Colombia
Expected Council Action
In April, the Security Council is expected to hold its quarterly meeting on Colombia. Special Representative and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia Miroslav Jenča will brief on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on the mission (S/2026/229), which was circulated to Council members on 26 March and covers the period from 27 December 2025.
The verification mission’s mandate expires on 31 October.
Key Recent Developments
On 8 March, Colombia held legislative elections for both houses of Congress (the Senate and House of Representatives) for 2026–2030. These were the third national elections in the country since the signing of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the government of Colombia and the former rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP).
Under the 2016 agreement, which provided for the political participation of ex-combatants as part of their reintegration into society, ten seats were guaranteed to the Comunes party (comprising former FARC-EP members) for the 2018-2022 and 2022–2026 electoral periods. The recent elections were the first in which the Comunes competed on an equal footing with the other political parties. The party did not win any seats and failed to secure the requisite half million votes to maintain its legal status. After the elections, the party’s leadership reaffirmed its commitment to the comprehensive implementation of the peace agreement.
“Pacto Histórico”, the left-wing party of Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego, won 25 seats in the 103-member Senate, a larger share than any other party. The second-largest party, the conservative “Centro Democrático”, secured 17 seats. The results leave a fragmented Congress requiring coalition-building by the next president to pass any reforms. (Under Colombia’s constitution, the president is elected for a single four-year term and cannot run for re-election.)
Also on 8 March, some parties held presidential primaries. Subsequently, 14 candidates registered to run in the presidential elections scheduled for 31 May. If no candidate wins over 50 percent of the votes in the first round, a second round will be held on 21 June. At the time of writing, the leading candidates according to polls were Iván Cepeda of the “Pacto Histórico”, Paloma Valencia of the “Centro Democrático”, and a far-right independent candidate named Abelardo de la Espriella. Candidates have presented different views on how to curb violence in the country; while Cepeda has expressed support for negotiations with armed groups operating in the country, others have advocated for stronger military action against these groups.
The Secretary-General’s report noted that the election day was largely peaceful. However, the run-up to the elections saw several significant instances of violence against candidates from across the political spectrum. The electoral cycle began with the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, a presidential hopeful who was shot on 7 June 2025. Other instances of political violence have been reported since then, including a fatal attack on the protection team of a Senator in the Arauca department, the disappearance of a candidate to the Senate in the Cesar department, and the holding of an Indigenous Senator by an armed group for several hours in the Cauca department.
Insecurity continued to negatively affect the implementation of several aspects of the peace agreement, including the reintegration of former combatants. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, the mission verified the killing of four former combatants, bringing the number of ex-FARC killed since the signing of the peace agreement to 491. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that conflict between non-state armed groups, which are present in 60 percent of municipalities, has intensified large-scale humanitarian emergencies. In 2025, more than 1.6 million people were impacted by violence—including more than 150,000 individuals who faced movement restrictions and nearly 100,000 others who were displaced—three times more than in 2024. Additionally, there was a 58 percent increase in attacks against civilians in 2025 compared with the previous year.
According to OCHA, the humanitarian response has been hindered by access constraints, with 416 incidents reported in 2025 that affected the ability to deliver assistance to 1.6 million people. In a recent relevant development, on 18 March, the dissident group of the former FARC-EP known as the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) announced that it will restrict access, in areas under its control, for the verification mission, the Mission to Support the Peace Process of the Organization of American States (MAPP/OAS), and Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office. The group alleged that humanitarian and verification activities have been used to gather intelligence on its positions, adding that it would only cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on humanitarian issues. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern about the announcement, emphasising that the organisations restricted by the EMC contribute to the protection of civilians.
The Secretary-General’s report noted that the government has activated some protection mechanisms established under the peace agreement to respond to emerging risks. However, progress in operationalising the public policy to dismantle illegal armed groups and criminal organisations—which was presented on 7 September 2023 by the National Commission on Security Guarantees (NCSG)—has “remained limited, given persisting coordination challenges among concerned institutions”. According to the report, the verification mission has urged more frequent high-level meetings of the NCSG to advance implementation of the public policy.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 27 January, OHCHR submitted its annual report on the human rights situation in Colombia. The report examines the country’s security landscape in 2025 as well as its progress on the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement in relation to human rights. Its findings highlighted that the “persistence of violence and armed conflict in several territories, together with the consolidation of non-State armed groups and criminal organizations, continues to seriously affect the civilian population and to weaken the organizational processes and social fabric of Indigenous Peoples and Afrodescendent and campesino communities”. Among other matters, the report warned that the country faces the prospect of returning to the grave human rights conditions it endured before the peace agreement, stressing the importance of strengthening the state’s response to prevent violence and protect the civilian population.
On 5 February, the UN Child Rights Committee (CRC) issued its findings on Colombia regarding concerns and recommendations on implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It expressed concern about the worsening impact of the armed conflict on children, particularly the increased recruitment and use of children by non-state armed groups, marked by disproportionate harm to Indigenous and Afro-Colombian children. Among other things, the CRC called on Colombia to end the recruitment and use of children by the military and police and to include in peace processes with armed groups the immediate halt of child recruitment.
In a report released on 19 March, OHCHR described the grave dangers faced by human rights defenders in Colombia, noting that 972 such individuals were killed between 2016 and 2025. Stressing that “Colombia remains one of the deadliest places on earth to be a human rights defender”, OHCHR urged immediate action to reverse these negative trends. The report notes that more than 70 percent of perpetrators were assessed as non-state armed actors. While acknowledging steps taken by the Colombian authorities to address the issue, the report also points to weak and overwhelmed state institutions, high impunity levels, and corruption as contributing factors to violence.
Key Issues and Options
As this month’s meeting will take place in the middle of the electoral cycle, Council members could emphasise the urgent need to use mechanisms contained in the peace agreement, such as the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics (SISEP), to facilitate the secure conduct of elections. (The SISEP aims to promote a holistic approach to security, including regarding prevention and protection mechanisms for elected officials, opposition members, and community leaders.)
One option is to convey such messages in a press statement. Such a product could also encourage the current government to continue prioritising implementation of the peace agreement in the remainder of its term, which ends in August, including by putting in place structures that can help facilitate continuity in the next administration. Several Council members emphasised this point at the Council’s latest quarterly meeting on Colombia, held on 23 January. Colombia, which made its first intervention on the file as a non-permanent Council member, expressed its intention to do so, including by elevating the entity in charge of implementation to a Presidential Advisory Office, in line with the September 2025 ruling by Colombia’s Constitutional Court on the matter.
Supporting relief efforts for conflict-affected communities is a critical issue. OCHA highlighted in its 2026 Colombia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which was launched on 13 February, the growing humanitarian needs—with seven million people estimated to need assistance this year—while capacities and resources are diminishing and access constraints are increasing. At the Council’s next meeting on Colombia, some Council members may choose to call on donors to enhance their support for humanitarian efforts in the country. They may also call on armed groups to cease restricting access for the UN and other humanitarian personnel.
The effects of the conflict on children in Colombia are an ongoing matter of concern. A 12 February report by the non-governmental organisation International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted the severe scale of child recruitment by armed groups, including through social media platforms. How to increase public-private partnerships to mitigate such risks is of increasing interest for Council members, and was most recently addressed during a 2 March open briefing titled “Children, technology, and education in conflict”. The ICG report further described the difficulties in reintegrating children released from armed groups and in mounting prevention efforts. Council members may seek more information on how the international community can support the Colombian government’s work in this regard, including by inviting to its meetings on Colombia relevant briefers such as UNICEF or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.
Council Dynamics
Colombia had previously been considered a file that enjoyed Council consensus. However, the strains in the bilateral relationship between Colombia and the US since President Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025 have created significant challenges in the Council’s engagement on the file.
These difficult dynamics were evident in the contentious negotiations on resolution 2798 of 31 October 2025, which last renewed the verification mission’s mandate, and in the fact that Council members have not adopted any press statements on Colombia since October 2024, although it had previously been the practice for them to do so after every quarterly meeting. Resolution 2798 removed from the mission’s mandate two tasks related to verifying implementation of the peace agreement’s ethnic and transitional justice chapters. The US insisted that these tasks be removed, while most other Council members strongly advocated for their retention. (For more information, see our 30 October 2025 What’s in Blue story.) Colombia, which would have liked to see the two tasks retained in the mission’s mandate, emphasised during the Council’s 23 January meeting the government’s commitment to continue working on these issues as part of the full implementation of the peace agreement.
Bilateral tensions between Colombia and the US appear to have reduced following Petro and Trump’s 8 January telephone call and subsequent in-person meeting at the White House on 3 February. It remains to be seen how much this will affect US engagement on the Colombia file at the Council. The US is nonetheless expected to continue stressing the need for Colombia to curb the illicit drug trade originating from its borders, both in its messaging at the Security Council and to the country’s next administration.
The UK is the penholder on Colombia.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 31 October 2025S/RES/2798 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia for another year, until 31 October 2026. It removed two of the mission’s tasks: verifying compliance with the restorative sentences handed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) and monitoring implementation of the 2016 agreement’s ethnic chapter. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 23 January 2026S/PV.10095 | This was the Council’s quarterly meeting on Colombia, held on 23 January 2026. |
