Great Lakes Region (DRC)
Expected Council Action
In April, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Huang Xia, is expected to provide the biannual briefing to the Council on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region.
Key Recent Developments
Since the Council’s last meeting on the Great Lakes region on 13 October 2025, there have been significant developments in the DRC and the Great Lakes. On 15 November 2025, the Congolese government and the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a politico-military coalition operating in eastern DRC which includes the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) as a major component, signed the Doha Framework for Peace, affirming their commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to de-escalation and stabilisation.
On 22 November 2025, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the Doha Framework for Peace as an important step towards addressing the conflict in eastern DRC. They urged the signatories to translate their commitments into a permanent, effective, and verifiable ceasefire and to remain engaged in the negotiation process to finalise the additional protocols, annexes, and technical arrangements. Only two of the eight protocols outlined in the Doha Framework—the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) and the prisoner exchange—have been signed by the parties. It appears that discussions on the remaining six have not yet begun.
On 2 February, the Congolese government and M23 signed a terms of reference for implementing the COVM in Doha. In this connection, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) deployed an exploratory and preliminary assessment mission to the city of Uvira in South Kivu from 23-27 February, together with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The aim of the mission was to assess the political, security, logistical, and socio-environmental conditions in and around the city. The M23 captured the city, which is located on the northern shore of Lake Tanganyika, in December 2025 but has since withdrawn.
On 4 December 2025, DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame signed the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity under the auspices of US President Donald Trump and in the presence of several regional leaders, committing to implement the 27 June 2025 Peace Agreement and the 25 April 2025 Declaration of Principles signed between the two countries as part of the Washington Process—a mediation effort led by the US aimed at easing regional tensions.
On 2 March, the US imposed sanctions on four Rwandan senior military officials and on the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) as an entity, citing the violation of the Washington Accords by the “Rwanda-backed M23” when it captured the city of Uvira just days after the signing of the agreement. The DRC welcomed the US decision, while Rwanda criticised the move, describing it as one-sided.
From 17 to 18 March, the US hosted representatives from the DRC and Rwanda to facilitate discussion on the implementation of the Washington Accords. According to an 18 March joint statement, the two sides agreed to a series of coordinated steps to de-escalate tensions and advance progress on the ground including the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda in defined areas in DRC territory, and time-bound and intensified efforts by the DRC to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC and implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
On 17 January, the President of Togo, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, in his capacity as African Union (AU) Mediator, convened a high-level meeting in Lomé attended by the five co-facilitators appointed by the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as representatives of Angola, Burundi, France, Qatar, Rwanda, Uganda, the US, the AU, EAC, SADC, and ICGLR, among others. (For more information on the co-facilitators, see our 11 April 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
In the communiqué adopted at the meeting, participants emphasised the need to enhance harmonisation, coherence, and coordination among all peace initiatives, with a view to leveraging existing synergies and avoiding the fragmentation of mediation efforts. Following the meeting, Gnassingbé and the co-facilitators travelled to Angola, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda in late January and early February to meet with regional leaders as part of their efforts to finding a lasting solution to the conflict in eastern DRC.
Tshisekedi travelled to Angola multiple times this year to meet with his Angolan counterpart, João Lourenço, in an apparent effort to revive Angola’s role in the ongoing mediation efforts. Angola had previously facilitated the Luanda Process, an African-led initiative aimed at supporting talks between the Congolese government and Rwanda, which was later replaced by the Doha process. Amid mounting pressure internally and M23 consolidating its position in territories it controls, Kinshasa apparently sought Angola’s support in advancing an inclusive national dialogue, an initiative spearheaded by Congolese church leaders, which so far has struggled to gain traction.
On 11 February, Lourenço announced a ceasefire between the Congolese government and the M23, to take effect on 18 February, following its acceptance by both parties. The Congolese government accepted the call for a ceasefire and noted that it did so within the framework of the ceasefire mechanism agreed in Doha. The M23 likewise reaffirmed its commitment to implementing the Doha agreement, while condemning what it described as Kinshasa’s “diplomatic fragmentation strategy”.
In the meantime, the security situation in eastern DRC has continued to deteriorate. On 17 March, Security Council members held closed consultations at France’s request, the penholder on the file, to discuss the situation, particularly in light of an 11 March drone attack in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, which killed one UNICEF staff member and two other civilians. (For more information, see our 16 March What’s in Blue story.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 26 February press release, UN experts expressed grave concern over reports of extreme violence committed against human rights defenders by the M23. Between November 2025 and February 2026, several human rights defenders in North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC were reportedly targeted by members of the M23 and their collaborators, in direct connection with their human rights work. The experts cited allegations of attempted killings, torture, sexual violence, and death threats as among some of the abuses the human rights defenders had endured or continue to experience at the hands of the armed group and its associates for documenting and speaking out against the group’s violations. Condemning the gravity and brutality of the abuse, the experts stressed that the M23 must immediately stop targeting human rights defenders and civilians. They also underscored the importance of fully respecting the ceasefire and called on the state authorities to undertake meaningful steps to guarantee that human rights defenders in eastern DRC can carry out their work safely without fear.
Key Issues and Options
A key issue for Council members in April is the security situation in eastern DRC, which continues to be a source of tension among countries of the Great Lakes region. Another major issue for Council members is the disconnect between the commitments made by the parties in ongoing peace processes and the escalation of fighting on the ground.
The need to ensure greater coordination among the various mediation initiatives in the Great Lakes region has been an ongoing issue for Council members. Since the start of the new year, the African-led mediation effort has once again become more active. During the meeting in April, Xia may brief Council members about his series of engagements with regional leaders, mediators, and facilitators as part of his good offices mandate to support ongoing mediation processes. A possible option for the Bahraini Security Council presidency in April is to invite Gnassingbé to brief the Council.
The illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC and the Great Lakes region remains a major issue, drawing renewed attention amid growing interest in the region’s vast reserves of critical minerals. Xia may speak about the issue in the context of his office’s ongoing efforts in promoting sustainable and transparent natural resource management. Council members could continue to stress the need for responsible mineral sourcing in their statements.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members have welcomed the progress in the ongoing mediation efforts to address the situation in eastern DRC. However, they remain concerned that the various agreements signed last year have not translated into reduced hostilities on the ground and eased tensions in the region.
At the 17 March meeting, some Council members apparently expressed concerns about the involvement of mercenary groups and the intensified use of drones. Media reports indicate that Blackwater, a US private security company, has been active in DRC since 2025 and is supporting the Congolese government’s recent military operations in eastern DRC.
At the time of writing, Council members were negotiating a draft presidential statement which, among other things, urges the parties to de-escalate, cease hostilities, and adhere to an effective and verifiable ceasefire.
The DRC, currently serving as a non-permanent member of the Council, is advocating for punitive measures against the AFC/M23 and Rwanda. The DRC was apparently supportive of adopting a resolution in response to the Secretary-General’s 27 February letter, submitted pursuant to resolution 2808 of 19 December 2025, which proposed recommendations on how to support the ceasefire. However, some Council members were less inclined to proceed, given that the ceasefire agreed upon by the parties has not been implemented.
In December 2025, the DRC signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the US, which could help the latter to secure access to the DRC’s critical mineral resources. The US appears to have prioritised this issue as part of a broader strategy to diversify its critical minerals supply chains and counter China’s dominance in the sector. As part of its March Security Council presidency, the US convened a briefing on “Energy, critical minerals, and security” under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item. (For more, see our 4 March What’s in Blue story.)
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 21 February 2025S/RES/2773 | This resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, strongly condemns the ongoing offensive and advances of the M23 in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces of the DRC–calling on the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to cease support to M23 and immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions. The resolution also reiterates an urgent call for all parties to conclude an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 1 October 2025S/2025/615 | This was the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Region. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 13 October 2025S/PV.10016 | This was an open briefing on the situation in the Great Lakes region. |
