described UNMIK as a “bloated peacekeeping mission without peacekeepers” and called for its functions to be transferred to agencies better suited to carry them out. Denmark and the UK similarly argued that a strategic review was overdue, framing the issue within the broader UN80 reform agenda. France adopted a more cautious position, expressing support both for “common-sense efforts to improve and streamline peacekeeping missions through efficiency measures” and for extending UNMIK’s mandate for as long as necessary, while noting that the mission’s mandate is intrinsically linked to the normalisation process. Russia, by contrast, has opposed changes to UNMIK’s mandate or budget, maintaining that the mission continues to play a crucial role.
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 10 October 2025S/2025/634 | This was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 21 October 2025S/PV.10019 | This was the second regular briefing of the year on the situation in Kosovo. |
