In Hindsight: Living with the Veto
Introduction
Since the founding of the United Nations over 80 years ago, few issues have generated as much controversy among the world body’s membership, or so affected the Security Council’s work, as the veto accorded to the Council’s five permanent members (P5). In recent years, P5 divisions have hindered meaningful engagement on situations such as Myanmar, Sudan, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, and Ukraine.
The exercise of the veto has continued to increase. The seven vetoed draft resolutions in 2024 were the most since 1986. A total of eight vetoes were cast on these failed drafts: four by Russia, three by the US, and one by China. They were on a range of issues, evidence of the divisiveness that currently pervades much of the Council’s work in an era of elevated tension among the major powers. In 2025, there were four vetoes: two by the US on draft resolutions on the war in Gaza, and two by Russia on amendments to a draft resolution on Ukraine. Significant attention continues to be focused on the adverse effects of the veto, which has been the subject of considerable academic research and a recent documentary film.[1]
Given the rise in the use of the veto—and the unlikelihood of a Charter amendment to reform the veto in the near future—our 23 March research report, Living with the Veto, explores options for action, without amending the Charter, to promote accountability for the use of the veto, to limit its exercise, and to help promote international peace and security when the Council is hamstrung by the veto or the threat of veto.
The report analyses the Liechtenstein-led “veto initiative”, which was launched on 26 April 2022 with the adoption by the UN General Assembly of resolution A/RES/76/262, and represents the first time that a UN body has taken action to modify the use of the veto. This resolution decides that the President of the General Assembly “shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council … on the situation as to which the veto was cast, provided that the Assembly does not meet in an emergency special session on the same situation”.
While the veto initiative is a positive development that promotes accountability and transparency, additional avenues need to be pursued to curtail the exercise of the veto in ways that violate the UN Charter and, as much as possible, to fill the void left by the Council in the face of irresponsible veto use. In this regard, a variety of proposals have been advanced, and in some cases pursued. The report explores options for action in this regard.
General Assembly Action in the Context of Security Council Divisions
In cases where the Security Council is gridlocked on an issue, the General Assembly can and has, in many cases, provided a forum for constructive engagement and action. While the UN Charter entrusts the Security Council with the “primary” responsibility for international peace and security under Article 24(1), it provides broad discretion to the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on matters related to international peace and security in Articles 10, 11, 12 and 14. Although it cannot exact binding legal obligations on UN member states like the Security Council, the General Assembly has a rich history of discussing and acting on issues related to international peace and security.[2]
During the past decade, notable actions taken by the General Assembly on issues that have faced vetoes in the Security Council have included, among others:
- the establishment of the “International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria to Assist in the Investigation of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011” (IIIM) in December 2016;
- the creation of the “Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic” to determine the fate and whereabouts of missing persons in Syria in June 2023;
- the recommendation for the creation of an international register of damage in Ukraine, which led to the establishment of such a body by the Council of Europe in May 2023; and
- the endorsement of the New York Declaration on 12 September 2025, calling for the end of the war in Gaza and mapping out conditions leading to Palestinian statehood and improved relations between Israel and Arab states.
Resuscitating the Obligatory Abstention under Article 27(3)
One concern that has been gaining traction among the wider UN membership in recent years is the decades-long dormancy of the obligatory abstention clause in Article 27(3) in Chapter V of the UN Charter. Article 27(3) stipulates that any Council member that is a party to a dispute shall not vote in Council decisions of a substantive nature under Chapter VI (that is, those related to the peaceful settlement of disputes) or under Article 52(3), which focuses on the pacific settlement of disputes through regional arrangements. Many member states have begun to call for the resuscitation of the oligatory abstention, especially since Russia’s vetoes of draft resolutions pertaining to the war in Ukraine, following its full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022. In this regard, the September 2024 Pact for the Future—the roadmap agreed by member states for the future of multilateralism—calls for full implementation and adherence to the provisions of the UN Charter, including Article 27(3).
Living with the Veto presents several options to help revive the obligatory abstention provision in Article 27(3); among these is the possibility of a General Assembly resolution calling for adherence to the obligatory abstention and clarifying who would be required to abstain by defining “party to a dispute”. It appears that discussion of such a proposal has been underway for several months, and a draft resolution addressing these issues was circulated by Liechtenstein and 13 other states to the wider membership on 27 March. The draft further calls on Council members to apply the term “party to a dispute” to promote implementation of the obligatory abstention under Article 27(3) and invites the Council to submit a special report on the implementation of the term “party to a dispute” when the Council invokes it, including in regard to relevant decisions.
Veto Restraint in the Case of Atrocity Crimes
A legal argument that has been gaining attention posits that use of the veto to block action in the context of atrocity crimes violates international law, including jus cogens norms, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions.[3] A major proponent of this argument has suggested that the General Assembly could pursue an ICJ advisory opinion or a resolution on this issue.[4] Legal obligations related to the use of the veto in the context of atrocity crimes are likely to engender further important consideration.[5]
In the meantime, member states that have yet to sign on to the French/Mexico initiative and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group Code of Conduct—which call for veto restraint in the face of atrocity crimes—could continue to be encouraged to do so. To date, 107 member states have pledged their support to the French/Mexico initiative, while 130 member states and two observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine) have supported the ACT Code of Conduct. Despite this significant level of support, it is revealing that France’s joint initiative with Mexico has not been supported by any other permanent member, while France and the UK are the only P5 members to back the ACT Code of Conduct.
Recommendations from the President of the General Assembly
The 5 September 2025 General Assembly resolution on revitalisation of the work of the General Assembly requests the President of the General Assembly (PGA) to continue preparing “detailed summaries following relevant discussions related to the annual report of the Security Council, on the use of the veto or General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) or 76/262, including recommendations for action based on such discussions” [emphasis ours]. This last clause—apparently incorporated in the negotiations on the resolution at the initiative of Mexico and ACT, among others—provides an opportunity for the PGA to highlight concrete recommendations regarding pathways for action for the General Assembly after the use of the veto.
Documenting the Pocket Veto
One factor that is not reflected by statistics on the veto is the “hidden” or “pocket” veto. This refers to cases in which draft resolutions are not formally presented for a vote—or if they are, their content is significantly altered—because of the threat of the veto by one or more permanent members. It is very difficult to document the use of the pocket veto because written records only exist if a draft resolution is circulated as a Council document, and in most cases, this only happens if there is a reasonable expectation of adoption. There is often anecdotal evidence of explicit veto threats, but implicit ones are harder to ascertain.
Nonetheless, documenting veto threats in as systematic a way as possible, while arduous, would be a fruitful task. It would create a more refined understanding of the positions of the permanent members and their impact on the work of the Council, including how they shape the operating environment and constrain potential action on certain files. An impartial think tank or academic institution could undertake such a project. Conducting this initiative would require consistent and extensive engagement with Council members to determine when such threats are made.
Careful documentation would consider several questions: Was a draft resolution produced? If so, what was the content? If not, is there an indication of the substance envisioned? Which permanent member(s) threatened the veto? If the threat was communicated explicitly, how was it conveyed—in a closed Council meeting, in a bilateral discussion, or in another format? If it is implicit, what is the precise substance of the messaging? In some cases, ascertaining the credibility of the information could be a challenge; for example, there may be contrasting interpretations of an exchange, with one or more sources maintaining that the use of the veto had been implied, while others, including the relevant permanent member(s), deny that the threat of the veto had been made. Such discrepancies can be explained on a case-by-case basis as part of the project to provide as complete and transparent a historical record as possible.
Conclusion
Political courage to challenge the status quo on the veto is sorely needed to address a deteriorating international security environment beset by multiple crises and enormous human suffering. Continued efforts need to be pursued by Council members, the wider membership and civil society to enhance accountability for the irresponsible exercise of the veto (and threat of veto) and to promote international peace and security when the Council fails to fulfil its responsibilities under the UN Charter.
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[1] Director/Producer Tim Slade, “The Veto”, 2025.
[2] See Erica Gaston and Adam Day, Assembly for Peace: A Digital Handbook on the UN General Assembly’s Past Practice on Peace and Security. The handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the work of the General Assembly (GA) on matters relevant to international peace and security. The authors write: “…the GA has engaged in a wide range of activities under Chapter IV of the Charter that might be considered part of its peace and security practice, including the deployment of mediators, the establishment of peace operations, the mandating of special envoys, recommendations for the use of force or sanctions and the creation of accountability mechanisms such as fact-finding missions (FFMs) and commissions of inquiry (COIs)”, 1.
[3] Jennifer Trahan. Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes (Cambridge University Press, 2022); see also, Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo and Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga. “Restraining the Use of the Veto” in Empowering the Security Council: Reforms to Address Modern Threats, eds. Mona Ali Khalil and Floriane Lavaud (Oxford University Press, 2024), 93-96.
[4] Trahan. Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes, 256-257.
[5] Trahan. Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes, 256-257.
