Haiti
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold its 90-day briefing on the situation in Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Carlos Ruiz Massieu is expected to brief the Council on recent developments in the country and on the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH. Closed consultations are expected to follow.
Background and Key Recent Developments
After the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti descended into a multidimensional crisis characterised by political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Armed gangs have overrun large parts of Port-au-Prince, the capital, employing tactics including murder, kidnapping, and sexual violence amid widespread impunity.
In recent months, the Haitian security forces have intensified operations against the gangs, with some reports that the police have retaken pockets of downtown Port-au-Prince, although their ability to maintain control remains uncertain. Gangs retain the capacity to carry out attacks in the capital and perpetrate abuses against the population and have expanded their reach beyond Port-au-Prince, including to the Artibonite and Centre departments. Overnight between 28 and 29 March at least 30 people were killed in an attack by the Gran Grif gang in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite.
Overall levels of violence remain high. According to a 23 March report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, between 1 March 2025 to 15 January, at least 5,519 people were killed and 2,608 were injured in Haiti. The report says that most casualties occurred during security operations against gangs, with at least 3,301 people killed during such operations. Gang violence was responsible for 27 percent of the total casualties, followed by acts of “popular justice” by self-defence groups and non-organised members of the population, and summary executions carried out by the police outside anti-gang operations. The report describes the continued perpetration of sexual violence by the gangs as a tactic to subjugate and punish the population, as well as violence against children, kidnappings, and extortion. The report also highlights the “unnecessary or disproportionate” use of force by Haitian and other security forces and the high number of casualties “among residents, who were killed or injured by stray bullets and by drone strikes” during security operations against gangs.
In this regard, the report refers to the operations carried out by private military company Vectus Global which was reportedly hired by the Haitian government to combat gangs. Since March 2025, Vectus Global has carried out operations independently and jointly with the national security forces involving mainly drone strikes and firing from helicopters. The report says that, among the casualties documented in connection with operations against gang members, 60 people not affiliated with gangs were killed and notes that “[s]ome, or even most, of these drone strikes and helicopter operations could be described as targeted killings”. A recent Human Rights Watch report documented similar patterns and provided additional details on some of these incidents.
On 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793, authorising UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. Like the MSS, the GSF is not a UN mission, but its mandate represents a clear shift from the MSS mission’s model. While the MSS mission focused on supporting and training the Haitian National Police (HNP), the GSF has been mandated to conduct “counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs” independently or in cooperation with the HNP and Haitian armed forces. It also authorised a personnel ceiling of 5,550, compared to the 2,500 envisaged (but never achieved) under the MSS mission’s concept of operations.
Although resolution 2793 authorised the transition from the MSS to the GSF, Kenyan personnel who formed the bulk of the MSS—along with its force commander—remained in Haiti during the initial phase of the transition even though they are ultimately expected to end their deployment. While media reports indicate that some officers will remain until replacement units are in place, some Kenyan contingents have already begun repatriating. In recent months, the Standing Group of Partners for the GSF—comprising The Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, and the US—has been working on force generation and funding for the new mission. While a small contingent of soldiers from Chad is reportedly expected to deploy to Haiti in April, the GSF is not expected to reach full operational capacity until October.
On 2 December 2025, the Standing Group of Partners for the GSF appointed Jack Christofides, who has held several leadership roles in the UN, as GSF Special Representative.
Resolution 2793 also requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide support to the GSF, among other entities, “with a view to assume full logistical support responsibility of the GSF within six months” of the resolution’s adoption, that is by the end of March. On 19 March, Daniela Kroslak was appointed Assistant Secretary-General and Head of UNSOH. The office is apparently ready to start providing operational support to the GSF.
On 29 January, the Security Council extended BINUH’s mandate for another year, until 31 January 2027, through resolution 2814. The resolution revised BINUH’s mandate to execute six key tasks in an “integrated manner” with UN entities in the country. The tasks focus on electoral assistance and facilitating “inter-Haitian national dialogue” in support of political and constitutional processes in Haiti; support in the areas of community violence reduction and disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration of armed gangs; assistance to the Haitian authorities on justice sector issues; as well as monitoring and reporting on “cases of gang violence, criminal activities, and human rights abuses and violations, including sexual violence”. The resolution tasked the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti with playing “a good offices and coordinating role, including in promoting accountability as well as respect for human rights, the political process, and the rule of law”. (For more information, see our 28 January What’s in Blue story.)
The Transitional Presidential Council (TPC)—the temporary body created pursuant to a 2024 agreement facilitated by the Caribbean Community and the US after a dramatic surge in gang violence—dissolved on 7 February, the date on which its mandate expired. The dissolution of the TPC followed several days of political turmoil in January, as a majority of TPC members attempted to dismiss acting Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, an act which the US, other international interlocutors, and national stakeholders criticised. Following the TPC’s dissolution, Fils-Aimé, who had been appointed by the TPC in 2024, remains the only official holding executive power. General elections are still planned for August, although delays due to the security situation or other factors cannot be excluded. According to media reports, over 300 political parties have registered to participate in the elections.
The humanitarian situation remains dire, with 6.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, including 2.8 million children, and over 1.45 million people internally displaced as at February 2026, levels that, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, are approaching those recorded after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
On 27 March, Bahrain and Denmark, as the co-focal points on conflict and hunger, convened an informal expert-level meeting on food insecurity in Haiti. Members were briefed by representatives of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization in Haiti.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 20 February, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Service of BINUH published a joint report on the impact of gang violence on the human rights of children in Haiti. The report finds that children are increasingly exposed to the trafficking risks, noting that more than 500,000 children live in gang-controlled areas, where the majority of Haitian gangs are involved in child trafficking. It also shows that both structural and contextual factors contribute to creating an environment in which children, particularly from extremely poor, marginalised families, as well as those living on the streets or in displaced persons’ sites, are at acute risk of trafficking or other forms of exploitation. The report calls for a comprehensive, human rights-centred strategy built around several pillars including expanding social protection programmes and financial services for families from marginalised areas; strengthening the role of schools as protective spaces; prioritising children’s rehabilitation and reintegration over punitive measures; and reducing gangs’ capacity though bolstering responses by law enforcement and the judicial system while ensuring compliance with international human rights law and standards.
Key Issues and Options
The Security Council’s overarching objective in Haiti is to support the country’s political transition, restore security conditions conducive to holding elections, and address the root causes of the country’s instability.
An additional issue for the Security Council is how to ensure it receives comprehensive and timely information on the GSF’s deployment, oversight arrangements, and operational conduct. Resolution 2793 requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution as part of his regular reporting on Haiti. The resolution also requested the GSF Special Representative, “in coordination with the government of Haiti and the UN, to keep the Security Council abreast of relevant developments and inform on the concept of operations, indicative financial needs to be funded by voluntary contributions, and a force generation plan”.
An option would be for Council members to invite Christofides to brief the Council on such issues as mission composition, funding arrangements, and measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse and the excessive use of force. For instance, members could seek clarification on how Christofides intends to address concerns raised by human rights interlocutors reporting that the Haitian security forces—which the GSF is expected to support—have employed unnecessary and disproportionate force and have been supported by contractors whose conduct appears to violate international human rights law.
Council Dynamics
Council members are united in their concern about Haiti’s multidimensional crisis and generally agree on the need to tackle escalating gang violence and its impact on the Haitian population. Views also converge on the continuing need for a sanctions regime and the importance of a Haitian-led political solution that addresses both security and socioeconomic challenges. At the same time, positions differ among Council members on how to appropriately respond to the security situation in Haiti.
The US was the main architect of the transition from the MSS mission to the GSF. China and Russia broke silence during the negotiation of resolution 2793 and, together with Pakistan, abstained in the vote citing concerns about issues such as rules of engagement, sources of funding, troop composition, oversight, and accountability. While these concerns were shared by many other members, the then “A3 Plus” grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and European members of the Council opted for negotiating the inclusion of language on human rights, child protection, and Haitian sovereignty into the text in an attempt to mitigate these concerns.
Differences among Council members also emerged during the negotiations on the renewal of the 2653 Haiti sanctions regime in October 2025. While the co-penholders (US and Panama) initially proposed adding four names to the sanctions list, Russia opposed the listing of political figures leading to the final version of the resolution only adding two names to the sanctions list. China and the A3 Plus sought to strengthen language on the arms embargo. While the co-penholders accommodated several of these requests, proposed references to record “the type, quantity, and serial number of weapons and ammunition seized” and “photographing all items and relevant markings and headstamps” were not included. (The majority of weapons trafficked into Haiti come from the US.)
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 29 January 2026S/RES/2814 | This resolution renewed BINUH’s mandate for a year, until 31 January 2027. |
| 17 October 2025S/RES/2794 | This resolution renewed the 2653 Haiti sanctions regime for one year and added Dimitri Herard and Kempes Sanon to the 2653 sanctions list. |
| 30 September 2025S/RES/2793 | This resolution authorised UN member states to transition the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti into a “Gang Suppression Force” (GSF) for an initial period of 12 months. The text also requested that the Secretary-General establish a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). The resolution received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia). |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 12 December 2025S/PV.10066 | This was the meeting record of the Council’s quarterly open briefing on Haiti. |
