Lebanon
Expected Council Action
In March, Security Council members expect to receive a briefing in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701. Adopted in 2006, resolution 1701 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The Secretary-General’s report, which is due on 10 March, will cover the period from 21 October 2025 to 20 February. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert are the anticipated briefers.
Council members are also likely to watch developments in Lebanon and the region closely following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February and the retaliatory strikes that followed, and evaluate whether additional Council action is required.
Key Recent Developments
Overnight between 1 and 2 March, shortly after the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah fired projectiles at Israel, stating that the action was taken in response to Khamenei’s assassination. The projectiles reportedly landed in open areas or were intercepted. In response, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) undertook a series of airstrikes on what it said were Hezbollah targets in several areas of Lebanon, including Beirut, the Bekaa, and the south. Israeli airstrikes resulted in the killing at least 31 people and the wounding of 149. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that the launch of projectiles toward Israel was an “irresponsible” act endangering Lebanon’s safety and security, while Justice Minister Adel Nassar ordered the arrest of those responsible for these launches. Hennis-Plasschaert has called for restraint, adding that “[n]o argument justifies gambling the country’s stability and future”.
These developments create uncertainty regarding the future of the 26 November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. Broadly based on the framework established by resolution 1701, the arrangement, which was brokered by the US and France, stated that the IDF would withdraw south of the Blue Line and, in parallel, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy to positions south of the Litani River. (The Blue Line is a withdrawal line set by the UN in 2000 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. While not an international border, the Blue Line in practice acts as a boundary between Lebanon and Israel in the absence of an agreed-upon border between the two states.)
The cessation-of-hostilities arrangement established that Israel would not carry out any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets in the territory of Lebanon, and that the Lebanese government would prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups from conducting operations against Israel. In addition, the LAF would dismantle unauthorised infrastructure and confiscate unauthorised arms, among other tasks. According to Israeli media reports, also cited by Lebanese news outlets, the US bilaterally provided additional guarantees to Israel with respect to the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement’s implementation, including recognising “Israel’s right to respond to Hezbollah threats”.
Since the arrangement, Israel has carried out near-daily airstrikes and shelling in Lebanese territory—particularly in southern Lebanon—saying that it was targeting members of Hezbollah and its facilities to prevent the group from rebuilding its capabilities. These included the 20 February airstrikes in the Bekaa valley that reportedly killed at least 10 people and wounded 24, including three children. Hezbollah had not been retaliating, and prior to 1 March, the most recent report of rocket launches from Lebanon towards Israel occurred in March 2025.
In mid-February 2025, Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon, but has since occupied five positions and two “buffer zones” in Lebanese territory near the Blue Line, with the IDF reportedly saying that it will remain there “until Israel is certain that Hezbollah will not return to the area south of the Litani River”.
Prior to the current escalation, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observed frequent IDF military activities in the mission’s area of operation and reported several incidents in which the IDF opened fire or dropped grenades in proximity to peacekeepers during the months of January and February. On 2 February, the IDF dropped glyphosate, a herbicide, over areas near the Blue Line. UNIFIL also continued to detect unexploded ordnance and unauthorised weapons in its area of operations in southern Lebanon, a region where Hezbollah has historically maintained significant influence.
Before the latest onset of hostilities, the LAF had announced on 8 January that it had achieved the objectives of the first phase of the plan to extend state authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory, an indirect reference to the disarmament of non-state groups in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. The announcement said that the first phase “focused on expanding the Army’s operational presence, securing vital areas, and extending operational control over the territories that have come under its authority in the South Litani Sector [the area south of the Litani River], with the exception of lands and sites that remain under Israeli occupation”. It added that continued Israeli attacks and the occupation of several sites in Lebanese territory “negatively affect the completion of the required tasks” and hinder the extension of state authority.
On 16 February, the LAF presented its plan to move to the second phase of its disarmament plan to the Lebanese government, which is expected to focus on the region between the Litani and the Awali River, estimating that it would take between four and eight months to complete. Hezbollah officials stated several times that the group had no intention to disarm in areas north of the Litani River, arguing that Israeli strikes and occupied positions must be addressed first.
Following an emergency meeting on 2 March, the Lebanese government reportedly asked the LAF and Lebanese security services to “immediately take all necessary measures to prevent any military operation or any rocket or drone fire from Lebanese territory”. It also called on the LAF to “immediately and firmly begin implementing” its disarmament plan north of the Litani River, “using all necessary means”. On the same day, IDF officials reportedly said that the Israeli military will continue the war until the threat posed by Hezbollah is “eliminated”.
UNIFIL has entered the final year of its mandate. On 28 August 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2790 extending UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December and directing the mission to begin an orderly drawdown and full withdrawal from that date, “and within one year”. (For more information, see our 28 August 2025 What’s in Blue story on UNIFIL.)
A UNIFIL spokesperson has recently announced that the mission is planning to withdraw most of its uniformed personnel by mid-2027. Separately from the planned drawdown, the mission has had to reduce the number of peacekeepers in its area of operations by approximately 2,000 in recent months as a result of the UN liquidity crisis and measures implemented across UN missions to cut costs.
Resolution 2790 requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June , “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL, including regarding “assistance in respect of security and monitoring of the Blue Line and the ways to enhance the support” to the redeployment of the LAF south of the Litani River through the UN’s “tools”. Lebanese officials have called for a continued international presence in southern Lebanon.
Resolution 2790 also urged the international community to intensify its support, “including equipment, material and finance” to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment and enhance their capacities to implement resolution 1701. An international conference in support of the LAF in the implementation of its plan to establish the monopoly of arms across the country was expected to take place in Paris on 5 March, but it was postponed on 1 March due to the escalating tensions. A preparatory meeting was held in Cairo on 24 February.
From 2 to 7 December 2025, the Security Council travelled to Syria and Lebanon on an official visiting mission. In Beirut, the Council delegation held meetings with Lebanese authorities, including President Joseph Aoun, Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, and Salam. The Council also met with the Commander of the LAF, General Rodolphe Haykal, and the Chair of the Cessation of Hostilities Mechanism, US Lieutenant General Joseph Clearfield. In addition, the Council travelled to Naqoura, where it received a briefing by UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander Major General Diodato Abagnara and visited a nearby UNIFIL position.
The deteriorating security situation has heightened uncertainty regarding the timely holding of elections. Parliamentary elections were anticipated in May. However, in addition to the recent military escalation, disputes over the electoral law, particularly regarding diaspora representation, as well as broader speculations about a possible postponement of the elections, had already raised concerns about possible delays.
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 19 January, the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group examined Lebanon’s human rights record, marking its fourth review under the UPR mechanism. At the outset, Lebanese Minister of Social Affairs Haneen Sayed highlighted recent human rights developments in the country on issues such as the death penalty, violence against women, and the rights of people with disabilities. Recommendations received by Lebanon during the review focused on freedom of expression, safety of journalists, gender equality and women’s rights, human trafficking, independence of the judiciary, migrant workers’ rights, and LGBTQ rights, among other issues.
Key Issues and Options
A pressing concern is that any further deterioration of the security environment could draw Lebanon into a dual crisis, facing both internal strife and a wider regional confrontation. Returning to a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon and averting a full-scale regional conflagration are pivotal issues for the Security Council.
Council members may consider issuing a presidential statement urging all relevant parties to immediately cease fire, and recommit to, and fully implement, the 26 November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, as well as Security Council resolution 1701. The presidential statement could also call for the protection of civilians and respect for international law. It is unlikely, however, that the US will in the short term support any direct calls for a cessation of hostilities.
Members could request emergency closed consultations to receive an update on the situation in Lebanon and across the Blue Line. Alternatively, for a more holistic understanding, members could ask for a closed briefing on the impact on the wider Middle East region of the war that has broken out between US-Israel and Iran.
Council Dynamics
There is broad consensus among Council members in support of Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security.
While Council members have regularly expressed their support for UNIFIL’s work in Lebanon, during the negotiations of resolution 2790, the US demanded a clear date for the mission’s termination and signalled its readiness to veto the mandate renewal if it did not contain such a date. On the other hand, none of the other 14 members had approached the negotiations seeking the termination of UNIFIL. The result was a compromise that tempered US insistence on a set date for the mission’s exit, with a final, longer-than-usual mandate renewal (16 months) reflecting the other members’ concern that an accelerated drawdown could have undermined the process of Lebanon achieving full control over its territory.
Differences persist in Security Council members’ views of Hezbollah. Some members distinguish between Hezbollah’s political and military wings and have designated only its military wing as a terrorist organisation; other members, including the UK and the US, have listed Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation. On the other hand, Russia sees Hezbollah as a legitimate sociopolitical force in Lebanon.
France is the penholder on Lebanon. At the same time, since the cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, the US has assumed a more active role in Lebanon, exerting pressure on Lebanese authorities for the timely implementation of commitments to disarm non-state actors, particularly Hezbollah.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 28 August 2025S/RES/2790 | This resolution extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a final time until 31 December 2026 and established several functions that UNIFIL is authorised to fulfil during the drawdown and withdrawal period. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to explore, by 1 June 2026, “options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701” following the withdrawal of UNIFIL. |
| 11 August 2006S/RES/1701 | This resolution called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. It also expanded UNIFIL’s mandate. |
| 2 September 2004S/RES/1559 | This resolution urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory and free and fair presidential elections. |